Bail pending appeal

The applicant, convicted of multiple sexual offences against a child including making sexually explicit material available to a child, sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, and sentenced to five and a half years' imprisonment, sought bail pending his conviction and sentence appeals.

The applicant argued the appeal was not frivolous on two grounds: insufficiency of the trial judge's sparse six-page reasons and material misapprehension of evidence.

The Crown conceded no public safety or flight risk concerns but argued the appeal was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The motion judge found the insufficiency of reasons argument was not frivolous and that the sparse reasons generated lower confidence in the justice of the conviction, diminishing the public interest in continued detention.

Bail was granted on terms agreed between the parties.

The applicant, convicted of sexual interference against a child aged 12 to 14 and sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment, sought bail pending appeal.

The applicant advanced three grounds of appeal: an allegedly improper corrective jury instruction regarding the defence theory, inconsistent verdicts on two counts, and error in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay based on delay.

The motion judge found all three grounds to be weak or without merit.

Applying the Oland framework, the court held that the seriousness of the offence and the weakness of the grounds of appeal elevated the enforceability concern over the reviewability concern.

Bail was denied.

The applicant sought bail pending conviction and sentence appeal.

Although the court accepted that the appeal was not frivolous and that surrender could be expected, it held detention remained necessary in the public interest.

Repeated breaches of release conditions, further offending while on bail, and the enforceability and public safety components of the test required continued detention.

The applicant, convicted by a jury of historical sexual offences against his daughter and sentenced to eight years, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would attend court but argued detention was necessary in the public interest given the seriousness of the offences, the lengthy sentence, and outstanding breach charges.

The motion judge found a serious issue to be tried regarding the trial judge's exercise of exclusionary discretion over relevant defence evidence, that the breach allegations had a problematic foundation reducing their weight, and that the applicant's age, health problems, and long history of compliance with release conditions favoured release.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The applicant was convicted at trial of one count of luring a person under 16 years by telecommunications, three counts of sexual assault, and three counts of sexual interference involving multiple child complainants.

He received a global sentence of 3 years' imprisonment.

He applied for bail pending appeal on three grounds: misapplication of the burden and standard of proof under R. v. W.(D.), insufficient reasons for conviction, and an unreasonable verdict on the child luring charge.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous but dismissed the bail application on public interest grounds, finding that the seriousness of the offences and the weakness of the grounds of appeal outweighed the reviewability interest despite minimal public safety concerns.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of weapons trafficking under section 100 of the Criminal Code for possessing 43 handguns, parts, and high-capacity magazines.

He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The appellant applied for bail pending appeal, raising three grounds: insufficient reasons, a Villaroman error regarding the inference of guilt, and failure to apply the proper test for knowledge and control of items in a motor vehicle.

The motion judge found that while the appeal grounds met the low threshold of not being frivolous, the proposed appeal was extremely weak and the public interest in the immediate enforcement of the conviction for this serious firearms trafficking offence outweighed the appellant's interest in reviewing the conviction.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, sought bail pending appeal.

The application was based on grounds including judicial bias, misapprehension of evidence, and an unfit sentence.

The court applied the three-part test from s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, finding that the appeal grounds were not frivolous, there was no flight risk, and detention was not necessary in the public interest, particularly given the significant portion of the sentence that would be served before the appeal could be heard.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the "Me Too" movement altered the balance in favour of enforceability.

The applicant was convicted of two counts of careless storage of a firearm/ammunition, two counts of possession of a firearm/ammunition unauthorized, possession of a firearm knowing, possession as the occupant of a vehicle, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and possession of a Schedule 1 substance for the purpose of trafficking.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment less time served.

The applicant appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the defence's alternate suspect theory regarding a third party present in the vehicle at the time of arrest.

The motion judge granted bail pending appeal, finding that the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and that the applicant's history of bail compliance supported release.

An applicant convicted of first-degree murder sought bail pending appeal.

The applicant had been convicted along with a co-accused following a jury trial.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on email correspondence and financial motive.

The applicant had been discharged at the preliminary inquiry but was subsequently tried following a direct indictment.

The applicant proposed a stringent release plan including a $500,000 recognizance with three sureties, house arrest, and GPS electronic monitoring.

The court granted bail pending appeal, finding that while the offence was serious, the applicant had demonstrated flawless bail compliance over three and a half years, there were no flight risks given the enhanced supervision plan, and the grounds of appeal regarding the reasonableness of the verdict clearly surpassed the "not frivolous" threshold.

Application for bail pending appeal from convictions for bribery, attempt to obstruct justice, criminal breach of trust, and trafficking cocaine, with a sentence of 13 years' imprisonment less 6 months' credit.

The applicant sought to establish that his appeal was not frivolous, that he would surrender himself into custody, and that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court found that while the applicant's grounds of appeal were not frivolous and he would likely surrender himself, his detention was necessary in the public interest given the gravity of the offences, the aggravated circumstances of their commission, and the weakness of the grounds of appeal.

The application was dismissed and the appeal was expedited.

The appellant sought judicial interim release pending the hearing of her sentence appeal challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for weapons trafficking under section 99(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding that while the appeal had arguable merit, it did not have sufficient merit to warrant release under section 679(4)(a), and that the appellant had not established that her detention was not necessary in the public interest under section 679(4)(c).

The appellant sought bail pending appeal and a stay of a six-year driving prohibition following conviction and sentencing to six months imprisonment plus two years probation.

The Crown opposed on the ground that the appeal was frivolous.

The motion judge found that while most grounds were frivolous, one alleged error of law regarding the trial judge's use of the appellant's failure to comment on a van in front of him to the 911 operator could not be characterized as frivolous at that stage.

The Crown did not rely on other grounds to oppose bail or the stay.

Bail and the stay were granted.

An applicant convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking sought bail pending his sentence appeal under s. 679(4) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant had been sentenced to two years in custody, less five months' pre-sentence credit.

The Crown opposed bail, arguing the appeal lacked sufficient merit.

The applicant's primary ground of appeal concerned collateral immigration consequences, as a sentence of six months or greater would render him inadmissible to Canada and subject to deportation without a right of appeal.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the bail application, finding the appeal lacked sufficient merit and that continued detention would not cause unnecessary hardship.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision denying bail pending appeal of his conviction for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault against his minor daughters.

The applicant argued the bail judge erred in applying the public confidence test from R. v. Oland and that her decision was clearly unwarranted.

The Chief Justice dismissed the application, finding no material errors of fact or law and that the bail judge's assessment of the seriousness of the offences, the merits of the appeal, and the likelihood of parole were all reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant sought judicial interim release pending appeal after being convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and trafficking a controlled substance for the benefit of a criminal organization, arising from investigations into Toronto-area gang activity.

The appellant's grounds of appeal concerned the legality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, including issues regarding mobile device identifier technology, warrantless surveillance in condominium common areas, and the naming of the appellant as a known person.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous and granted bail pending appeal, subject to strict conditions including perfection of the appeal by January 12, 2018.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of his conviction for first degree murder in the killing of a victim on June 20, 1981.

The applicant had been tried four times for the offence: the first conviction was set aside on Charter grounds, the second and third trials resulted in hung juries, and the fourth trial resulted in conviction.

The applicant had been on bail for many years during the proceedings and had complied with all bail conditions.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: (1) the appeal is not frivolous; (2) the applicant will surrender into custody; and (3) detention is not necessary in the public interest.

The court found all three criteria satisfied and granted bail pending appeal, increasing the recognizance to $750,000.

The appellant challenged pre-appeal detention after conviction for second degree murder under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, focusing on whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court clarified that the public-interest analysis balances enforceability and reviewability, with seriousness of offence, public safety, flight risk, and strength of appeal all assessed contextually from the perspective of a reasonable, informed public observer.

It further held that a reviewing panel under s. 680(1) owes deference on factual findings but may intervene for material legal or principled error, or where the decision is clearly unwarranted.

On the facts, negligible safety/flight concerns and clearly arguable grounds made detention clearly unwarranted.

The appeal was allowed, though no further order was made due to mootness.

The applicant was convicted of first-degree murder of his wife following a jury trial.

He sought judicial interim release pending appeal, which was initially denied.

Three years later, he brought a second application for bail, citing new grounds of appeal, fresh evidence regarding a potential third-party suspect, and the passage of time as material changes in circumstances.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was arguable but opposed release on public interest grounds.

The court granted the application, finding that the interests of reviewability outweighed the interests of enforcement, particularly given the serious new ground relating to defence counsel's removal from the record, the substantial fresh evidence regarding an alternative suspect, the applicant's four years of incarceration pending appeal, and the imminent scheduling of the appeal hearing.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code after being convicted of sexual interference involving a minor family member and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment.

The court considered whether the appeal was not frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender into custody, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The applicant raised several grounds of appeal, including an arguable issue regarding whether sexual interference is an included offence under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the third ground raised a viable issue on appeal and that the applicant had previously complied with bail conditions and posed no significant public interest risk.

Judicial interim release pending appeal was therefore granted with conditions.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal following convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault against a minor and a custodial sentence of five months.

The court considered the criteria under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, including whether the appeal was frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender into custody, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Crown conceded the second and third criteria but argued the appeal lacked merit.

After reviewing the four proposed grounds of appeal concerning character evidence, alleged misapprehension of GPS evidence, DNA contamination issues, and reliance on a transcript of a police statement, the court concluded none demonstrated arguable merit.

The applicant failed to establish that the appeal was not frivolous and the bail application was dismissed.