Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-08-27

Docket: M56207 (COA-25-CR-1008)

Motion Judge: Huscroft J.A.

Between

His Majesty the King Respondent

and

Brandon Laffin Moving Party

Counsel

Neha Chugh, for the moving party

Andrew Cappell, for the responding party

Heard: August 21, 2025

Endorsement

The Conviction and Sentence

[1] The appellant brings an application for bail pending appeal. He was convicted of one count of possession for the purpose of weapons trafficking under s. 100 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46. Specifically, the appellant was found to have possessed 43 handguns, parts, and high-capacity magazines. As outlined by the trial judge, this included:

26 Glock 9 mm pistols, one 45 calibre Glock pistol, two 40 calibre Glock pistols, one 10 mm. Glock pistol, seven Mini Draco .762 long-barrelled pistols, as well as six 9 mm. Hellcat handguns. Most of the firearms had high-capacity magazines attached to them.

[2] The appellant was sentenced to a term of seven years' imprisonment.

The Legal Test for Bail Pending Appeal

[3] The burden is on the appellant to establish the following in accordance with s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code:

a) the appeal is not frivolous;

b) the applicant will surrender himself into custody in accordance with the terms of the release order; and

c) the applicant's detention is not necessary in the public interest.

[4] There is no concern that the appellant will not surrender into custody. The application for bail depends on the first and third criteria.

The Appeal is Not Frivolous

[5] The appellant intends to argue that the trial judge made three errors:

1. The trial judge's reasons were insufficient.
2. The trial judge erred in finding that guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the evidence (Villaroman error).
3. The trial judge failed to apply the proper test for knowledge and control of items in a motor vehicle.

[6] The Crown argues that these arguments do not pass the "not frivolous" standard. This is a difficult argument to establish, given this court's decisions establishing that an appellant need only raise arguable issues and need not establish even a likelihood that his argument will succeed. See e.g., R. v. Manasseri, 2013 ONCA 647, 312 C.C.C. (3d) 132, at para. 38. The bar is a very low one: R. v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, at para. 20. I am satisfied that the very low bar is met in this case.

[7] However, as I will explain, the grounds are so weak that they do not establish a reviewability interest that outweighs the public interest in immediate enforcement of the decision.

The Appellant Has Failed to Establish That His Detention Is Not Necessary in the Public Interest

[8] The public interest criterion has two components: public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice: Oland, at paras. 23, 26. The focus here is on the second component. The question is whether the appellant has established that his interest in reviewing the conviction outweighs the public interest in the immediate enforceability of that decision.

[9] The strength of the proposed appeal is a relevant consideration at this stage. I see no merit in any of the appellant's proposed arguments on appeal.

Sufficiency of Reasons

[10] First, the duty to give reasons is satisfied if, read in context, the reasons show why the judge decided as he did – why he has found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. H.S.B., 2008 SCC 52, [2008] S.C.R. 32, at para. 2. The reasons in this case appear to me to do so and appear sufficient to permit this court to review the decision on appeal.

Villaroman Error

[11] Second, the trial judge referred to the relevant authority, R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, and recognized that he could convict only if guilt was the only reasonable inference available from the evidence. He recognized that inferences consistent with innocence or otherwise inconsistent with guilt do not have to arise from proven facts. The appellant does no more than assert Villaroman error. No such error is apparent.

Knowledge and Control of Items in a Motor Vehicle

[12] The appellant puts the most weight on his third argument – that the trial judge failed to apply the proper test for knowledge and control of items in a motor vehicle. The difficulty with this argument is that this is a case of actual possession, not constructive possession, and there is strong if not overwhelming evidence of actual possession.

[13] Most significantly, the appellant was videotaped transferring a heavy suitcase to a car that parked alongside him in an empty row in a parking lot. The trial judge inferred that the suitcase contained the illegal guns and magazines based on an extensive body of evidence. He accepted that motorists are not deemed to know the contents of their vehicles but found that the suitcase was so large and obvious that it would not possibly have escaped his observation either when it was placed in the car or when he was driving. The trial judge found it defied common sense that the appellant did not know what he had been transporting, or that he would move the suitcase from his vehicle without knowing what was in it. The circumstances of the transaction also demonstrated an attempt to avoid detection, with his co-accused, Mr. Lazore, acting as lookout while the transfer occurred. It may be that the appellant will be able to develop an argument to attack this decision, but he has not done so on this application.

The Seriousness of the Offence and Public Interest

[14] On the other side of the scale, this is an extremely serious offence. Gun violence is a major problem in the community and the appellant has been found guilty of possessing a massive number of illegal firearms and magazines. Unleashed in the community, these weapons could have caused untold harm and death.

[15] I appreciate that this court has, in some cases, granted bail pending appeal in cases involving possession of large quantities of illegal firearms: See e.g., R. v. Ansari, 2023 ONCA 601. In other cases, bail has been denied. See e.g., R. v. Abdullahi, 2020 ONCA 350, 150 O.R. (3d) 790. The grant of bail pending appeal is a discretionary judgment and each case is decided on its own merits. Bail is not required in one case simply because it was granted in another case that is ostensibly similar. That is true specifically having regard to R. v. Amirdad, 2025 ONCA 215, in which Sossin J.A. granted bail to one of the people found guilty of possessing the very weapons Mr. Laffin transferred to Mr. Lazore. Sossin J.A. recognized that the enforceability interest was high given the seriousness of the offence but considered that the strength of the proposed appeal, which concerned a challenge to the arresting officer's grounds for arrest, in addition to other factors, outweighed the enforceability interest – a decision he described as a "close call". That was a discretionary call that was his to make. It does not establish a precedent that must be followed in this or any other case. Again, each case is decided on its own merits.

[16] The proposed appeal in this case is very weak and is brought in the context of an extremely serious conviction and imposition of a lengthy sentence of imprisonment. The public is entitled to expect that the courts take guns, and the violence and death that they involve, seriously. The grant of bail in this case would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. The appellant's interest in reviewing his conviction is clearly outweighed by the public interest in the immediate enforcement of the decision.

Sentence Appeal

[17] I appreciate that the appellant also seeks leave to appeal his sentence, but there is no risk that a successful sentence appeal would be rendered moot, as this is not a case in which the sentence will already have been served by the time the appeal is heard.

Disposition

[18] Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

"Grant Huscroft J.A."