Katherine E. Swinton

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the LCBO for damages for conversion.

The appellant's credit card was used without his authorization to purchase over $37,000 in alcohol from the LCBO, which was delivered to a nightclub.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the LCBO did not commit conversion because there was no evidence of an intentional or wrongful act, as the LCBO had no knowledge the charges were unauthorized.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party, a veterinarian, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Veterinarians of Ontario, which found him guilty of professional misconduct based on an Agreed Statement of Facts.

He argued that he did not enter into the settlement agreement voluntarily due to stress and duress from his former counsel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party did not form an intention to appeal within the relevant period, his explanation for the delay was unreasonable, and the appeal lacked merit as there was no medical evidence to support his claim of duress.

The applicants and respondent Kumer were shareholders in 1751060 Ontario Inc. (175), which held a 25% interest in an apartment building.

The applicants transferred their shares to Kumer to facilitate his purchase of the remaining 75% interest from other owners, based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that guaranteed their continued shareholder draws and Kumer's best efforts to purchase their shares at fair value.

After Kumer acquired the 75% interest, he ceased paying dividends to the applicants and later asserted they were not shareholders.

The applicants brought an oppression application.

The court found Kumer's actions constituted oppressive conduct by unfairly disregarding the applicants' interests.

The court ordered Kumer to purchase the applicants' shares at fair value, declining to apply a minority discount, and ordered 175 to pay outstanding dividends.

The applicant wife sought to serve the respondent husband in China with a family law application.

She obtained an ex parte order validating service without complying with the Hague Service Convention, arguing the Family Law Rules provided a complete code for service.

The husband appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Family Law Rules do not adequately cover international service and do not clearly rebut the presumption of conformity with international law.

Therefore, Rule 17.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies, making compliance with the Hague Service Convention mandatory for family law proceedings.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the assessment of a commercial office building.

The Board had reduced the property's current value to achieve equity with similar lands in the vicinity pursuant to s. 44(3)(b) of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court determined that the appropriate standard of review for the Board's interpretation of its home statute is reasonableness, departing from older jurisprudence that applied correctness.

The Court found the Board's methodology and interpretation were reasonable given the evidence presented, and dismissed the appeal.

The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of an arbitration award between CUPE Local 27 and the Greater Essex County District School Board, arguing the arbitrator erred in interpreting s. 177 of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for the reasons given in a related Stated Case (2016 ONSC 2361), finding the result was the same regardless of whether the standard of review was correctness or reasonableness.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to CUPE Local 27.

The Minister of Education brought a Stated Case asking the Divisional Court to determine whether the Education Act permits school boards to pay for life insurance and health benefits for retired employees over 65 years of age.

The Minister argued that the Act only permits payments to current employees and that specific statutory authority is required for such expenditures.

The Court held that while ss. 177(3) and 177(4) do not authorize these payments, other sections of the Act, including ss. 58.5(1), 170(1)18, 171(1)3, and 177(1), when read together and in context, provide the necessary authority.

The Court found that school boards have the power to negotiate and pay for post-retirement benefits as part of employee compensation packages.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding that a $1 million life insurance policy was part of the deceased's estate and available for dependant support claims under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).

The deceased had been ordered on consent to maintain his former spouse as the irrevocable beneficiary of the policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the deceased still 'owned' the policy under s. 72(1)(f) of the SLRA despite the irrevocable designation.

The Court further held that the former spouse did not have 'creditor rights' under s. 72(7) because the designation did not create a security interest, and she was not entitled to damages for breach of contract.

Following a judicial review application where the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias by the Child and Family Services Review Board, the parties sought costs against the tribunal for both the tribunal hearing and the judicial review.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to award costs for the proceeding before the administrative tribunal.

Furthermore, the court declined to award costs of the judicial review application against the tribunal, finding its participation was not adversarial and its conduct did not rise to the exceptional level required to justify such an award.

The self-represented parties' alternative claim for costs against the children's aid society was also dismissed as they were unsuccessful in the application.

The defendant municipalities sought leave to appeal a Case Management Judge's order requiring them to cease and desist an opt-out campaign directed at class members, which the judge found created undue influence.

The plaintiff class representatives sought leave to cross-appeal, arguing the judge should have ordered the removal of existing communications.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Case Management Judge's findings or the discretionary remedy granted.

The appellant mother appealed orders determining that Ontario had jurisdiction to deal with custody and access of the parties' child under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The family had moved to Hawaii in 2010, but the child returned to Ontario for the summer.

The Divisional Court found the motion judge erred in concluding the child was habitually resident in Ontario and that the child would suffer serious harm if returned to Hawaii.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders were set aside, as Ontario lacked jurisdiction.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision upholding his ineligibility for an enhanced allowance under Peel's Investment and Affordable Housing program.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the eligibility requirement of living in a self-contained unit was ambiguous.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness as the applicant was given reasons and opportunities to respond.

The court also held that the determination that the applicant's rooming house accommodation was not a self-contained unit was reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision certifying the respondent union and refusing reconsideration.

The applicant argued it was denied procedural fairness because the Board failed to contact it by telephone, and that the Board's finding regarding delivery of the certification application was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the procedural fairness argument was not raised before the Board and the Board's decision on delivery was reasonable based on the evidence.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent union.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating his tenancy because his dog caused or contributed to the landlord's severe allergic reaction.

The tenant argued the Board breached procedural fairness, exhibited bias, misapprehended evidence, and made an unreasonable decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's procedures were fair, there was no reasonable apprehension of bias, and the evidence supported the finding that the dog exacerbated the landlord's asthma.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order making her three children Crown wards, with no access for the purpose of adoption.

She argued the Children's Aid Society failed to provide a proper written Plan of Care, the trial judge failed to consider returning the children under supervision, and the trial judge erred in denying access.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law.

The trial judge properly considered the Plans of Care, correctly concluded that a supervision order would not work, and reasonably found that access would not be beneficial and would impair adoption opportunities.

The moving parties sought to introduce new evidence on a motion to vary a decision refusing to stay an order of the Ontario Securities Commission.

The new evidence related to steps taken by IIROC regarding the moving parties' conditional registration in Quebec.

The Divisional Court struck the new evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test for fresh evidence as it was not relevant to the decisive issue of whether the motions judge erred in refusing the stay, and it did not meet the reliability criterion.

The moving parties sought an extension of time under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to bring a motion to set aside or vary a decision dismissing their request to stay sanctions imposed by the Ontario Securities Commission for insider trading.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties failed to form the requisite intention to appeal within the four-day window, provided no satisfactory explanation for the delay, and that an extension would prejudice the public interest in protecting capital markets.

The court also found no apparent merit to the underlying motion.

The appellant physician appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario revoking his medical license.

The Committee found he engaged in unwanted touching of hospital employees and coercive sexual activity with a 17-year-old camp counsellor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence and upheld the penalty, finding the revocation was a reasonable outcome given the serious nature of the misconduct, the need to protect the public, and the lack of evidence regarding the risk of future misconduct.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision regarding a complaint that his union breached its duty of fair representation concerning overtime grievances.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Board did not record the proceedings and proceeded by way of consultation rather than a full hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the Board's substantive decisions and remedial orders were reasonable.

The appellant appealed an order confirming a Master's reference report in a construction lien action.

The Master found an oral contract for home renovations, which the appellant anticipatorily breached, and awarded damages and costs to the respondent.

The appellant argued procedural fairness was denied when the Master refused to admit an amended Scott Schedule filed out of time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law, and held that the Master's refusal to admit the schedule did not affect the outcome as she relied on the appellant's expert witness instead.