Jeff G. Saikaley

Following the dismissal of the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff sought costs.

Under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, a responding party is generally not entitled to costs unless appropriate in the circumstances.

The court found it appropriate to award costs to the plaintiff due to the defendant's over-litigation of the motion, the potential finding of malice, and the prejudice to the plaintiff in a Simplified Procedure action.

The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs fixed at $27,263 on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff in a Rule 76 wrongful dismissal action brought a motion on the eve of trial seeking production of documents and answers to questions refused on discovery.

The plaintiff sought payroll records of allegedly related corporations to prove the defendant met the $2.5 million payroll threshold for statutory severance under the Employment Standards Act.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, holding that leave is required to bring such a motion after an action is set down for trial.

The court further held that even if leave were not required, the requested production was disproportionate, unnecessary, and pertained to documents not in the defendant's control, making it unjust to adjourn the fixed trial date.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff, a prominent fencing coach, sued the defendant over an online article and blog posts alleging sexual impropriety and athlete mistreatment.

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff established that his claim had substantial merit and that there were grounds to believe the defendant had no valid defence.

The court also concluded that the public interest in allowing the plaintiff to vindicate his reputation outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The motion was dismissed.

This is a costs decision following the court's grant of leave to commence a derivative action under s. 246 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The applicant sought to bring proceedings on behalf of two corporations against their directors for breach of fiduciary duties and duties of care relating to excessive compensation.

The applicant sought costs against the respondent directors on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents argued for no costs or significantly reduced costs, citing divided success and adverse findings regarding the applicant's own conduct.

The court reserved costs to the trial judge, finding that the trial judge would be best positioned to assess costs of the entirety of the proceedings and the parties' conduct.

The applicant sought leave to commence a derivative action on behalf of two closely held companies (Cen-Ta Real Estate Ltd. and Plum Financial Group Inc.) against the companies' directors for breach of fiduciary duties and duties of care.

The applicant alleged that the directors awarded themselves and their personal companies unreasonable and unfair compensation despite the companies' declining revenues and financial losses.

The respondent directors opposed the application, arguing the applicant failed to satisfy the mandatory statutory preconditions under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, specifically that the applicant was not acting in good faith and the proposed action was not in the interests of the corporations.

The court granted leave for the derivative action, finding that the applicant satisfied all requirements under the Act, was acting in good faith, and the action was in the interests of the corporations.

The court ordered that the applicant and corporations share legal costs equally.

The plaintiff brought an action for defamation arising from a Facebook post made by his ex-wife, the defendant, approximately two years after the end of their roughly ten-year marriage.

The defendant counterclaimed for defamation and sexual battery.

The parties had lived in Los Angeles and were involved in the online gaming and pornography industries.

Their marriage was polyamorous in nature.

The defendant's Facebook post alleged that the plaintiff had sexually, physically, and emotionally abused her and other women during their marriage.

The court found that while many of the defendant's statements were truthful or constituted fair comment, certain statements regarding sexual assault, physical violence, and lack of consent were defamatory and not supported by the evidence.

The court dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for sexual battery, finding insufficient evidence of non-consensual sexual activity.

The plaintiff was awarded general damages for defamation.

La décision porte sur une demande d’annulation d’une sentence arbitrale concernant l’interprétation et l’exécution d’un contrat verbal relatif à la répartition de lots dans le cadre du Projet Oasis.

La Cour conclut que l’arbitre a commis des erreurs de droit en annulant une ordonnance de la Cour supérieure et en liant une société non partie à l’arbitrage, mais que ces erreurs n’affectent pas le résultat.

La Cour confirme que la détention d’une licence Tarion/HCRA est une condition implicite du contrat et que le droit d’acheter les lots appartient à Maisons Lacroix, non à la requérante.

This costs endorsement addresses the entitlement and quantum of costs following the successful anti-SLAPP motion by the Canadian Anti-Hate Network and Bernie Farber.

The court awards full indemnity costs of $49,319.13 to the moving parties, finding no basis to depart from the statutory presumption under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision reviews the relevant factors for costs, including proportionality, complexity, and settlement offers, and finds the amount sought to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP).

The parties had a brief relationship, after which the defendant made public allegations in the gaming community and on social media that the plaintiff had sexually assaulted her and was a sexual predator.

The court found that while the expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff's defamation claim had substantial merit and there were grounds to defeat the defence of justification.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expressions.

The motion was dismissed, with no costs awarded.

This case concerns an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the Canadian Anti-Hate Network (CAHN) and Bernie Farber against multiple plaintiffs who initiated a $44 million action following the Ottawa protests and the invocation of the Emergencies Act.

The plaintiffs alleged defamation and civil conspiracy, claiming CAHN provided false information to government and police, influencing the emergency measures and freezing of assets.

The court dismissed the action against CAHN, finding the plaintiffs failed to particularize their claims, lacked substantial merit, and could not overcome valid defences such as non-compliance with notice periods under the Libel and Slander Act and the Limitations Act.

The court also determined that the public interest in protecting CAHN's expression on a matter of public interest outweighed the harm alleged by the plaintiffs, and declined to award damages to CAHN.

The appellant, Dr. Kulvinder Kaur Gill, appealed the dismissal of her defamation, conspiracy, and negligence claims against four defendants (Dr. Angus Maciver, André Picard, Carly Weeks, and Alheli Picazo) under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act), and the associated costs order totaling over $1.1 million.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the claims were strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

The court affirmed that the "fair comment" defence was prima facie available to Picard, Weeks, and Picazo, and that the appellant failed to demonstrate "serious harm" causally linked to the defendants' expressions, which would outweigh the public interest in protecting free expression.

The court also upheld the substantial indemnity costs award, distinguishing the case from general guidance due to its complexity and the number of defendants.

The Pointer Group Incorporated brought a motion for security for costs of the appeal and the underlying action and anti-SLAPP motion, pursuant to Rule 61.06(1)(a) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving party argued the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant, Dr. Kulvinder Kaur Gill, had insufficient assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to demonstrate that the appeal was both frivolous and vexatious, or that Dr. Gill had insufficient assets.

The court also found no "other good reason" to order security for costs, as the appeal presented arguable errors of law and there was no indication of vexatious conduct or difficulty in collecting costs from Dr. Gill.

Dr. Gill was awarded partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion.

The plaintiff estate sought leave to amend its statement of claim mid-trial in a long-running family business dispute involving an oppression remedy claim.

The court granted leave for some amendments, finding they merely provided further particulars of the originally pleaded misappropriation of funds (e.g., the Stapledon loan allegations and the Stoke Lacey sale).

However, the court refused leave for other amendments (e.g., failure to pay property taxes and failure to complete audited financial statements), finding they constituted new, statute-barred causes of action that would cause actual and presumed non-compensable prejudice to the incapacitated defendant due to inordinate delay.

The court also refused amendments that amounted to a collateral attack on findings made in the first part of the bifurcated trial.

The City of Brockville appealed an application judge's order that set aside three arbitral awards and appointed a new arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by characterizing questions of mixed fact and law as extricable questions of law and by misapplying procedural fairness principles under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Court emphasized the narrow basis for setting aside arbitral awards and the caution required in extricating questions of law from contractual interpretation.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating the arbitrator's original awards.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal concerning a dispute among investors in a residential subdivision.

The appeal, brought by 1750714 Ontario Inc. et al., was dismissed.

The court determined the quantum of costs payable by the appellants to the respondent, 1750738 Ontario Inc., on a partial indemnity basis, considering factors such as complexity, importance of issues, and party conduct.

The court awarded a global amount of $32,000 to the respondent.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The action arose from a Facebook post in which the defendant alleged the plaintiff had sexually, physically, and emotionally abused her during their marriage.

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff demonstrated that his claim had substantial merit and that the defendant's defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege could realistically fail.

The court concluded that the severe harm to the plaintiff's career and reputation outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion was dismissed, allowing the defamation action to proceed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs, finding that the plaintiff was not a powerful entity using litigation to intimidate a vulnerable opponent and that the claim had substantial merit.

Applying a modest discount for the defendants' delay in bringing the motion, the court awarded the defendants $75,000 in costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants, a national broadcaster and its employees, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff, a student travel company, alleged that the defendants' reporting on the death of a student during a trip was defamatory.

The court found that the expression related to a matter of public interest and that the plaintiff failed to show there was no valid defence, specifically the defence of fair comment.

The court also found the balance of harms favoured protecting the expression, and dismissed the action.

This is an appeal concerning a dispute over access to a landlocked property ("the triangle property").

The appellants claimed a right to use a private road ("the red track") across the respondents' property based on two grounds: a prescriptive easement acquired by lost modern grant before 1999, or as an access road under the Road Access Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, dismissing both claims.

The court found no prescriptive easement was established due to insufficient continuous use and lack of agency, and that the red track was not a contemporary "access road" under the Act due to disuse and overgrowth.