Ian V.B. Nordheimer

The appellant, Mr. Thomas, appealed the dismissal of his Hague Convention application for the return of his son, Isaiah, from Toronto to his habitual residence in Balch Springs, Texas.

The application judge had found that the appellant unequivocally acquiesced to the child's relocation.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by reversing the burden of proof, misapplying the standard of "clear and cogent evidence" for acquiescence, and failing to properly consider the appellant's subjective intention.

The Court reiterated that the standard for finding acquiescence is high and that the Hague Convention's objective is the prompt return of abducted children.

The appeal was allowed, and the child was ordered to be returned to Texas.

The appellant, Gurdeep Nagra, appealed an order from a motion judge that had dismissed his appeal from a Registrar in Bankruptcy's decision.

The Registrar had reduced Nagra's claim in Verinder Malhotra's bankruptcy by expunging a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, noting the deference owed to the Registrar's ruling and that the appellant's arguments, which were not raised before the Registrar, were unsuccessful.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial order concerning parenting time, decision-making authority, and child support arrears, and sought leave to appeal a costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding it repetitive of trial evidence and not meeting the Palmer test.

The Court upheld the trial judge's decisions on equal parenting time (2-2-3 schedule), parallel decision-making (even though parties sought sole authority), and the finding that the appellant waived entitlement to retroactive child support.

Leave to appeal the costs award was denied, as the trial judge's discretion was found to be properly exercised based on the appellant's litigation conduct.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision on three issues: the inclusion of a "Maher payment" (110 gold coins) in the net family property (NFP) calculation, the failure to order an unequal division of NFP due to short marriage duration and non-disclosure of assets, and the method of payment for the gold coins.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's decision.

It held that the Maher payment was correctly included, consistent with prior jurisprudence, and found no error in the decision not to order an unequal division given the evidence.

The court also upheld the trial judge's practical approach of deducting the Canadian equivalent of the gold coins from the equalization payment.

A procedural fairness argument was also rejected.

The applicant, Xin Peng, sought a review of a motion judge's order that dismissed her motion to extend the time to file a motion for leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order.

The Divisional Court had previously dismissed her motion for leave to appeal from two costs orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's analysis or conclusion.

The court affirmed that the Divisional Court is not required to provide reasons for refusing leave to appeal, as this is standard practice for appellate courts.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found the proposed motion for leave to appeal to be without merit.

The review motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the responding party, May Hing Tam.

The applicant sought a review of a motion judge's decision that dismissed her motion to extend the time to perfect her motion for leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order.

The Divisional Court had dismissed her application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, noting unacceptable delay and lack of merit in the proposed appeal, as the underlying Human Rights Tribunal decision was fact-based and the Divisional Court found no question of law warranting intervention.

The review motion was dismissed.

The appellant challenged an application judge's decision concerning a right of way dispute between properties.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding errors of fact or legal errors in the application judge's analysis, noting that the lower court was entitled to resolve evidentiary conflicts.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed orders striking out two applications, arguing they failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, were improperly commenced, and that the motion judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions on all grounds.

The appellant, Ian Bush, appealed his conviction for three counts of first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's error in admitting evidence seized from the appellant's home without proper individual analysis of probative value versus prejudicial effect, and an erroneous jury instruction on first-degree murder regarding transferred intent.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors occurred.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the overwhelming evidence, particularly the fact that the murders occurred while the victims were forcibly confined (which automatically elevates murder to first-degree), meant no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal, reversing a Divisional Court decision that had quashed an umpire's assessment of actual cash value (ACV) for a fire-damaged business premises under section 128 of the Insurance Act.

The Court found that the Divisional Court erred by giving undue weight to market value and by failing to defer to the umpire's reasonable assessment.

It clarified that "actual value" means the value to the insured, which can exceed market value, and that repair estimates are relevant to ACV.

The umpire's pragmatic approach in choosing between parties' proposed ACV amounts was upheld as non-arbitrary, reinforcing the deferential standard of review for such appraisals.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder, arguing the trial judge failed to properly scrutinize eyewitness identification evidence alongside alternative suspect evidence, and erred in his treatment of the victim's prior descriptions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly analyzed the identification and alternative suspect evidence holistically.

Although the trial judge erred in law by treating the victim's prior descriptions of the gunman's tattoos as admissible hearsay to prove their truth, the Court applied the curative proviso, finding the error harmless given the multiple, interlocking, and mutually reinforcing non-erroneous reasoning pathways that supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision striking down the Toronto Transit Commission Labour Disputes Resolution Act, 2011, which eliminated TTC employees' right to strike and replaced it with binding interest arbitration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the complete ban on strikes violates the employees' right to meaningful collective bargaining under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court further found that the Crown failed to justify the infringement under s. 1, as it did not demonstrate that the complete ban was minimally impairing or that its salutary effects outweighed the deleterious effects on the workers' Charter rights.

The appellant, Qiao Zeng, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's jury instructions were confusing and inadequate, particularly regarding the two distinct routes to liability (aiding a planned murder and common intention in a kidnapping resulting in death) and the evidence relevant to each.

The blending of these routes and the lack of clear delineation between them for the appellant and co-accused likely confused the jury and may have led to a compromise verdict.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder.

The appellant, Neighbour’s Drug Mart Ltd., appealed the Divisional Court's dismissal of its judicial review application.

The original decision by the Executive Officer of the Ontario Public Drug Programs terminated Neighbour’s Health Network System Agreement, revoked its billing privileges under the Ontario Drug Benefit Act, and suspended its entitlement to payment due to false or unsubstantiated claims.

Neighbour’s argued the Divisional Court erred by misapprehending the record, imposing an unsupported sanction, and creating absolute liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the Divisional Court's application of the reasonableness standard or its conclusions regarding the owner's responsibility and the regulatory scheme's honour system.

The court also rejected the argument that the Executive Officer's consent to a change of control precluded subsequent termination, emphasizing the new owner's assumption of all liabilities.

The appellant, Lance Burkhard, appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a co-accused's statement to police, specifically regarding the handling of prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instruction to the jury on prior consistent statements was incorrect and exacerbated the risk of the jury using them for a prohibited purpose, namely to bolster the co-accused's credibility on the central issue of who stabbed the victim.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Vertical Horizons Contracting Inc. appealed a trial judgment that ordered it to pay the City of Markham $22,291.25 after a set-off, stemming from a breached contract for sanitary sewer system replacement.

The appellant argued that issues with water and soil caused additional expenses and challenged the trial judge's finding of contractual breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or interpretation of the contract, which held the appellant responsible for the work methodology and the impacts of site conditions beyond the initial 30 metres of pipe installation.

The appellant sought to overturn a trial judgment that dismissed her application for a declaration of trust over a residential property and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings, particularly given the trial judge's finding that the appellant's evidence was "inherently improbable" and exaggerated.

No error of law was demonstrated.

The appellants sought to set aside a default judgment issued against them after an uncontested trial, and requested related relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no inappropriate conduct by the plaintiff or error by the trial judge in conducting an uncontested trial.

The court emphasized that an appeal is not the proper route to seek to set aside a default judgment; rather, a motion under Rule 19.08(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure should be brought first.

The appellant, Mr. Flight, appealed two orders from a motion judge concerning three issues: whether the transfer of a "Trustee Action" to him required the Trustee's consent, the Trustee's production of documents, and the motion judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusions regarding document production or the costs award.

The court also noted that the issue of Trustee consent for the action transfer had been previously addressed in a prior decision and was currently under reserve by another motion judge, thus requiring no further comment from the Court of Appeal.

NWG Investments Inc. appealed the motion judge's dismissal of its 2014 action for delay, which stemmed from events in 2007-2008.

The motion judge found the delay inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial.

NWG challenged only the finding of prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's assessment of prejudice, which included factors like document availability, witness relevance, and memory.

The court reiterated the plaintiff's obligation to move an action expeditiously and rejected the argument that the decision rewarded defendants for "lying in the weeds."