Frank Iacobucci

The appellant, a cult leader, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against teenage girls.

At trial, the judge admitted evidence of each count as similar fact evidence for the others, and restricted the defence from cross-examining one complainant on the absence of references to sexual abuse in her teenage diary.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the admission of the similar fact evidence, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the Court held that the trial judge erred in restricting the cross-examination on the diary, as the complainant's privacy interest did not substantially outweigh the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered for the counts relating to that specific complainant, while the other convictions were upheld.

The respondents, staff lawyers with the federal Department of Justice, sued the federal Crown for breach of contract regarding salary disparities.

During discovery, the government claimed Cabinet confidentiality over certain documents under s. 39 of the Canada Evidence Act, including some previously listed as producible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 39 provides absolute protection once information is validly certified by the Clerk of the Privy Council, and the common law concept of waiver does not apply.

The Court also upheld the constitutionality of s. 39, finding it does not impermissibly infringe on the core jurisdiction of superior courts or unwritten constitutional principles.

The accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown introduced similar fact evidence from the accused's former wife regarding alleged past assaults to show a propensity for non-consensual, painful sex.

The accused argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and that the former wife and the complainant had colluded.

The trial judge admitted the evidence and left the issue of collusion to the jury, resulting in a conviction.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the similar fact evidence was wrongly admitted because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and the trial judge erred in law by failing to resolve the issue of collusion as a condition precedent to admissibility.

The appellant was tried by a jury for attempted murder.

The jury intended to return a guilty verdict, but due to the foreman's stuttering or coughing, the trial judge and others heard 'not guilty'.

The verdict was recorded as not guilty, and the jury and accused were discharged.

Shortly after, a court officer discovered the error.

The trial judge reconvened the jury over the next few days and eventually changed the recorded verdict to guilty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a trial judge has a narrow post-discharge jurisdiction to correct a verdict if it does not require the jury to reconsider its decision, this jurisdiction is lost if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Given the jury's extensive dispersal and potential exposure to media, a reasonable apprehension of bias existed.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants claimed that lands set aside for the Ross River Band in the Yukon Territory constituted a reserve under the Indian Act, entitling them to a tax exemption.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that no reserve was legally created because there was no intention to create a reserve on the part of Crown agents with the authority to bind the Crown.

The Court found that while lands were set aside for the band's use, the statutory framework and royal prerogative require both an act of setting apart and a clear intention to create a reserve, which was absent in this case.

The respondent filed complaints with the Commissioner of Official Languages regarding language rights violations.

During the investigation, witnesses were promised confidentiality.

The respondent later requested access to the personal information in the investigation files under the Privacy Act.

The Commissioner refused to disclose certain interview notes, relying on the exemption in s. 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act for information that could reasonably be expected to be injurious to lawful investigations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the exemption can apply to concluded investigations to protect future ones, the Commissioner failed to establish a reasonable expectation of injury in this specific case.

The Court ordered the disclosure of the personal information but denied access to non-personal information.

The Attorney General of Quebec sought leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Canada from Quebec Superior Court decisions ordering the state to pay defence counsel's fees at rates exceeding legal aid tariffs.

The Supreme Court held that a direct appeal does not lie, as section 676.1 of the Criminal Code provides for an appeal of costs orders to the provincial court of appeal.

The Court interpreted 'costs' broadly to include future payments for legal services.

The applications for leave to appeal were referred to the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had allowed the accused's appeal from his robbery conviction and ordered a new trial based on issues related to hearsay evidence.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

The plaintiff was injured while riding on a paratransit bus and brought an action against the bus company and driver in both tort and contract nearly two years later.

She also sued her former solicitors for failing to bring the claim within the one-year limitation period for 'damages occasioned by a motor vehicle' under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a substantive approach must be taken to determine if the presence of a motor vehicle is the dominant feature of the claim, regardless of whether it is framed in tort or contract.

The Court concluded that the damages were occasioned by a motor vehicle, meaning the action against the bus company and driver was statute-barred, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with her negligence claim against her former solicitors.

The Minister of National Revenue appealed a decision holding that accounts receivable factored to a third party were not subject to a deemed trust for unremitted payroll deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the deemed trust under s. 227(4.1) of the Income Tax Act attaches to property acquired by a tax debtor after a default, it does not continue to attach to property once it has been sold to a third-party purchaser for value in the ordinary course of business.

The appeal was dismissed.

The insured was covered by two insurance policies, one from Family Insurance and one from Lombard Canada, both containing 'other insurance' clauses declaring their coverage to be excess to any other insurance.

The trial judge found the clauses mutually repugnant and apportioned liability equally.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding Family's policy primary based on surrounding circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that where competing policies cannot be read in harmony, the conflicting clauses should be treated as mutually repugnant and inoperative.

Both policies provide primary coverage, and the loss is borne equally by each insurer until the lower policy limit is exhausted.

The respondents were limited partners in a partnership that purchased a mini-warehouse.

The partnership generated losses, which the respondents deducted for income tax purposes.

The Minister reassessed the respondents, disallowing the losses on the basis that the partnership did not carry on business with a reasonable expectation of profit.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying the test from the companion case of Stewart v. Canada, held that the storage park operation was commercial in nature and lacked any personal element.

Therefore, the reasonable expectation of profit test did not apply, and the operation constituted a source of income under s. 9 of the Income Tax Act.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an experienced real estate investor, acquired four condominium units from which he earned rental income.

The properties were highly leveraged, resulting in significant interest expenses and rental losses.

The Minister of National Revenue disallowed the deduction of these losses on the basis that the appellant had no 'reasonable expectation of profit' and therefore no source of income under section 9 of the Income Tax Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, rejecting the 'reasonable expectation of profit' test as a stand-alone test for determining a source of income.

The Court established a two-stage approach, finding that the appellant's rental activities lacked any personal element and were clearly commercial, thus constituting a valid source of income from which interest expenses could be deducted.

The accused was acquitted of sexual assault but convicted of the included offence of assault at trial.

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's judgment, adopting the dissenting reasons of Roscoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal.

The appellant broadcaster sought injunctive relief against parties assisting Canadian residents to subscribe to and decode U.S. direct-to-home satellite programming.

The appeal turned on whether s. 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act imposed a blanket prohibition on decoding encrypted subscription programming signals unless authorized by a lawful distributor in Canada, or only prohibited decoding of signals from licensed Canadian distributors.

Applying the modern contextual approach to statutory interpretation, the Court held the provision unambiguously creates an absolute prohibition with a limited exception and aligns with the broader broadcasting and copyright regime.

The Court refused to answer the stated Charter questions because the record did not support constitutional adjudication.

The appellant resigned from her position as a lawyer with the respondent city while the first collective agreement was being negotiated.

The finalized agreement included a retroactive salary adjustment but restricted it to employees employed on the date the agreement was signed.

The appellant sued the city and the union, arguing the clause violated the Labour Code and the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and that the union breached its duty of representation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the retroactivity clause was lawful, did not constitute discrimination under the Charter, and that the union had properly carried out its duty of representation in the context of collective bargaining.

The appellant bank and respondent trust company entered into agreements to finance a condominium project.

When the real estate market collapsed, the respondent breached its commitment to provide takeout financing, leaving the appellant with a significant shortfall.

The trial judge awarded the appellant damages including compound pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate specified in the loan agreement.

The Court of Appeal substituted simple interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that courts have jurisdiction at common law and in equity to award compound interest as expectation damages to fully compensate a plaintiff for the time-value of money.

The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, sought a confidentiality order for technical documents related to the environmental assessment of nuclear reactors being built in China.

The Federal Court Trial Division and Federal Court of Appeal denied the order.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada established the test for granting confidentiality orders in civil litigation, adapting the Dagenais/Mentuck framework.

The Court held that a confidentiality order should be granted when necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, such as a commercial interest, and when the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects on the open court principle and freedom of expression.

Applying this test, the Court allowed the appeal and granted the confidentiality order.

The appellants, Air Ontario pilots, brought an action against the respondents, Air Canada pilots, for breach of contract based on the union constitution after the respondents refused to implement an arbitration award integrating their seniority lists.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the historical legal fiction of a web of contracts between individual union members is no longer necessary or practical.

Instead, the Court recognized that a trade union is a legal entity capable of entering into a contract of membership with each individual member, and therefore, union members cannot be held personally liable to one another for breaching the union constitution.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder following a second jury trial.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and eyewitness identification.

The trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could infer guilt from a disbelieved alibi without independent evidence of fabrication.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso to uphold the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the erroneous alibi instruction was a serious error that provided a direct route to guilt, and the curative proviso could not be applied because it could not be said that any other reasonable jury would inevitably convict.