Dr. Philip Klassen

On a dangerous offender application following convictions for multiple sexual offences against children, the court held that the offender's conduct formed part of a repetitive pattern demonstrating a failure to control sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing severe psychological harm in the future.

The court relied on the offender's history of prior child sexual offences, reoffending while subject to probation and treatment, and persistent denial of the extent of his pedophilia, which the court found materially impaired treatment prospects.

Although expert actuarial evidence placed the risk near the 50% range, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory likelihood threshold under s. 753(1) was met.

The court further found there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure, including a long-term supervision order, would adequately protect the public.

A dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence were imposed.

The Crown applied to have Justin Primmer declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention.

Primmer sought dismissal or a determinate sentence with long-term supervision.

The court found Primmer met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation under two pathways, based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour, failure to restrain behaviour, likelihood of future violence, and persistent aggressive behaviour showing substantial indifference to consequences.

The court rejected arguments for a lesser sentence, including religious conversion, pro-social behaviour in custody, treatability, and the "burnout theory" citing his history of manipulation, lack of genuine remorse, and chronic dishonesty.

An indeterminate sentence was imposed to protect the public.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender/long-term offender assessment under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code and sought to designate Dr. Philip Klassen as the assessor.

Defence counsel opposed this designation, proposing alternative psychiatrists.

The court held that while the accused has a role in the expert designation, the court should defer to the Crown's choice absent cogent and compelling reasons indicating the Crown's choice is inappropriate, such as lack of qualifications, bias, or unavailability.

The court found no such reasons to reject Dr. Klassen and rejected the defence's proposals due to potential bias (treating psychiatrist) and unavailability.

Dr. Klassen was designated.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the accused following his guilty plea to possession of weapons dangerous to the public peace and three counts of uttering threats.

The accused initially opposed the application but changed his position mid-hearing and consented to being declared a dangerous offender.

The court found that the accused's conduct, which began as an apparent suicide attempt but escalated into threatening behaviour toward police officers, constituted a predicate offence under the Criminal Code.

The court considered the accused's extensive criminal history including 34 prior convictions, pattern of threats, and psychiatric assessments indicating high risk of future offending.

The court declared the accused a dangerous offender and imposed a 6-year determinate sentence plus a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated a dangerous offender following convictions for multiple offences, including sexual assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment against an intimate partner.

The court found that the respondent's history of escalating domestic violence established a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing severe injury or psychological damage in the future.

The court concluded that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, designated the respondent a dangerous offender, and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The plaintiffs, former inmates of the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre, brought a motion to certify a class action against the provincial Crown alleging systemic negligence and Charter breaches resulting from overcrowding and inadequate supervision.

The Crown opposed certification and moved to strike portions of the claim and evidence.

The court struck the claim for breach of fiduciary duty but found the pleadings otherwise disclosed reasonable causes of action in systemic negligence and Charter breaches.

The court admitted the plaintiffs' evidence for the limited purpose of the certification motion and concluded that all criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act were met.

The motion for certification was granted.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application following the offender's convictions for sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The offender had an extensive criminal record, including two prior convictions for sexual assault.

The court heard competing expert evidence on the offender's risk of re-offending.

The court found that while the offender had a pattern of repetitive behaviour, the Crown failed to prove beyond a balance of probabilities that there was a likelihood of the offender causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage in the future.

The court also declined to designate the offender as a long-term offender.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10.5 years, reduced to 2 years less a day after credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by 3 years of probation with strict conditions.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following his convictions for multiple violent and sexual offences against his intimate partner, including aggravated assault and sexual assault with a weapon.

The offender had a lengthy criminal history involving domestic violence, an antisocial personality disorder, and chronic substance abuse.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation.

However, considering the offender's cognitive limitations, his expressions of remorse, and the availability of intensive treatment and supervision in the penitentiary and community, the court concluded there was a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of 10 years and 1 day (after credit for pre-sentence custody) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Crown sought a s. 752.1 assessment order following convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, and breach of probation.

The court held that the assessment stage is a summary proceeding within the sentencing process and that the statutory threshold is low: whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be found to be a dangerous offender or long-term offender.

The court rejected the respondent’s submissions that the 2008 amendments enhanced the judicial gatekeeper role or required a higher evidentiary standard, and further held that the offender’s lengthy violent record could support a qualifying pattern under s. 753(1)(a)(i) or (ii).

Leave to file additional Crown materials was granted, and the assessment order was issued.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following his guilty plea to sexual assault.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record, including three prior sexual assaults, and was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and severe substance abuse issues.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to his pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour and failure to control his sexual impulses.

However, the court concluded that a lesser measure than an indeterminate sentence would adequately protect the public, imposing a determinate sentence of five years followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The defendant brought a motion seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo psychological testing as part of a defence medical examination in a civil action alleging historical assaults during a domestic relationship.

The defendant argued the testing would assist a psychiatrist retained by the defence in forming an opinion and responding to the plaintiff’s psychological expert evidence.

The court held that additional defence medical examinations are discretionary and require clear and compelling evidence demonstrating necessity.

The proposed testing was characterized by the defence experts only as helpful or beneficial rather than necessary.

The court also considered the risk of creating an imbalance in expert evidence and the potential delay to the scheduled trial.

The motion for psychological testing was dismissed.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for first degree murder.

At his first Ontario Review Board hearing, the board accepted a joint submission for detention in a medium security unit with escorted hospital grounds privileges, but added a condition permitting escorted or accompanied access to the community at the hospital's discretion.

The Crown appealed, arguing the community access condition was unreasonable and that the board breached procedural fairness by adding it without allowing prior submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the condition was supported by expert psychiatric evidence and that the board did not owe the Crown a common law duty of procedural fairness in these circumstances.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following his conviction for kidnapping and sexually assaulting a third victim while threatening to use a knife.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive history of violence, non-compliance with court orders, and diagnoses of sexual sadism and antisocial personality disorder.

Despite the offender's recent use of anti-androgen medication (chemical castration), the court found no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community, given his history of deceit and the need for lifelong treatment.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term in penitentiary.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for aggravated sexual assault and other offences against a 13-year-old girl.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to consider the age-related decline in recidivism and the potential for a long-term supervision order with mandatory drug treatment conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, given the appellant's history of non-compliance with treatment and deception of supervisors.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge to s. 753(1.1) of the Criminal Code, which creates a rebuttable presumption that an offender is a dangerous offender where certain predicate convictions exist.

The provision shifts the burden to the offender to disprove dangerous offender criteria on a balance of probabilities once the Crown proves specified prior convictions.

The court held that the reverse onus violates s. 7 of the Charter because it requires an offender to disprove aggravating sentencing factors that traditionally must be proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt.

Applying the Oakes test, the court found the provision was not rationally connected to the legislative objective and did not minimally impair Charter rights.

The provision was declared of no force and effect.

The accused was charged with first degree murder after stabbing his landlord to death.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused should be found not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder under section 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

Two forensic psychiatrists testified that the accused suffered from paranoid schizophrenia or a delusional disorder, and that his actions were driven by persecutory delusions.

The court applied the test from R. v. Oommen and concluded that, on a balance of probabilities, the accused's mental illness prevented him from knowing that his actions were morally wrong at the time of the offence.

The accused was found not criminally responsible.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of luring a child via computer contrary to Section 172.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

Over a period of three-and-a-half months, the accused engaged in thirteen computer communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 12-year-old girl, including sexually explicit content and masturbation on camera.

No meeting was arranged or attempted.

The accused, a 59-year-old with no criminal record and stable employment history, was sentenced to eight months imprisonment concurrent on all counts, followed by three years probation with strict conditions including a 10-year Section 161 order, 10-year Sex Offender Registration Act order, DNA sampling, and computer forfeiture.

The applicant, a former firefighter whose employment was terminated due to off-duty criminal misconduct, requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision dismissing his human rights application.

He argued that the Tribunal erred by denying his late request to call his doctor as an expert witness and by failing to ask him questions to elicit missing factual details about his alcohol addiction.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for reconsideration, finding that the applicant had access to legal advice, failed to provide a credible explanation for his late expert witness request, and had a fair opportunity to present his case without the Tribunal acting as his advocate.

The applicant, a firefighter, alleged that the respondent municipality discriminated against him on the basis of disability by suspending and terminating his employment due to off-duty criminal misconduct related to his alcohol addiction.

The respondent argued the termination was due to his criminal record, which caused reputational harm and operational hardship, and denied knowledge of the addiction or a nexus to the misconduct.

The Tribunal found that while the applicant had an alcohol abuse disorder, he failed to prove a causal relationship between his addiction and the criminal misconduct, which included criminal harassment and assault.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to designate the respondent as a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender.

The respondent, a diagnosed psychopath with a history of severe domestic violence, was found to pose an extremely high risk of violent recidivism.

The trial judge imposed a ten-year sentence followed by a ten-year supervision order with strict conditions, hoping his risk would 'burn out' by age 45.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by relying on strict community supervision conditions that were practically impossible to implement due to a lack of resources.

The Court substituted a dangerous offender designation, emphasizing that public protection is paramount and cannot be compromised by assuming unavailable resources will materialize.