Dennis R. O'Connor

The respondent was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident after losing control of her vehicle on a snow and ice-covered municipal road.

The trial judge found the appellant municipalities liable for failing to maintain the road, apportioned liability 50/50 due to the respondent's contributory negligence, and rejected the municipalities' defence under the Minimum Maintenance Standards (MMS).

On appeal, the municipalities argued the MMS provided a complete defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the specific MMS provisions for snow accumulation and icy roadways did not apply to the municipalities' failure to monitor weather and deploy resources before the road became icy.

The respondent's cross-appeal on the 50/50 apportionment of liability was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding them liable on a personal guarantee for a corporate debt.

The guarantee was provided via an email stating 'I will personally guarantee the debt to Pintar in full.

Signed Chris'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the email exchange created a binding guarantee, with forbearance in collecting the debt serving as consideration.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that the respondent insurer had no duty to defend him against a landlord's statement of claim.

The landlord alleged arson, breach of contract, and negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the arson claim fell under the intentional act exclusion, the breach of contract claim fell under the contractual liability exclusion, and the negligence claims were merely labels for what were in substance breaches of contract.

The respondents brought a motion before the Court of Appeal regarding the appellants' proposed fresh amended notice of appeal.

The court held that the motion judge's finding on the interpretation of the franchise agreement was a final order and properly appealable.

However, the remaining issues decided under Rule 20 were interlocutory, as the motion judge merely found genuine issues requiring a trial without finally determining them.

The motion was granted, with costs awarded to the moving parties.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved substantial but not total success, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The appellants did not seek costs, and the court determined the respondents were not entitled to costs.

Consequently, the court made no order as to costs.

The appellant farmer sued the respondent, claiming it supplied animal feed that caused death and illness to his livestock.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, noting the appellant failed to present expert evidence or cross-examine the respondent's affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly concluded the appellant failed to put his best foot forward and meet his evidentiary burden.

The mother applied to relocate with the parties' child from Toronto to Kingston.

The trial judge granted the application, focusing heavily on the mother's reasons for moving and her relationship with the paternal family.

The father appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in applying the Gordon v. Goertz factors.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the maximum contact principle and inappropriately treated the mother's reasons for moving as the primary factor, despite this not being an exceptional case where such reasons were relevant to her ability to meet the child's needs.

The order allowing the relocation was set aside.

The appellant appealed a costs judgment awarding the respondent $298,681.16 in partial indemnity costs following a 16-day trial where the respondent was awarded $218,331.15 in damages.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by awarding an amount virtually the same as substantial indemnity costs and failing to consider proportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully explained his reasons, considered the complexities of the case, and had the proportionality principle in mind, demonstrating no error in principle.

The appellants, life insurance companies, appealed a trial judgment finding that transactions involving their participating accounts to finance a corporate acquisition breached the Insurance Companies Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the transactions breached the Act by failing to comply with generally accepted accounting principles, improperly allocating expenses, and constituting prohibited transfers.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the remedy, finding that the trial judge's order to return $390 million to the participating accounts via litigation trusts was overly broad and akin to an oppression remedy not available under the Act.

Instead, the Court ordered the transactions unwound as of the present, with adjustments for expense savings already received.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court judge that dismissed his appeal from three interlocutory orders of a Master.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the proper route of appeal from the Superior Court judge's order regarding interlocutory matters was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her credibility assessments and misapprehended evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge gave substantial reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence and that any minor misapprehension of peripheral evidence did not affect the overall credibility assessment.

The court also declined to admit the fresh evidence, noting it would not assist the appellant's credibility.

The appellant appealed a conviction for possession of child pornography found on a shared home computer, arguing that the trial judge failed to explain why he accepted the estranged spouse’s evidence and rejected the appellant’s denial.

The court held that, in a case turning on credibility and conflicting evidence about who was responsible for the material, the reasons did not adequately reconcile significant contradictions or explain why no reasonable doubt remained.

The court also identified material misapprehensions of the forensic and testimonial evidence.

Applying the functional approach to sufficiency of reasons, the court concluded that meaningful appellate review was foreclosed and the verdict was unsafe.

The appellant, a former executive and minority shareholder, sued the respondents in Ontario for wrongful dismissal, unpaid wages, and oppression.

The motions judge denied the appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the respondents' motion to stay the action based on an exclusive forum selection clause in a Shareholders' Agreement favouring England.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the denial of summary judgment but set aside the stay.

The Court found that the motions judge erred by ignoring a non-exclusive Ontario forum selection clause in the appellant's Service Agreement and by failing to consider that the respondents had attorned to Ontario's jurisdiction by defending the action on the merits and counterclaiming before invoking the English forum selection clause.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing their request to amend their pleading to correct an alleged misnomer in naming a defendant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Ormerod test or her exercise of residual discretion under Rule 5.04(2).

The motion judge properly considered the appellants' significant, unexplained delay and the prejudice to the respondent, who had no notice of the potential claim for about five years.

The appellant appealed an order regarding her qualification for survivor benefits under the respondent pension plan.

The respondent confirmed before the Court of Appeal that the appellant would continue to qualify for benefits as long as her academic institution considered her to be in full-time attendance, even with a reduced course load.

Given this assurance, the appellant achieved the result she sought by way of alternative relief.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant brought a tort claim against his former wife following the final settlement of their matrimonial litigation.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant was precluded from proceeding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the appellant knew all necessary facts at the time of the matrimonial settlement and failed to pursue the claim or reserve his right to do so.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Two sets of proposed interveners sought to be added as parties to two separate criminal appeals in order to cross-examine witnesses and tender evidence regarding the jury panel selection process.

The court dismissed the motions to add them as parties, noting that adding strangers as parties to a criminal appeal is inappropriate.

However, the court granted the applicants intervener status as friends of the court and, exceptionally, exempted them from the usual condition of accepting the record as it exists, allowing them to potentially augment the record and cross-examine witnesses.

The appellant company appealed a summary judgment in favour of the respondent bank for an undisputed debt amount.

The appellant argued that the respondent had orally agreed to change the loan agreement so it was no longer payable on demand.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that this argument lacked an air of reality and was not supported by the written agreement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the respondents' civil action based on statutory immunity under s. 38.1 of the Independent Health Facilities Act and abuse of process.

The respondents cross-appealed the striking of allegations relating to investigations under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeals and the cross-appeal, holding that while s. 38.1 provides immunity for losses resulting from specific regulatory orders, factual findings at trial are required to determine if any claimed losses fall outside this protection.

The abuse of process arguments were also left open for trial.

The appellant appealed a judgment, arguing that correspondence between the parties constituted a binding settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the initial letter was a valid offer, the subsequent correspondence indicated an intention to negotiate rather than an acceptance.

The court concluded there was no meeting of the minds sufficient to form a binding contract, as evidenced by a draft agreement containing only a one-way release.