David S. Rose

The accused, Chiduben Anthony Okeke, was charged with Aggravated Assault and Failing to Comply with a Recognizance.

Both the Crown and Defence jointly sought a finding of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) under sections 16 and 672.34 of the Criminal Code.

Two forensic psychiatrists provided reports concluding that the accused suffered from schizophrenia with paranoid and somatic delusions and auditory hallucinations at the time of the offence, rendering him incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of his actions.

The court accepted the joint recommendation, finding the accused NCR for both charges, and issued a DNA order.

The judgment also highlighted the severe impact on the victim, PC Andrew Varao, and raised concerns about the lack of adequate supervision for mentally ill individuals released on bail.

The defendant, Nhat Nguyen, was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol ("80 plus").

He conceded the elements of the offence but brought a Charter motion arguing a violation of his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The court found that police failed to facilitate contact with his chosen lawyer, Kim Schofield, despite her number being in his seized phone, and instead directed him to Duty Counsel.

The court noted inconsistencies in police testimony and identified a systemic issue in police training regarding counsel of choice.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath sample evidence, leading to an acquittal.

This ruling addresses a motion by defence counsel to withdraw from a criminal case after the accused, Juan Chua, pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking but subsequently failed to appear for sentencing.

The Crown took no position on the motion.

The court, applying the discretionary factors for counsel withdrawal outlined in *Cunningham v. Lilles*, denied the motion.

The judge emphasized that the accused was at a crucial stage of the proceedings (sentencing for a serious offence), counsel still held valid instructions, and denying withdrawal was in the best interest of the administration of justice, particularly given the potential for an in absentia sentencing and a lengthy custodial sentence without representation.

F.B. pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.

The Crown sought 6 months open custody, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence of 18-24 months probation.

The court considered the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) sentencing principles, including proportionality and the "last resort" principle for custody.

Aggravating factors included the unprovoked, cowardly nature of the attack, the serious injuries, and the location (school parking lot).

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, genuine remorse, community service, and efforts towards rehabilitation (work and school).

The court found a custodial sentence was proportionate and necessary, imposing 4 months custody (80 days open custody + 40 days supervision) followed by 18 months probation, along with a weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The accused brought a Charter application under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to quash a search warrant and exclude evidence.

The search warrant was obtained to search a residence for crystal methamphetamine based on information from a confidential informant.

The accused challenged both the validity of the warrant and the particularity of the offence listed in Appendix B (which listed powder cocaine instead of crystal methamphetamine).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the issuing justice had sufficient grounds to issue the warrant based on the credible, compelling, and corroborated information from the confidential informant, and that the discrepancy in Appendix B was not a fatal defect.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against his wife, alleging incidents on April 9 and 14, 2019.

The Crown alleged non-consensual sexual contact, while the defence claimed the contact was consensual.

The complainant testified that she had no interest in the accused, that their marriage had broken down, and that she did not consent to the sexual contact.

The accused testified that the contact was consensual and that their marriage was loving.

The court found the accused's evidence to be unreliable due to multiple inconsistencies and evasiveness regarding the state of the marriage.

The complainant's evidence also contained inconsistencies regarding post-incident contact with the accused.

The court found a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both counts.

The appellant appealed her guilty pleas to multiple Provincial Offences Act charges, including operating a motor vehicle without insurance and failing to comply with probation.

She argued that her guilty plea was not informed, that she acted under duress, and sought to have the entire proceeding quashed and sent back for trial.

The trial court had imposed a sentence of 7 days in jail and a $5,000 fine.

The appeal court examined the validity of the guilty plea under the five conditions set out in the Provincial Offences Act and found that the appellant failed to meet her onus of demonstrating that the plea was involuntary, uninformed, or equivocal.

The appeal was dismissed.

Multiple appellants appealed convictions for Highway Traffic Act offences, challenging the dismissal of their s. 11(b) Charter motions for stay of proceedings based on delay.

The central issue was whether the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan applies to Provincial Offences Act Part I prosecutions, or whether a lower ceiling applies to Highway Traffic Act cases.

The appellants argued for ceilings of either 13 months or 12 months, while the respondent contended that the 18-month ceiling applies uniformly.

The court upheld the 18-month ceiling, finding no demonstrated delay problem in Highway Traffic Act prosecutions and rejecting a patchwork approach to presumptive ceilings.

One appellant also raised additional grounds regarding evidentiary sufficiency and proof of the date of the offence, both of which were dismissed.

The accused was charged with assaulting the complainant on December 2, 2018, outside a hockey rink.

The incident arose from tensions between the parties in youth hockey circles.

The accused claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the accused's credibility undermined by significant testimonial inconsistencies and rejected the self-defence claim.

The court found the accused was the aggressor who initiated the physical altercation by confronting the complainant as he arrived at the rink with his son.

The accused was found guilty of assault.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences following the seizure of a loaded 9mm handgun from her vehicle.

She brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of police conduct, including a warrantless entry into a condominium unit, the warrantless seizure of her vehicle, and the manner of execution of a search warrant on the vehicle.

The court found that while the initial entry into the unit and seizure of the vehicle were lawful, the officer's opening of the glove box to search for vehicle documentation (rather than the bullet authorized by the warrant) constituted an unreasonable search.

However, applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court admitted the evidence, finding the breach was minor, the privacy interest in a vehicle is diluted, and society has a strong interest in adjudication on the merits given the serious nature of illegal firearms.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial addressed Charter issues regarding the timing of access to counsel and the privacy of lawyer-client communications during custody.

The court found a technical violation of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding the delay in providing access to counsel (approximately 14 minutes), but found no violation regarding the privacy of the phone booth conversation.

The breath test evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused was convicted.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a speeding charge.

The trial judge dismissed the charge on two grounds: insufficient evidence regarding radar device calibration and insufficient evidence regarding visibility due to foggy conditions.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in law by imposing an incorrect burden on the prosecution regarding radar device testing.

The court held that it is sufficient to prove the officer tested the radar unit before and after the investigation and was a qualified operator.

The court also found the trial judge's visibility finding was a palpable and overriding error, as the evidence clearly showed the officer could see 400 metres in each direction and identified the vehicle directly.

The conviction was restored.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The respondent was also charged with driving with a suspended licence and driving without a valid licence plate.

The trial judge acquitted on the insurance charge, finding that the Crown had not proven the complete absence of insurance.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that the insurance charge is a strict liability offence where proof that the owner-operator could not produce proof of valid insurance upon demand establishes the prima facie offence.

The respondent was convicted and fined $5,000.

The Crown appealed two sentences imposed by a Justice of the Peace for driving without insurance and driving under suspension.

In both cases, the trial judge imposed fines below the mandatory minimums, citing the victim fine surcharge as a mitigating factor.

The appellate court found this reasoning constituted an error of principle.

The court allowed both appeals but imposed different outcomes: for Paul East, who was impecunious and receiving public assistance, the court imposed a reduced fine of $7,500 (below the $10,000 minimum) based on exceptional circumstances of destitution; for Kainnon Jennrich, who earned a substantial income and had demonstrated ability to pay large fines, the court imposed the mandatory minimums of $2,000 and $5,000 respectively.

The accused was convicted of multiple offences involving the sexual exploitation and trafficking of a minor for the purposes of prostitution.

The offences occurred between August 2015 and August 2017 and included recruitment of a person under 18 for exploitation, receiving material and financial benefits from sexual services, procuring a minor to offer sexual services, advertising sexual services, two counts of sexual assault, criminal harassment, and mischief to property.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years and 5 months, reflecting the serious nature of the exploitation, the vulnerability of the victim, the use of violence and coercion, and the extended duration of the criminal conduct.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed by a Justice of the Peace after the respondent pleaded guilty to leaving the roadway not in safety contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent had originally been charged with careless driving but agreed to plead guilty to the reduced charge.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a $500 fine with 180 days to pay.

The Justice of the Peace imposed a $350 fine instead, undercutting the joint submission.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to invite further submissions before rejecting the joint submission and by failing to make a finding that the submission was contrary to the public interest.

The court also criticized the trial judge's comments regarding the victim fine surcharge and its comparison to Criminal Code provisions.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed acquittals on six Building Code Act charges arising from Orders to Comply issued in 2013 for unauthorized construction at a marina property.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent on the basis that the 2013 Orders were identical to Orders issued in 1996, and that the respondent had complied with the earlier Orders.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by permitting a collateral attack on the 2013 Orders, which had not been appealed to the Superior Court as required by statute.

The court also rejected defences of due diligence, estoppel, laches, and officially induced error.

The acquittals were overturned and convictions were entered on all counts, with fines of $100 per count totalling $600.

The appellant appealed her conviction under the Building Code Act and brought two motions: (1) to bifurcate the appeal into separate hearings on different grounds, and (2) to perfect the appeal without filing all trial transcripts due to financial constraints.

The trial lasted 8 days over 15 months.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the appeal grounds were factually and legally interrelated and that permitting severance would not be fair or expeditious.

The court also rejected the request to proceed without transcripts, holding that the appeal must be perfected in the usual course with all transcripts filed.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death in connection with a motor vehicle collision that killed Julia Baciu.

The accused, a novice G2 driver, was operating a vehicle at 168 km/h in a 50 km/h zone while impaired by alcohol and marijuana.

He struck a vehicle driven by the victim's boyfriend, causing catastrophic injuries.

The court imposed a sentence of 5 years 9 months imprisonment, an 8-year driving prohibition, and ordered a DNA sample.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the predominant sentencing principles, noting the epidemic of traffic fatalities in York Region.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a single motor vehicle collision on July 30, 2017.

The Crown called three witnesses and filed a toxicology report.

The defence raised four issues: (1) the admission that the accused was the driver was obtained in violation of section 7 Charter rights as a compelled statement under the Highway Traffic Act; (2) the accused did not waive rights to counsel under section 10(b); (3) the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated a motor vehicle; and (4) there was no proof the accused operated the vehicle after 3:15 hours per expert opinion.

The court found that the accused's self-identification as the driver was a statutorily compelled statement under the Highway Traffic Act and must be excluded.

Without this identification, the ASD demand was unlawful and the breath test must be excluded.

The court excluded the breath samples and acquitted the accused.