R. De Chellis

The accused, Muhammed Ali Malik Sher, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance, failure/refusal to comply with a breath demand, and breach of a probation order (operating a vehicle with any alcohol in blood).

The accused testified that his symptoms (swerving, unsteadiness, vomiting) were due to illness (COVID-19) and not alcohol.

The court rejected the accused's explanation, finding it illogical and contradicted by evidence, particularly the strong odour of alcohol.

The court found that alcohol was at least a contributing factor to the impairment.

Regarding the refusal to provide a breath sample, the court found an unequivocal refusal based on words and actions, despite the accused's claim of disorientation.

The court also found that the impaired operation by alcohol logically inferred a blood alcohol concentration above zero, breaching the probation order.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The defendant, charged with 80 plus operation of a conveyance, brought a Charter application to exclude breath test evidence, arguing a violation of her s. 10(b) right to counsel due to a language barrier.

The court found that special circumstances existed, requiring the police to provide the informational component of the right to counsel in the defendant's native Tamil, which was not done, thus constituting a s. 10(b) violation.

However, applying the R. v. Grant test, the court found the seriousness of the breach to be low, the impact on the defendant's Charter rights to be low (as she received legal advice via an interpreter later), and society's interest in adjudication on the merits to be high.

Consequently, the breath evidence was admitted, and the defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant's vehicle crashed into a ditch.

A civilian found him exiting the driver's side and called police.

The defendant demonstrated signs of alcohol consumption and language difficulties.

The court found two violations of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel: the officer failed to translate the right to counsel despite clear language barriers, and failed to properly implement the right by steering the defendant to duty counsel without inquiry.

The breath samples were excluded as a remedy.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired care or control based on circumstantial evidence including the unexplained accident, strong odour of alcohol, physical presentation, and vomiting.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE investigation, the defendant failed an approved screening test and was arrested.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test readings, alleging violations of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The defendant argued that police violated his right to counsel of choice by presenting a binary option between identified counsel and duty counsel, failing to provide tools to search for counsel, and inappropriately steering him to duty counsel.

The court found no Charter violation and admitted the breath test evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with threatening to cause bodily harm contrary to section 264.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused made threatening statements to a Children's Aid Society caseworker when she attended his home to remove his children.

The accused denied making the threats.

The trial judge found the caseworker to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable.

The court found that the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and entered a conviction.

Following guilty pleas to sexual interference, child luring, and making child pornography involving a 15‑year‑old complainant, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate detention.

Extensive psychiatric and psychological evidence established that the offender suffered from antisocial personality disorder with psychopathic traits, severe substance dependence, and a high actuarial risk of violent and sexual recidivism.

The court found the offence of sexual interference constituted a serious personal injury offence and that the offender demonstrated a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing failure to restrain conduct and a likelihood of causing injury or severe psychological harm in the future.

Although one statutory pathway for dangerous offender status based on persistent aggressive behaviour was not proven, the criteria under s. 753(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code were satisfied.

The court concluded that neither a determinate sentence nor a long‑term supervision order would adequately protect the public and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the accused brought a mistrial application after concerns were raised that some jurors appeared to have difficulty staying awake during lengthy testimony related to a successful K.G.B. application involving a recanting eyewitness.

Following an inquiry of the jury, one juror acknowledged momentarily nodding off while others reported occasional difficulty maintaining focus.

The court held that a mistrial is a remedy of last resort requiring proof of concrete prejudice to the trial process.

The evidence did not establish that jurors missed significant evidence or that the integrity of the proceedings had been fatally compromised.

The application for a mistrial was therefore dismissed.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased concerning his belief that the accused had orchestrated a prior theft of his money.

The defence objected on the basis that the statements would introduce prejudicial and untestable allegations of bad character.

The court held that the deceased’s statements were admissible as evidence of the declarant’s state of mind and were relevant to establishing potential motive and context for confrontation between the deceased and the accused.

However, the court limited the scope of admissibility to the deceased’s belief itself and excluded statements recounting the accused’s alleged response about the stolen money.

The jury would receive a limiting instruction restricting the use of the evidence to motive rather than proof of bad character.

During a murder jury trial, the Crown applied to admit a witness’s videotaped police statement and prior preliminary inquiry testimony as substantive evidence under the K.G.B. framework after the witness recanted portions of his earlier account and repeatedly claimed memory loss while testifying before the jury.

The court found the necessity requirement satisfied because the witness adopted an obstructive stance and attempted to shield the true events despite earlier detailed accounts of the shooting.

Reliability was established through procedural safeguards including a videotaped interview, oath, warnings regarding penal consequences for false statements, and the witness’s availability for cross‑examination.

Additional corroborative circumstances, including forensic evidence and the witness’s belief that surveillance cameras captured the event, further supported reliability.

The court admitted both the videotaped statement and the preliminary hearing evidence as substantive evidence before the jury.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit a lengthy videotaped police interrogation of the accused.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive interrogation tactics and further alleged a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter based on a police comment suggesting consulting counsel would be a mistake.

Applying the confessions rule and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court found that statements made during the first portion of the interview were voluntary but that later portions raised concerns about potential oppression after repeated assertions of the right to silence and fatigue.

The court also found no Charter breach arising from the officer’s comment.

Only the portion of the statement up to 1:05 a.m. was ruled admissible.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder, the court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under s.745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought an 18‑year period while the defence argued for the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The court considered the offender’s criminal record, involvement in drug trafficking, illegal firearm possession, and conduct surrounding the offence, including returning to deliver a final fatal shot after the victim had fallen.

Although the victim had been the initial aggressor and armed with knives, the offender’s criminal lifestyle and aggravating conduct warranted a significant increase above the minimum.

A period of 16 years of parole ineligibility was imposed.

The accused had pleaded guilty to luring a child, sexual interference, and making child pornography.

The Crown intended to pursue a dangerous offender application, and a lengthy hearing had been scheduled.

Due to the presiding judge becoming unavailable because of commitments to a lengthy homicide trial, the issue arose whether the sentencing and dangerous offender proceedings should be adjourned or continued before another judge.

Interpreting s. 669.2(1) of the Criminal Code broadly, the court held that another judge may continue proceedings where the original judge is unable to proceed within a reasonable time.

Given the substantial delay that would otherwise result and the interests of justice for both the accused and the complainant, the matter was directed to proceed before another assigned judge.

The accused was charged with sexual assault of his step-daughter when she was between 12 and 15 years of age, with the alleged offences occurring over a three-and-a-half-year period ending May 31, 2007.

The complainant testified that the accused came into her bedroom on multiple occasions and touched her breasts and attempted to touch her pubic area while she was in bed.

The accused denied all allegations, claiming he only entered her room to wake her for school.

The trial involved significant credibility issues, including the complainant's initial false denial to police, inconsistencies in her evidence regarding peripheral details, and the accused's admission of making an inappropriate sexual comment to the complainant.

The court found the complainant generally credible but harbored concerns about certain aspects of her evidence.

The accused's evidence was also found troubling, particularly regarding his admission of listening to the complainant's phone call and his implausible explanation regarding an alleged accidental breast contact.

Despite finding the complainant more believable than the accused, the court determined that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence and reasonable doubt arising from the accused's testimony.

The accused brought a motion to determine the admissibility of the complainant's personal diaries for use in cross-examination.

The defence sought to cross-examine the complainant on four issues: the absence of any mention of alleged sexual abuse in the diaries, limited references to money, the complainant's relationship with her biological father, and her relationship with her mother.

The court applied the test from R. v. Shearing and R. v. Seaboyer, balancing the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect and privacy interests of the complainant.

The court permitted limited cross-examination on the absence of entries relating to sexual abuse and money, but prohibited cross-examination on entries relating to the complainant's relationship with her mother, finding that the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value.