Carolyn J. Horkins

The applicant brought a motion for further financial disclosure and leave to question the respondent in advance of the respondent's scheduled motion for interim disbursements under Family Law Rule 24(12).

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was contrary to a prior case management order that set a strict timetable and directed that disclosure disputes be handled at the hearing of the main motion.

Furthermore, the court held that the requested disclosure was excessive, unnecessary, and disproportionate to the issues raised on an interim costs motion, and the applicant failed to meet the test for questioning under Rule 20(5).

The appellant retained the respondent law firm for his divorce litigation and failed to pay his legal accounts.

The respondent obtained a writ of seizure and sale under the Creditors' Relief Act for the unpaid trial debt.

The appellant appealed, arguing the respondent required leave under the Solicitors Act to proceed and that the accounts should be assessed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that leave was not required because no assessment of the trial debt had been requested, and the motion judge reasonably exercised his discretion in refusing to order an assessment due to the appellant's undue delay.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board that summarily dismissed her complaint against her union for failing in its duty of fair representation.

The applicant had previously settled a grievance regarding her termination, but subsequently complained about the union's representation.

The Divisional Court held that the Board was entitled to dismiss the complaint summarily without a hearing, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the Board's decision was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The Toronto Police Services Board appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding damages to Moses and Princess Water for injuries and trauma sustained during the execution of a search warrant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding Moses, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding police used excessive force.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding Princess, setting aside her damages award because the trial judge failed to find the police liable for any cause of action against her.

The cross-appeals by Moses and Princess alleging unlawful detention and arrest were dismissed, as the police actions were deemed necessary to secure the premises during the search.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division decision that denied his application for a paralegal license on the basis that he was ungovernable.

The applicant argued that the Chair of the Hearing Panel should have recused herself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the Appeal Panel lacked independence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Appeal Panel reasonably concluded there was no apprehension of bias and that the tribunal's structure met the requisite degree of independence as directed by the legislature.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the respondent college issuing and extending a Notice of Trespass against him.

The application was brought almost three years after the second notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for delay, finding the delay was lengthy, unexplained, and caused prejudice to the respondent.

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order directing the disclosure of a draft prosecutorial guideline concerning HIV exposure.

The Commissioner found that while the draft guideline originated in solicitor-client privilege, the privilege was waived when an Assistant Crown Attorney shared it with a municipal public health manager.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Commissioner reasonably concluded the privilege was waived because the Ministry and the public health authority did not share a sufficient common interest.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to extend the time to review an order of a single judge under Rule 61.16(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying action involved allegations of solicitor negligence against the respondents.

The court reviewed the extensive procedural history, noting numerous unpaid costs orders against the appellant and her failure to attend the previous motion.

Applying the four-part test for an extension of time, the court found the appellant failed to explain her delay, the respondents had suffered prejudice, and the intended review lacked merit.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle collision and sued for damages.

At trial, the jury awarded $25,000 in general damages and $5,000 for future health care, but the trial judge granted the respondents' threshold motion under the Insurance Act, reducing the damages to zero.

The appellant appealed the threshold ruling, the trial judge's refusal to put the loss of income claim to the jury, and the jury charge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the threshold analysis, agreeing there was insufficient evidence to support a loss of income claim, and concluding the jury charge was appropriate.

The applicant Commissioner of the OPP sought judicial review to quash an order by the respondent Independent Police Review Director requiring a misconduct hearing for an OPP officer.

The officer was charged with neglect of duty for failing to disclose in an Information to Obtain (ITO) and during testimony before a Legislative Committee the reason why a suspect refused to provide a statement.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the order, finding that the officer's conduct could not possibly constitute neglect of duty.

The court held there is no duty to include irrelevant information in an ITO, and the officer answered the Committee's questions truthfully without a duty to volunteer extraneous information.

The applicant employer brought a motion to stay an arbitrator's interim award pending judicial review.

The employer had disciplined an employee, who grieved the discipline.

The employer subsequently withdrew the discipline and argued the arbitrator lost jurisdiction as the matter was resolved.

The arbitrator found there were remaining remedial issues and retained jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the stay motion, finding no serious question to be determined because the judicial review application was premature and would result in fragmentation of the administrative process.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering the return of $19,656 to the respondent.

The respondent had transferred funds, part of which belonged to her and part to her mother, to the appellant's bank account.

The trial judge found the appellant held the funds as a bare trustee and was liable for the respondent's portion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim against CIBC for allegedly damaging his credit rating.

The trial judge had found the claim was statute-barred and that there was no basis in law for finding CIBC liable.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the appellant was aware of his credit issues more than two years before commencing the action, and that the continuous act provisions of the Limitations Act did not apply.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant estate appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying reimbursement for out-of-country medical expenses incurred by the deceased in Texas for cancer treatment.

The Board found that the deceased did not seek prior approval and did not meet the requirement for post-approval because the services were not provided in 'emergency circumstances'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's factual findings were supported by the evidence and its decision was reasonable.

The appellant contractor appealed the dismissal of its construction lien and quantum meruit claims against the respondent landowner.

The trial judge found the respondent was not an 'owner' under the Construction Lien Act because it did not request the work, which was performed under a separate contract with a third-party purchaser.

The Divisional Court upheld this finding, concluding there was no palpable and overriding error.

The Court also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding that while the trial judge erred in requiring the respondent to have caused the deprivation, the claim still failed because the appellant's contract with the third party constituted a juristic reason for the enrichment.

The tenant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board refusing to set aside an eviction order, arguing she was the true owner of the property and the landlord held legal title due to fraud.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the appeal did not raise a question of law under s. 220 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, but rather sought to re-litigate factual findings.

The court also refused to admit fresh evidence, noting it merely attempted to contradict the Board's factual findings, which the court could not review.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision that denied his claim for a bonus payment following his termination.

The motion judge had found that the appellant had no contractual entitlement to a bonus, as the bonus plan was purely discretionary and subjective.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings, concluding that the employment offer only provided eligibility to participate in the bonus plan, not an entitlement.

The court also found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's alternative calculation of the bonus quantum or the costs award.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind turbine project, the successful respondent sought costs of $20,000.

The appellant argued no costs should be awarded as he was a public interest litigant and the appeal raised a novel issue.

The Divisional Court rejected these arguments, noting that private landowners challenging REAs are not public interest litigants and the appeal did not raise a novel issue.

The court fixed costs payable by the appellant to the respondent at $10,000.

This costs endorsement follows a judgment dismissing appeals by The Humane Society of Canada (HSC).

The court found HSC's conduct, including frivolous and vexatious appeals and unfounded accusations, to be reprehensible and egregious.

Mr. Gates, the plaintiff/respondent, sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded Mr. Gates $8,000 in substantial indemnity costs, finding HSC's conduct fully justified the award and that HSC was not entitled to use its charitable status to shield its misconduct.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Vaughan Council to suspend his pay for 90 days based on a report by the Integrity Commissioner.

The Commissioner found the applicant had improperly interfered with municipal tendering processes and attempted to obstruct her investigation.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Commissioner refused to disclose the names and statements of 32 witnesses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, applying the Baker factors to find that the Commissioner properly balanced the applicant's right to know the case against him with the need to protect cooperating staff from reprisals.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and the Commissioner's jurisdiction.