Carolyn J. Horkins

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering him to pay $25,000 in compensation for disposing of the tenant's property after an eviction.

The tenant had been incarcerated, and his parents attempted to pay rent, but the landlord refused payment and ignored their communications.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the landlord's conduct constituted an abuse of process was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision finding that the parties had entered into an oral agreement whereby the respondent was a 50% beneficial shareholder in the appellant corporation and was entitled to a $2.8 million shareholder loan in exchange for his assistance in restructuring a distressed business.

The appellants argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact and erred in granting an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's factual findings regarding the oral agreement and credibility assessments.

The Court further held that the trial judge did not err in principle in granting the oppression remedy, as the respondent met the definition of a complainant and the remedy accorded with his reasonable expectations.

The appellants brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, specifically an aerial photograph they claimed showed the respondent's equipment had been removed from the construction site earlier than the respondent testified.

The Divisional Court applied the Palmer test and dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence could have been discovered before trial with due diligence, was not decisive to the core issue of when the work was completed, and lacked credibility without expert interpretation.

The appellants, homeowners, appealed a trial judgment that awarded the respondent masonry subcontractor $14,714.12 on a construction lien claim and dismissed the appellants' $200,000 cross-claim for slander of title.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the contract, finding the lien was preserved in time, and awarding $30,000 in costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the contract terms and the date of last work.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting the appellants had refused to transfer the matter to Small Claims Court and had unnecessarily complicated the proceedings.

The father appealed an order requiring him to return his child to Denmark pursuant to the Hague Convention.

The father argued that a parenting plan signed by the mother before they moved to Denmark established that the child's habitual residence remained in Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the parenting plan was unenforceable and signed under duress, and that the child's habitual residence was Denmark at the time of the wrongful removal.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision granting judgment in favour of the plaintiffs based on original minutes of settlement.

The motion judge found that the individual defendant had fraudulently misrepresented the financial status of the corporate defendant to extract an agreement from the plaintiffs to amend the settlement and remove his personal liability.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings of fraudulent misrepresentation and equitable rescission, concluding that the original minutes of settlement were binding despite not being formally executed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant car wash business appealed an Ontario Municipal Board order requiring it to pay $86,943.20 in costs to the respondent municipality after its claim for injurious affection was dismissed.

The appellant argued the costs were excessive and the Board placed undue reliance on the respondent's $15,000 settlement offer.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly exercised its discretion under the Expropriations Act to award costs based on the appellant's unreasonable conduct in refusing the offer and proceeding with a meritless claim.

The appellant husband appealed a final spousal support order, arguing a lack of procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court found that the lower court judge, who had presided over a settlement conference, erred by deciding the substantive issue without clear consent from both parties.

Furthermore, the unrepresented husband was prejudiced by the late service of the respondent's factum and affidavit on the morning of the hearing.

The appeal was allowed, the support order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Family Court for a new hearing before a different judge.

Following a successful appeal that set aside an order reducing spousal support, the appellant sought costs of the underlying motion.

The issue of costs for the motion had not been addressed during the appeal hearing or in the initial reasons for judgment.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to correct the oversight before the final order was entered, relieving the appellant from the requirement to file a formal notice of motion.

The court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs of the underlying motion fixed at $14,604.53.

The Town of Richmond Hill appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that approved the Town's official plan policies regarding parkland dedication but imposed a 25% cap on the alternative requirement under s. 42 of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the OMB's interpretation of the Planning Act was unreasonable.

The Court held that the legislation expressly grants municipalities the authority to set the alternative parkland dedication rate by by-law, and the OMB does not have the jurisdiction to impose a cap or fix a specific rate through its power to approve official plan policies.

The appellant tenant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board and requested an adjournment on the day of the hearing, providing a vague medical note via a friend.

The Divisional Court denied the adjournment, noting the note's insufficiency, the tenant's history of rent arrears totaling $52,500, and the prejudice to the landlord.

The court proceeded to dismiss the appeal on its merits, finding no errors of law or jurisdiction by the Board, and awarded $5,000 in costs to the respondent landlord.

The respondent employee was wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages in Small Claims Court.

The appellant employer engaged in years of frivolous and vexatious litigation to avoid paying the judgment, including multiple failed appeals and motions.

The respondent successfully garnished the funds after correcting a misnomer in the appellant's name.

The appellant appealed the misnomer correction and the refusal to return the garnished funds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the misnomer appeal on the merits, declined to lift the stay of garnishment due to lack of financial hardship evidence, but ultimately dismissed the appellant's second appeal as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.02, thereby lifting the stay and prohibiting the appellant from bringing further motions without leave.

The applicants, trustees of multi-employer pension plans, sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordering the disclosure of confidential actuarial valuation reports to a representative of a rival union.

The applicants argued that disclosure would cause harm during the construction industry's 'raiding season'.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and set aside the commissioner's order, finding that the commissioner applied an overly burdensome standard of proof and an overly stringent test for causation of harm under s. 17(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The court held that the applicants only needed to establish a reasonable expectation of probable harm, which was met given the highly competitive context of union raiding.

In a high-conflict family law dispute following a long-term marriage, the applicant sought extensive interim relief including the appointment of a receiver, interim disbursements, support, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent's financial circumstances were complex, involving multiple corporations and a significant pending tax liability.

The court declined to appoint a receiver but ordered the appointment of a joint expert to determine the respondent's income, requiring the respondent to pay the $50,000 retainer.

The court also ordered the respondent to pay $25,000 in interim disbursements to level the playing field, awarded interim child and spousal support based on an imputed income, and granted the applicant temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The tenants had failed to pay rent for over a year and did not comply with the Board's interim orders.

The tenants appealed the eviction order, which automatically stayed the eviction, allowing them to remain in the premises rent-free.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit, raised no valid questions of law, and was brought solely for the purpose of delay.

The appeal was quashed as an abuse of process and costs were awarded to the landlords.

The appellant, a disabled former spouse, appealed a motion judge's order reducing her spousal support from $1,500 to approximately $800 per month.

The motion judge had found a material change in circumstances based on the respondent's adoption of his new wife's children, his deteriorating health, and his new wife's inability to work.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact regarding the respondent's health and income, and erred in law by failing to apply the 'first-family-first' principle to the respondent's voluntary assumption of new financial obligations.

The original spousal support order was restored.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal a Master's order that had dismissed her motion for further production of her former solicitor's file.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal and found that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the Master had made factual findings that the requested documents were either already produced or did not exist, and correctly held that intake notes belong to the solicitor.

The motion was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision that mitigated the termination of an employee who engaged in a sophisticated scheme of job-related thefts.

The arbitrator had reinstated the employee for the purpose of applying for long-term disability benefits, finding that the employee's undiagnosed PTSD and depression 'clouded' the thefts.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and quashed the award, holding that the arbitrator's decision was unreasonable because it relied on contradictory findings regarding the medical evidence and failed to establish a clear nexus between the PTSD and the premeditated thefts.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing her motion to substitute a named individual for a 'John Doe' defendant on the basis of misnomer, or alternatively to add the individual after the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant had the vehicle's license plate number since the motor vehicle accident but did not identify the owner until after the limitation period expired.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's conclusion that this was not a classic misnomer and that the appellant failed to exercise due diligence to discover the defendant's identity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal confirming the director's issuance of renewable energy approvals for two wind turbine projects.

They argued that section 145.2.1 of the Environmental Protection Act requires a two-step process shifting the onus to the approval-holder, that the tribunal erred in rejecting the material contribution test for causation, and that they were denied procedural fairness when an adjournment was refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the statute imposes a single onus on the appellants to prove harm, the material contribution test was properly rejected, and the tribunal reasonably exercised its discretion in denying the adjournment.