Alexander Alvaro

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and failing to stop after striking a pedestrian and fleeing the scene.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the jury instructions were flawed.

The Crown appealed the 30-month sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the verdict was supported by the evidence, the jury instructions did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the sentence was entitled to deference.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the deaths of a married couple.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge interfered unduly in the trial, had improper out-of-court contact with the jury, and erred in several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of similar fact evidence and the refusal to order production of third-party records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a proper inquiry into the alleged jury contact, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The court also upheld the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, noting that the similar fact evidence was highly probative of a distinctive pattern of conduct.

The appellant appealed their Dangerous Offender designations and indeterminate sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the designations and indeterminate sentences, and ordered a new hearing.

Additionally, because several convictions had been previously set aside by the court, the fixed sentence of twelve years and two months was quashed and a new hearing was ordered under section 686(8) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of first degree murder following a lengthy trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of three unsavoury witnesses, including a jailhouse informant.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence of post-trial recantations by two of these witnesses and argued that the trial judge made several errors, including failing to give an adequate Vetrovec warning and improperly admitting highly prejudicial evidence of a prior manslaughter conviction.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence of one witness's recantation and found that the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning and evidentiary rulings.

The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery following a jury trial and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment with an order for increased parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on prior discreditable conduct and by failing to leave the defence of theft with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted as part of the narrative and there was no air of reality to the theft defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's lengthy criminal record and poor prospects for rehabilitation justified the increased parole ineligibility period.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and other offences arising from the confinement and fatal beating of the deceased.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of a witness's prior statement to police under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule, the jury instructions on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, and several other aspects of the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the witness's statement was properly admitted under both the traditional past recollection recorded criteria and the principled approach to hearsay, and that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were adequate and correct in law.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation.

The Crown conceded the sexual exploitation conviction was unreasonable as the victim was not a 'young person' under the Criminal Code.

For the child pornography charges, which involved written materials, the trial judge had convicted the appellant before the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Sharpe.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the defence of artistic merit and by applying an overly broad definition of child pornography.

The appeal was allowed, an acquittal was entered for the sexual exploitation charge, and a new trial was ordered for the child pornography charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence, failing to charge on s. 37 of the Criminal Code, and improperly instructing on the burden of proof under the W(D) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge sufficiently linked prior assaults to the appellant's apprehension of harm, correctly omitted s. 37 as it would not have assisted the defence, and properly conveyed the burden of proof when the charge was read as a whole.

The appellant appealed his three convictions for conspiracy to utter counterfeit money, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule and on the essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the hearsay instruction was unnecessary, it could only have benefited the appellant.

The Court also found no error in the instructions on the elements of the offences or the presentation of the defence theory.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting a 16-year-old girl with a sawed-off shotgun during a home invasion robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding planning and deliberation, forcible confinement, re-examination of a Crown witness, and the limited use of a defence witness's preliminary inquiry testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the first three grounds.

While the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction on the preliminary inquiry testimony, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The respondent, a young offender, was charged with wilfully failing to comply with a probation order.

At trial, the charge was dismissed because the youth court had failed to provide a copy of the disposition to the respondent's counsel, as required by s. 20(6)(a) of the Young Offenders Act.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's further appeal, holding that the requirement in s. 20(6)(a) is imperative.

The failure to provide counsel with a copy of the disposition deprived the young person of the opportunity to obtain legal advice regarding the probation order, rendering it unenforceable.

The appellant appealed jury convictions arising from a multiple shooting in a drug-trafficking setting, advancing Charter, evidentiary, jury-instruction, inconsistent-verdict, and sentence grounds.

The court held that the police did not deny reasonable access for obtaining blood or urine samples from the accused in custody, and rejected the argument that the state forced the accused to surrender privacy or self-incrimination protections as a condition of obtaining samples.

Although the court concluded that evidence of a prior violent stabbing by the deceased should have been admitted on the self-defence issue, it found the error harmless because the excluded evidence would not have affected the jury’s rejection of self-defence.

The court further found substantial compliance with the Lifchus principles, no misdirection on self-defence, no true inconsistency in the verdicts, and no basis to interfere with the life sentence for attempted murder.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit possession of stolen property and fraud.

He argued the trial judge erred by reading an unconstitutional evidentiary presumption from s. 354(2) of the Criminal Code to the jury, failing to adequately caution the jury on post-offence conduct of a co-accused, and that Crown counsel improperly cross-examined him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in reading the full text of s. 354(2), it caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court also found the jury charge as a whole was adequate and the cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.

The accused was convicted of first degree murder.

Years later, he applied to the Minister of Justice for a review based on fresh evidence.

The Minister referred the matter to the Court of Appeal under s. 690 of the Criminal Code for an opinion on whether the evidence was admissible, and if so, to determine the appeal.

The Court of Appeal concluded the evidence was inadmissible and did not proceed to determine the appeal.

The accused sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the application for leave.

The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that the Court of Appeal had only provided an advisory opinion under s. 690(c), which is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies.

In a criminal conviction appeal, the self-represented appellant advised that he did not want counsel appointed to represent him but did not oppose the appointment of amicus curiae.

The court was informed that the appeal had previously been adjourned to permit preparation of the appeal book and consideration of whether amicus should be appointed.

The court appointed amicus curiae under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to assist on the appeal and adjourned the appeal to a date to be fixed by the registrar for further speaking to or hearing.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that the 15-year starting point used by the trial judge may have been at the upper end of the range, but it was not outside the range and no error in principle was established.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The sentence was nonetheless varied to reduce a lifetime firearms prohibition to a 10-year prohibition because no notice had been given.

The appellant appealed his attempted murder conviction arising from a gang invasion of a karaoke bar, arguing that the trial judge misdirected himself on the principles governing eyewitness identification evidence.

The court held that the identification case was very strong, based on circumstantial evidence and the eyewitness identification of two persons, and found no error in the trial judge's treatment of that evidence.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, submitting that a three-year sentence for extortion should have been concurrent rather than consecutive.

The court held that, regardless of that issue, the total sentence of 18 years, taking into account two years of pre-trial custody, was entirely appropriate.

The appellant, a young person, appealed an order transferring him to adult court for numerous offences including robbery, unlawful confinement, and related property offences.

The Court of Appeal held that the youth court judge erred in concluding that the maximum youth sentence was inadequate to protect the public and failed to give sufficient weight to the appellant's excellent progress in secure custody.

The court found that the objectives of public protection and rehabilitation could be reconciled within the youth justice system.

The appeal was allowed and the Crown's transfer application was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a confrontation at his estranged wife's relatives' home while attempting to locate his child.

The court refused to admit fresh evidence consisting of an affidavit cataloguing inconsistencies from earlier proceedings, holding the evidence lacked due diligence, was not compelling, and would not have affected the result.

The court held that mischief under s. 430(1)(c) or (d) is not an included offence of unlawful entry into a dwelling-house with intent under s. 349, and further held that the trial judge erred by treating intent for mischief as presumptively flowing from the appellant's acts through an objective lens.

The threatening and assault convictions were upheld, but the appeal was allowed in part: one mischief conviction was replaced with an acquittal, and the other was set aside with a new trial ordered and proceedings stayed on that count.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her habeas corpus application with certiorari in aid following committal for trial on a charge of second degree murder.

She alleged denial of natural justice at the preliminary inquiry based on limits on cross-examination, continuation of the inquiry during her absence, inadequate assistance while unrepresented, and failure to conduct a fitness hearing during the inquiry.

The court held there was no denial of natural justice and no loss of jurisdiction, noting that irrelevant questioning was properly curtailed, witnesses heard in her absence were later recalled for cross-examination, and fitness had already been addressed.

The appeal was dismissed.