Alexander Alvaro

The Crown appealed a jury verdict acquitting the respondent of sexual offences against a young complainant.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by refusing to allow re-examination of the complainant on prior consistent statements and by failing to grant a mistrial following defence counsel's closing address.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence cross-examination did not implicitly allege recent fabrication, and the trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial was well within his discretion.

The appellant sought an extension of time to file an appeal from conviction under s. 135 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The provincial judge treated the hearing as an appeal on the merits and dismissed it without giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard.

The Crown conceded this was an error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the dismissal and the underlying conviction, struck the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and unlawful confinement.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings, finding that the 30-month delay from the date of the charge to the scheduled trial date violated the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, concluding that the delay was not unreasonable given the mutual agreement to convert the case to a superior court trial with a preliminary inquiry, and the lack of significant prejudice to the accused.

The stay was set aside and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The respondent, a 17-year-old, pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a presumptive offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The YCJA required the young person to justify why an adult sentence should not be imposed and why a publication ban should apply.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that these reverse onus provisions violate section 7 of the Charter because they are inconsistent with the principle of fundamental justice that young people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral culpability.

The provisions were not saved by section 1, and the youth sentence imposed by the trial judge was upheld.

The young person appealed the trial judge's decision to sentence him as an adult for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by directly deducting two and a half years of pre-trial custody rather than treating it as a discretionary consideration.

The appeal was allowed, the adult sentence was set aside, and the maximum youth sentence was imposed to better facilitate the young person's rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's demeanour after the event and at trial as confirmatory of a lack of consent, and by failing to resolve critical credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while demeanour was not confirmatory of lack of consent, its use did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's comments were largely a response to defence counsel's suggestions.

The court also found the credibility issues raised by the appellant to be peripheral or adequately explained.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in a contract killing.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that lies told by one of the appellants to the police could be used to infer his participation in a murder scheme, rather than merely a carjacking scheme as the defence argued.

The Court of Appeal held this was a misdirection, as the post-offence conduct had no probative value in determining the level of culpability between manslaughter and murder.

The error tainted the convictions of all three appellants.

The appeals were allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for offences including being a party to pointing a loaded shotgun in a public place and possessing the weapon while subject to three firearms prohibitions and probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly distinguished between the appellant and his brother when imposing sentence.

Given the gravity of the offences, the appellant's record, and other aggravating circumstances, the sentence was deemed fit and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer, who took over the case shortly before trial expecting a guilty plea, was inadequately prepared when the trial proceeded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that claims of ineffective assistance based on inadequate preparation only lead to a miscarriage of justice if the lack of preparation undermines the reliability of the verdict.

The appellant failed to show any prejudice or that the trial could have been conducted differently.

On a ministerial review reference treated as a conviction appeal, the court admitted fresh forensic pathology and archival evidence undermining the reliability of the original time-of-death evidence that had been central to the Crown’s theory of exclusive opportunity.

Applying the fresh evidence framework, the court held that the conviction, as affirmed on the earlier reference, could no longer stand and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

At the remedial stage, the court undertook an extensive review of the historical record, expert evidence, archival material, and the practical impossibility of a retrial.

Although an acquittal was not the only conceivable verdict, the court concluded that an acquittal was clearly the more likely result at a hypothetical new trial and entered that remedy.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence or her refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

In the context of a Reference regarding his 1959 murder conviction, the applicant sought production of third-party nursing school and psychiatric records of a key Crown witness.

The applicant tendered fresh evidence from two individuals who claimed the witness admitted to lying at trial and sought psychiatric hospitalization to avoid testifying at a 1966 Supreme Court rehearing.

The Court of Appeal applied the O'Connor test and ordered production of the nursing school records, finding they provided independent confirmation of the fresh evidence with minimal prejudice to the witness's privacy.

However, the court refused to order production of the psychiatric records, concluding that the witness's high expectation of privacy outweighed the limited probative value of the one-page discharge form.

In a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice concerning the 1959 murder conviction of Steven Truscott, the Crown sought to introduce fresh evidence from a witness, Ms. X. The proposed evidence described a brief, unwanted sexual advance by Truscott in a cornfield approximately a year before the murder.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to rebut good character, challenge credibility, support another witness's testimony, and act as similar fact evidence identifying Truscott as the killer.

The Court of Appeal ruled on the admissibility without hearing the testimony viva voce, finding the evidence clearly irrelevant to any material fact in issue.

The Crown's application to tender the evidence was dismissed, and the defence's request for a publication ban on the ruling was denied.

The Crown applied for a review of a Superior Court order granting bail to the respondent, who was charged with the first-degree murder of his estranged wife.

The bail judge had released the respondent on the basis that public concern could be met through conditions and that denying bail would mean no one charged with first-degree murder facing a strong Crown case could get bail.

The Court of Appeal found the bail judge erred by equating public concern with public confidence and by placing insufficient weight on the four statutory factors under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

Given the gravity of the offence, the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case, the potential for a life sentence, and the brutal domestic nature of the murder, the Court of Appeal concluded that detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail order was set aside and the respondent was ordered returned to custody.

In the context of a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice regarding a 1959 murder conviction, the Crown applied for a production order under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code against third-party journalists.

The journalists had produced a documentary about the case and interviewed several witnesses who were now providing fresh evidence.

The journalists resisted, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a production order against a third party for investigative purposes.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to order production where it is in the interests of justice to assist in determining the admissibility of fresh evidence.

The court ordered the production of two of the three retained video recordings.

In a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice under s. 696.3(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code regarding the 1959 murder conviction of Steven Murray Truscott, the parties sought directions on the scope of the issues.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the Reference is limited to the issue of fresh evidence, which means material not presented in prior court proceedings (including the 1966 Supreme Court Reference).

The Court further held that the Kaufman Report does not limit the evidence the parties can tender, and that transcripts from the Kaufman investigation are part of the record but must satisfy hearsay exceptions to be admitted for their truth.

The Crown appealed a youth court decision that struck down provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) requiring a young person convicted of a presumptive offence to prove that a youth sentence is sufficient and to justify maintaining a publication ban.

The youth had pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the onus provisions violate section 7 of the Charter by presuming adult treatment and reversing the burden of proof for aggravating sentencing factors.

The Court also upheld the youth sentence imposed but quashed the trial judge's order requiring the Crown to pay the youth's costs for the Charter application.

In the context of a ministerial reference regarding Steven Murray Truscott's 1959 murder conviction, the court addressed two preliminary issues.

First, the court granted the appellant's request to have the panel hear witness evidence viva voce rather than out of court.

Second, the court dismissed a motion by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to permit camera access to the proceedings, finding that recording is prohibited under s. 136(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the statutory exemptions did not apply because the Crown did not consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death after driving his truck through a stop sign and colliding with another vehicle, killing the driver.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the mens rea requirement for dangerous driving and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the modified objective test from R. v. Hundal and that the verdict was supported by the evidence, including the appellant's failure to stop, lack of evasive action, and the absence of visibility impairment.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and failing to stop after striking a pedestrian and fleeing the scene.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the jury instructions were flawed.

The Crown appealed the 30-month sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the verdict was supported by the evidence, the jury instructions did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the sentence was entitled to deference.