Wendy M. Matheson

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Toronto Local Appeal Body.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and reserved costs, fixed at the agreed amount of $7,500, to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the all-inclusive amount of $5,000.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of J.S. Richard J. dated July 25, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting partial summary judgment to the respondent on property issues following a 34-year marriage.

The motion judge had dismissed the appellant's claims for unjust enrichment and an unequal division of net family property, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding allegations that the respondent diverted funds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's preference for the respondent's financial reconciliation over the appellant's expert report, and no error of law in determining the unequal division claim before finalizing the exact equalization payment.

The moving parties brought motions to quash part of an application for judicial review for lack of jurisdiction and to strike out certain expert evidence.

The underlying application challenged a decision by the Minister of Natural Resources regarding the Abitibi River Water Management Plan and sought a declaration that the Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act regime is unconstitutional for failing to trigger the duty to consult.

The Divisional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to hear the broad constitutional challenge and transferred that portion of the application to the Superior Court.

The motion to strike evidence was adjourned to the panel hearing the judicial review.

The appellant, a high-profile public figure, appealed a motion judge's dismissal of his request for a sealing order and publication ban in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider alternative protective measures such as anonymization and partial sealing.

The court also found a palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no evidence of harm to the child, noting the child's need for security guards and signs of distress.

A partial sealing order and publication ban were granted to protect the child's privacy.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director under the Discriminatory Business Practices Act.

The Director had concluded that the Act was not engaged by agreements between the University of Windsor and student groups regarding protest encampments, which included a provision limiting institutional academic agreements with Israeli universities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Director's conclusion that the University was not 'engaging in business' under the Act to be reasonable.

The court also upheld the Director's alternative finding that the agreements did not mandate a refusal to employ or promote, as required by section 4(1)3(ii) of the Act.

The Ministry of the Solicitor General sought judicial review of a Presiding Coroner's interlocutory decision regarding the scope of an upcoming inquest into seven deaths at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre.

The Coroner had included issues of correctional programming and staff absenteeism in the scope, and admitted expert evidence on programming.

The Divisional Court held that the challenge to the evidentiary ruling was premature.

On the scope issues, the Court found the Coroner's decision reasonable, as there was sufficient evidence to warrant considering whether programming and staffing were contributing factors to the deaths.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal of an interlocutory injunction order.

The underlying dispute involved competing oppression applications between 50/50 shareholders of a condominium project.

The Divisional Court found that the injunction order was interlocutory, not final, as it merely preserved the status quo pending the merits hearing.

The court reaffirmed that section 255 of the Business Corporations Act does not provide an appeal as of right for interlocutory orders.

Furthermore, because the standstill period had expired, the proposed appeal was moot.

The motion to quash was granted.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA) which concluded that the Ottawa Police Service adequately investigated his complaint against two police officers.

The applicant alleged the officers were rude and hung up on him when he called for assistance regarding his former physician.

LECA found the investigation adequate and the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of misconduct reasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the LECA decision reasonable and rejecting the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Bezaire J. dated August 14, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Audet J. dated June 12, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with no costs awarded.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of an adjudicator.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and reserved the costs of the motion, fixed at $5,000, to the appeal panel.

The parties were directed to request a case conference to address the appeal schedule and a request for an interim stay.

The appellant, an ODSP recipient with Avoidant/Restrictive Food Intake Disorder (ARFID), appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal denying her a special diet allowance.

The Tribunal had found that while ARFID required dietary modifications, the appellant failed to prove it resulted in additional food costs compared to a regular healthy diet.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellant raised numerous procedural, substantive, and constitutional issues, including challenges to the Tribunal's rules and the introduction of new evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or procedural fairness in the Tribunal's decisions, and declined to hear constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal without proper notice.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Penny J. dated March 24, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with no order as to costs.

The applicant commenced a second application to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) seeking over $100 million in damages against her insurer, adjusters, and health professionals for alleged tortious conduct related to her statutory accident benefits (SABS) claim.

The LAT declined to process the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to award damages or make orders against non-insurer parties.

The applicant sought judicial review and appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court dismissed the proceedings under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that the LAT is a statutory body without jurisdiction to award general or non-compensatory damages, and that the proceedings constituted an abuse of process and an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final LAT decision regarding her SABS.

The applicant/appellant commenced a second application to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) seeking damages and declaratory relief against her insurer and various non-insurer parties for alleged tortious conduct related to her statutory accident benefits (SABS) claims.

The LAT dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, noting it had no authority to award damages or make orders against non-insurers.

The applicant/appellant appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and subsequently dismissed the proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding that the LAT lacks statutory jurisdiction to grant the requested relief and that the proceedings were an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final LAT decision.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision terminating his occupancy in a non-profit housing co-operative for failing to pay regular monthly housing charges.

The appellant argued the LTB failed to address the co-op manager's non-compliance with bylaws and that the hearing was procedurally unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the LTB correctly restricted its inquiry to its limited jurisdiction under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, and that the appellant failed to demonstrate any procedural unfairness during the hearing.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which upheld a finding of professional misconduct and a one-month suspension.

The misconduct involved sexual harassment of employees and uncivil correspondence to clients and a client's father.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness and that the rules of professional conduct regarding incivility did not apply to communications with a client's family member.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, confirming that the incivility rule applies to communications with 'any other person', and upholding the penalty and costs awards.