Wendy M. Matheson

Investors in real estate development projects brought an oppression application under ss. 161 and 248 of the Business Corporations Act seeking, among other relief, the appointment of an inspector to investigate the use of investor funds.

The evidence showed project funds had been commingled in a separate entity rather than segregated as investors had been led to expect, financial disclosure was deficient, audited financial statements were unavailable, and a dividend was withheld from one preferred shareholder.

The court held that these circumstances raised a prima facie case that reasonable security holder expectations had been defeated and that oppressive conduct may have occurred.

The court ordered the appointment of a court‑appointed inspector and granted additional relief including payment of an unpaid dividend, redemption of preferred shares, and production of a shareholder list.

A charitable foundation appealed a decision of the Minister of Revenue denying a refund of retail sales tax paid on prepared food products served at fundraising events where attendees paid a single ticket price.

The dispute concerned whether food provided at such events was supplied “without specific charge” under s. 12 of Regulation 1012 made under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

The court applied modern principles of statutory interpretation and concluded that the phrase requires a distinct charge for the food itself, not merely that food costs be embedded within a bundled event price.

Because the ticket price for the events did not itemize or separately allocate a charge for the prepared food products, the food was provided “without specific charge.” The foundation was therefore entitled to the exemption and the requested refund.

The applicant sought a declaration that a 1991 default judgment against him was discharged by his bankruptcy and absolute discharge later that same year.

The respondent argued the debt survived under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act because it allegedly arose from misappropriation of trust funds under the Construction Lien Act.

The court held that the default judgment, obtained from the registrar on unpaid invoices, did not incorporate a finding of breach of trust and that the pleadings and deemed admissions were insufficient to establish misappropriation.

The court also declined to vary or amend the judgment under Rules 19.08 or 59.06 or order a trial of the issue, citing delay and prejudice caused by the loss of records and witnesses over more than two decades.

The court declared that the debt was discharged by the applicant’s bankruptcy.

The moving defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The self-represented plaintiff alleged defamation, conspiracy, harassment, and mental distress arising from a commercial lease dispute and related litigation.

The court held that the pleadings failed to properly plead the elements of any recognized cause of action and consisted largely of vague and conclusory allegations.

The claim against the moving defendants was struck as it was plain and obvious that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

However, the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the statement of claim within 45 days.

The defendants moved for a stay of a civil action on the basis of an arbitration clause contained in a later energy supply agreement, or alternatively sought an extension of time to deliver a statement of defence.

The plaintiff alleged that the agreements were void and sought damages for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation relating to the formation of the contracts, asserting that the agreements were not authorized and were based on misrepresentations regarding energy savings.

The court held that the arbitration clause applied only to disputes “under” the agreement and did not encompass a challenge to the existence or validity of the agreement itself.

As the dispute concerned the validity of the agreements rather than performance under them, it fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause.

The motion to stay the action was therefore dismissed, though the defendants were granted additional time to deliver their statements of defence.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to note the Crown in default and obtain default judgment after alleging that the defendant failed to deliver a statement of defence.

The court considered whether the plaintiff complied with the notice requirement in s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, which requires that notice of claim be served at least 60 days before commencing an action.

The court held that an action is commenced when the statement of claim is issued, not when it is served.

Because the claim was issued before the required notice period elapsed, the proceeding was a nullity and the statutory precondition to suing the Crown was not met.

In addition, the Crown had delivered a statement of defence before being noted in default, meaning it was not in default in any event.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment alleging civil fraud arising from altered trust ledger statements relating to land transfer tax amounts in three condominium transactions.

The moving party alleged the defendant misrepresented tax amounts, resulting in a $40,000 discrepancy and sought damages, tracing, and disgorgement.

The court found that the defendant had made a false representation and knew it was false, but determined that the plaintiff failed to establish the required element of loss because the $40,000 had been repaid pursuant to a certified cheque delivered in connection with criminal proceedings.

As a result, the claim for repayment of the $40,000 could not succeed on summary judgment.

Remaining claims, including disgorgement and related relief, were left to be determined at trial.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a claim alleging wrongful dismissal, breach of contract, unpaid commissions, discrimination, and various aggravated damages arising from the termination of a financial services associate relationship.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff was an employee or an independent contractor and whether the termination was valid under the governing agreement.

Applying the legal test for employment relationships and considering the contractual terms and surrounding evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff operated as an independent contractor.

The court further held that the agreement permitted termination where minimum commission levels were not maintained and that the evidentiary record showed the plaintiff earned insufficient commissions.

Claims for unpaid commissions and other damages, including emotional distress and discrimination, were unsupported by evidence.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action on summary judgment, the successful defendant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued the claimed amount was excessive and requested that no costs be ordered, asserting the dispute could have been avoided if the defendant had obtained a current appraisal when the property was sold.

The court held that the core issue had already been litigated and decided against the plaintiff in earlier injunction proceedings and that the plaintiff chose to re-litigate it.

Applying the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the requested partial indemnity costs reasonable.

Costs were awarded to the defendant in the amount claimed.

Lawyers sought a declaration that their professional liability insurer owed a duty to defend them in an underlying negligence action arising from a client's failed business investment.

The insurance policy excluded coverage for claims related to investment advice unless the advice was a direct consequence of professional legal services.

Although the pleadings alone could potentially fall within the policy’s coverage for professional services, the policy contained a "notwithstanding" clause permitting the court to consider extrinsic evidence.

The evidence showed the lawyer provided investment advice before any professional legal services were rendered.

The court held the investment advice exclusion applied and the insurer reasonably denied coverage.

Following a decision that granted a motion to strike certain affidavit evidence but dismissed an application challenging an arbitral award, both parties sought costs.

The respondent, successful on the application, sought substantial indemnity costs, while the applicant sought costs for its successful motion to strike.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to either party, finding the conduct did not reach the threshold of reprehensible behaviour and there were no settlement offers.

The court held that each side had partial success and that reasonable partial indemnity costs would be similar for both.

As a result, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs.

Following a prior decision striking the claim against an insurer as an abuse of process, the successful defendant sought costs totaling $10,000 on a partial indemnity basis for the motion, the action, and written submissions.

The plaintiffs argued the award should reflect only the earlier bill of costs relating to the motion and challenged certain items claimed for the broader action as not properly recoverable on a party-and-party basis.

The court considered the range reflected in the competing bills of costs for the motion and the conduct underlying the abuse of process finding.

The court fixed costs for the motion at $5,400, added $300 for written costs submissions and $1,000 for the action.

Total costs were set at $6,700 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following a successful motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful moving party sought full costs of $3,647 plus an additional punitive amount, alleging the opposing party’s conduct caused the dismissal and necessitated the motion.

The responding party argued the amount sought was unreasonable and proposed a substantially lower costs award.

The court accepted that the responding party’s conduct could be considered but declined to award the full amount or punitive costs.

Costs of $3,000 plus HST were ordered payable within 30 days.

The insurer brought a motion under rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss or strike portions of a Toronto action commenced after a prior Newmarket action arising from the same motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs had earlier attempted to add insurers as defendants in the Newmarket proceeding under Rule 26 but were directed to bring the motion on notice.

Instead of complying, they commenced a second action in Toronto asserting overlapping claims against the same defendants and the insurer.

The court held that commencing the new action circumvented the procedural requirements of Rule 26 and the court’s supervisory jurisdiction, thereby constituting an abuse of process.

The paragraphs of the Toronto statement of claim asserting claims against the moving insurer were struck without leave to amend.

A family law proceeding addressing child support where the custodial parent sought support and special expenses for a child.

The responding parent argued that religious beliefs exempted him from legal obligations to pay support and provided minimal financial disclosure while claiming near-zero income.

The court rejected pseudo-legal and religious arguments against the authority of Canadian law, referencing Meads v. Meads.

Finding the respondent intentionally unemployed and capable of working, the court imputed income pursuant to s. 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

Child support and limited s.7 special expenses were ordered based on the imputed income.

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitral award arising from a dispute between two agricultural businesses over the purchase and sale of carrot products conducted under the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation arbitration process.

The applicant argued jurisdictional errors, procedural unfairness, improper reliance on mediation materials, lack of arbitrator expertise, and the applicability of the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

The court held that the Arbitration Act, 1991 applied because the dispute involved two Ontario businesses and the arbitration was not international.

The application to set aside the award was statute‑barred because it was brought outside the 30‑day limit under the Arbitration Act and the court had no jurisdiction to extend the time.

In any event, the court found no jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness warranting intervention.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay under Rule 48 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The parties had agreed that the defendant would file the trial record and set the action down for trial by a court‑ordered deadline, but the defendant failed to file the trial record, resulting in the dismissal.

The plaintiff promptly brought a motion after learning of the dismissal and explained that the failure arose from the defendant’s omission.

The court held that the plaintiff had provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and that the defendant could not rely on its own failure to comply with the timetable.

Given admissions made by the defendant during discovery regarding the essential elements of the claim, the court found no non‑compensable prejudice and set aside the dismissal order.