Yoni Silberman

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and suffered an intracranial brain contusion.

The insurer placed her in the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS), limiting her benefits to $3,500.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal upheld this decision, finding that the definition of 'minor injury' includes all contusions, including brain contusions.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the Tribunal erred in law by focusing on the degree of impairment rather than the nature of the injury.

The court held that an intracranial brain contusion is not a 'minor injury' under the SABS, allowed the appeal, and ordered the appellant removed from the MIG.

The Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the Court in an appeal concerning the interpretation of 'minor injury' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that OTLA's proposed submissions overlapped substantially with the appellant's factum and that the perspective and interests were adequately represented without OTLA's involvement.

The court concluded that OTLA was unlikely to make a useful contribution to the resolution of the appeal.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a slip and fall in a restaurant parking lot, which was previously determined to be an accident under the Schedule.

The Tribunal found the applicant was entitled to income replacement benefits for a closed period until he returned to work.

Claims for attendant care benefits were dismissed as the applicant failed to prove the expenses were incurred.

The Tribunal awarded funding for an attendant care assessment, physiotherapy, and partial occupational therapy, finding them reasonable and necessary.

The applicant's request for a special award under s. 10 of O. Reg. 664 was denied, as the insurer's initial denial based on the definition of an accident was not unreasonable.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision finding that her brain contusion fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in law by interpreting 'contusion' in the definition of 'minor injury' to include brain contusions, asserting this was incompatible with the catastrophic impairment definition.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, holding that the legislature did not exclude intracranial contusions from the minor injury definition, and a brain contusion remains a minor injury unless it results in a non-minor impairment.

The Tribunal also found no error of fact in its weighing of the medical evidence.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The respondent insurer raised a preliminary issue, arguing the applicant was barred from proceeding because she failed to notify the insurer within seven days of the accident, as required by section 32(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's husband had reported the accident to the insurer's property damage line on the day it occurred.

Following recent Divisional Court binding authority, the Tribunal held that reporting the accident itself constitutes sufficient notice under section 32(1), triggering the insurer's obligation to inquire about injuries and provide benefit application forms.

The applicant was therefore not barred from proceeding.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, arguing her injuries warranted removal from the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) due to a head injury, chronic pain, and pre-existing conditions.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant's cerebral contusion fell within the definition of a minor injury and rejected the assertion that she suffered a traumatic brain injury or concussion.

The Tribunal also found insufficient evidence of chronic pain causing functional impairment, noting the applicant returned to work within two months and failed to meet the criteria under the AMA Guides.

Finally, the applicant failed to provide compelling evidence that her pre-existing conditions prevented maximal recovery within the MIG.

The application for treatment plans outside the MIG, an award, and interest was dismissed.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision which found he was not involved in an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Schedule.

The applicant had slipped and fallen on ice while reaching to open his vehicle door.

The Vice-Chair granted the reconsideration, finding the initial adjudicator erred in law by concluding the slip and fall was an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The Vice-Chair held that ice is a common and well-known risk when entering or exiting a vehicle, and thus does not constitute an intervening act.

The decision was varied to find the applicant was involved in an accident, and the substantive hearing was ordered to proceed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after slipping and falling on snow and ice while walking towards his remotely started vehicle in a restaurant parking lot.

The respondent denied benefits on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under section 3(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal applied the purpose and causation tests, finding that while the purpose test was met, the causation test failed because the snow and ice constituted an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) after the insurer terminated them.

The Tribunal found that the applicant, a self-employed painter and contractor, suffered a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of his pre-accident employment within 104 weeks of the accident, primarily due to a specific phobia of driving.

For the post-104-week period, the Tribunal found the applicant was completely unable to engage in any employment for which he was reasonably suited by education, training, or experience, due to a combination of physical and psychological impairments caused by the accident.

The applicant was awarded ongoing IRBs and interest, but his claim for a special award under Regulation 664 was dismissed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motorcycle accident, including non-earner benefits (NEB), medical benefits for physiotherapy and massage therapy, and an award for unreasonable delay.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found the applicant was not entitled to the NEB because his pain did not practically prevent him from engaging in his pre-accident activities.

However, the Tribunal granted the medical benefits for physiotherapy and massage therapy, finding them reasonable and necessary to address ongoing pain.

The Tribunal also awarded a 10% penalty under s. 10 of O. Reg. 664, finding the insurer unreasonably delayed payment by denying treatment while simultaneously paying NEBs.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received attendant care benefits, which were subsequently denied.

The parties executed a partial release for past benefits up to May 11, 2017.

The applicant later submitted a new treatment plan and assessment form, which the respondent denied on the basis that the benefits had been terminated more than two years prior.

The respondent argued the applicant was statute-barred from disputing the denial.

The Tribunal found that while the initial denial was clear and unequivocal, the justice of the case required extending the limitation period under section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act.

The Tribunal reasoned that the partial release only extinguished past claims, giving the applicant a bona fide belief that future claims remained open, and found minimal prejudice to the respondent.

The defendant daycare brought a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action after a three-year-old child broke his arm falling from a play structure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues of supervision adequacy, staff training, and policy implementation required significant credibility assessments and a highly contextual legal analysis, making the case unsuitable for resolution via summary judgment.

The court emphasized the difficulty of assessing credibility on a paper record, particularly when the injured child could not provide evidence, and declined to order a mini-trial.

The applicant sought dispute resolution for non-earner benefits and two physiotherapy treatment plans following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent insurer argued the applications were filed beyond the two-year limitation period.

The Tribunal found the non-earner benefits claim was statute-barred because the insurer provided a clear and unequivocal denial with proper dispute resolution information more than two years prior, and subsequent applications did not restart the clock.

However, the Tribunal found the treatment plan claims were not out of time because the insurer provided confusing and conflicting information in a later denial regarding the limitation period, which restarted the clock.

The treatment plan claims were permitted to proceed to a hearing.

Following the plaintiff's success in resisting an appeal from a Master's order, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale or, alternatively, on a partial indemnity scale.

The court found no reason to award costs on an elevated scale and fixed the plaintiff's costs on a partial indemnity basis at $4,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

An Ontario plaintiff injured while visiting New York commenced an Ontario action against the New York driver and her own insurer under the OPCF 44R underinsured motorist coverage.

The insurer asserted a cross‑claim for indemnity against the driver.

The driver moved to permanently stay the claim and cross‑claim for lack of jurisdiction simpliciter and alternatively on forum non conveniens grounds.

Applying the framework in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court held that none of the recognized presumptive connecting factors for tort jurisdiction were present, as the defendant resided in New York, carried on no business in Ontario, and the accident occurred in New York.

The insurer’s argument that the driver was a necessary party to its cross‑claim did not create a presumptive connecting factor.

The Ontario action and cross‑claim were permanently stayed.