Lisa Marie Allegro

A non-party brought a motion to be added as a respondent or, alternatively, to be granted leave to intervene in a family law application concerning parenting time and decision-making authority for a child.

The non-party is the biological father of the respondent's older child and has developed a close relationship with the subject child through his co-parenting arrangement with the respondent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the non-party did not meet the statutory criteria under the Children's Law Reform Act or the procedural requirements under the Family Law Rules for being added as a party or for intervention.

The court held that the non-party had no legal interest in the application and that his presence was not necessary to determine the issues between the applicant and respondent.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Bezaire J. dated August 14, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

This decision concerns an appeal by James Brent Maxwell from an arbitration award regarding child support, retroactive child support, and costs, following a lengthy family law dispute with Lynne La Fontaine.

The court reviews the arbitrator’s findings on income imputation, retroactive support, and the application of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, particularly regarding support for adult children attending post-secondary education away from home.

The court finds that while the arbitrator made a reviewable error by failing to conduct a proper analysis under s. 3(2)(b) of the Guidelines for adult children living away from home, most other findings were within her discretion.

The appeal is allowed in part, with directions for further submissions on quantification if the parties cannot resolve the issue.

This case involves a dispute between D.P. (father) and K.G. (mother) regarding parenting arrangements, child support, and spousal support for their child, L.P., born in 2019.

The parties had a brief common-law relationship and entered into several separation agreements.

D.P. sought joint decision-making, expanded parenting time, and termination of spousal support, while K.G. sought sole decision-making, continued spousal support, and higher imputed income for D.P. The court found K.G. to have made false allegations against D.P. and to be intentionally underemployed.

The court ordered joint decision-making, adopted D.P.'s proposed parenting schedule, imputed incomes for both parties, and terminated spousal support, offsetting it with K.G.'s credit card debt to D.P.

The appellant father appealed a final restraining order granted by a motion judge during a motion for temporary relief.

The respondent mother had sought a temporary restraining order after being violently attacked by the appellant's father.

Neither party requested a final restraining order, and both were content with the temporary order in place.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by granting a final order on an interim motion without giving the parties an opportunity to make submissions.

The temporary restraining order was reinstated.

The respondent mother brought a motion in the Superior Court of Justice to enforce child support and section 7 expenses provisions of a separation agreement that had been filed with the Ontario Court of Justice.

The applicant father brought a cross-motion challenging the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to enforce or vary a final order of the Ontario Court of Justice arising from section 35 of the Family Law Act.

The applicant's cross-motion was granted, and the proceeding was transferred to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion seeking the return of the parties' two children from Quebec to Ontario, sole decision-making responsibility, and primary residence.

The respondent mother argued that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction and that the motion was not urgent.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the children were habitually resident in Ontario prior to their removal to Quebec, thereby granting Ontario jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court ordered temporary joint decision-making responsibility but adjourned the issues of primary residence and the return of the children to allow the parties to adduce further evidence.