Timothy Pinos

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the applicants' judicial review application for delay, or alternatively, to strike a recent amendment to the application.

The applicants had commenced the application to challenge regulations under the Payday Loans Act, 2008, but delayed advancing it while monitoring a related case and negotiating with government officials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the applicants provided an adequate explanation for the delay and the respondents suffered no prejudice.

The court also allowed the amendment to stand, noting the broader public interest issues involved, and appointed a case management judge to prevent further delay.

Following a lengthy commercial dispute involving allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, misuse of confidential information, wrongful dismissal, and fraudulent conveyances, the court determined the allocation and scale of costs arising from two trials and related proceedings.

The litigation involved numerous parties and mixed results, with certain defendants fully successful and others partially liable.

The court concluded that the complexity of the litigation and the magnitude of the claimed costs warranted referral of most quantification issues to an assessment officer under Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded in several instances, including where unproven allegations of fraud or serious misconduct had been advanced, while partial indemnity costs applied to others depending on conduct and settlement offers.

The court also considered the appropriateness of Bullock and Sanderson orders in allocating responsibility among defendants.

Two related applications arose from a commercial arbitration concerning a Liquidity Payment obligation under a financing arrangement between a dairy company and a pension fund.

The moving party sought to set aside a final arbitral award under s. 46(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, alleging breaches of procedural fairness and arguing the arbitrator’s contractual interpretation was unreasonable.

The court held the arbitration process was fair, the parties had adequate opportunity to present their cases, and the arbitrator’s interpretation of the Liquidity Payment Agreement was consistent with its plain language.

The application to set aside the award was dismissed.

The responding party’s application to enforce the arbitral award and supplementary costs award was granted, with interest fixed at 3% in accordance with the contract and applicable statutory rates.

The appeal concerned whether online music previews streamed before purchase are fair dealing for the purpose of research under the Copyright Act.

The Court held that research must be interpreted broadly and assessed from the user perspective, not only from the service provider perspective.

Applying the CCH framework, the Court found the previews fair in purpose, character, amount, alternatives, nature of the work, and market effect.

Because the previews were short, lower quality, temporary, and supported consumer selection without substituting for purchases, no additional royalties were payable for them.

The appellant succeeded on appeal in obtaining a new trial on damages for one of its breach of contract claims against the respondent.

In this costs endorsement, the Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $50,000 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal.

For the trial costs, the court found that despite the appellant's limited success on appeal, the respondent remained the overwhelmingly successful party at trial, having defeated five of six claims totaling $121 million.

The court reduced the trial judge's costs award to the respondent to reflect the appellant's partial success and the removal of a Rule 49 substantial indemnity consequence, awarding the respondent $753,076.37 in trial costs.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motions for leave to appeal and for a stay, the successful responding parties sought their costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The moving party failed to provide any costs submissions.

The court considered the principle of proportionality and the moving party's conduct which thwarted the bankruptcy trustee's mandate.

Costs were fixed at $20,000 for the trustee and $7,323.41 for the applicants, payable by the moving party.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order appointing an investigative receiver over it.

The moving party argued the motion judge erred by not first finding evidence of fraud or dissipation of assets.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motion judge applied the correct test under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act and that the appointment was just and convenient given the interconnectedness of the moving party with bankrupt companies and the flow of funds between them.

The test for leave to appeal was not met.

The appellant, an independent power producer, appealed a trial judgment that found the respondent breached a power purchase agreement but awarded no damages due to unreliable evidence.

The trial judge had concluded that the respondent failed to include an inter-area transmission credit in its avoided costs calculations, but dismissed the damages claim because the appellant's expert evidence was deemed unreliable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of breach but held that the trial judge erred in dismissing the damages claim entirely.

Relying on Martin v. Goldfarb, the Court found that where a significant loss is proven but the quantum is difficult to assess, the plaintiff should not be denied compensation.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial on damages was ordered.

The appellant franchisees appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class proceeding against the respondent franchisor and distributors.

The appellants alleged price maintenance under the Competition Act, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract regarding mark-ups and sourcing fees for supplies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in principle by focusing exclusively on the individualized nature of damages and failing to recognize that the breach of the Competition Act, breach of contract, and the fact of loss were common issues.

The Court conditionally certified the class action, concluding it was the preferable procedure to achieve judicial economy, access to justice, and behaviour modification.

Yamana Gold Inc. brought an application to cease-trade the shareholder rights plan (poison pill) of Meridian Gold Inc. amid a hostile takeover bid.

The Ontario Securities Commission determined that Meridian's board had sufficient time to respond to the bid and assess any competing proposals.

The Commission ordered the poison pill cease-traded effective September 11, 2007, on the condition that Yamana extended its bid to the same date.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal (majority) allowed the appeal, finding that the admission relied upon by the motion judge did not establish liability for the full proceeds of the machines purchased by Husky.

The Court concluded that there were material facts in dispute regarding whether the respondent acquired ownership of the machines and whether it paid for them, which were necessary to determine the quantum of loss.

The appeal was allowed, with costs reserved to the trial judge.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to set aside service outside Ontario and permanently stay the action on the basis that Ontario was not the forum conveniens.

The Divisional Court determined that the standard of review for a Master's decision on forum conveniens is correctness, as it is vital to the final disposition of the lawsuit.

Applying this standard, the Court upheld the Master's finding that Ontario was the appropriate forum, noting the plaintiff's central location and the lack of evidence showing another jurisdiction was clearly more appropriate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, investors in a failed real estate redevelopment project, appealed the dismissal of their claims for rescission and damages against the promoter, Shelter Corporation.

The trial judge found that Shelter breached numerous contractual commitments, causing the loss of the investment, but held that rescission was unavailable and no damages were proven because the project was too heavily leveraged to survive the market downturn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the breaches were not fundamental and that the appellants had not proven substantial damages.

However, the Court allowed the appeal to the limited extent of awarding nominal damages of $1 to each appellant for the proven breaches of contract.

A cross-appeal by the financial institutions regarding equitable set-off and penalty interest rates was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the quantum of costs awarded to the respondents by the application judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in principle by failing to analyze the application of costs principles to the facts.

The costs awarded to one respondent effectively amounted to substantial indemnity costs, while the costs awarded to the other were disproportionate to its participation.

The appeal was allowed, and the costs awards were reduced.

The appellant bank appealed a trial judgment holding it liable for the unauthorized transfer of $4 million of the respondent's funds.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by relying on hearsay evidence to reject its defences of acquiescence, ratification, and contributory negligence, by failing to draw an adverse inference, and by not reducing damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the out-of-court statements were properly admitted to show the respondent's state of mind, not for their truth.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on the adverse inference and damages.

Following a decision ordering a new trial, the court issued an addendum on costs.

The court clarified that the new trial would only extend to claims that formed the subject-matter of the appeal, and stayed the execution of a damages award against one respondent pending the new trial.

The costs of the first trial were reserved to the presiding justice at the new trial.

The appellant was awarded costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal, fixed at $36,000 on a partial indemnity basis, specifically for the motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment that found it had wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee and dismissed its claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

On appeal, the appellant brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence showing the respondent had been criminally charged with defrauding the appellant of over $200,000 through a secret scheme involving a third-party corporation.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the Palmer criteria, including due diligence, as the evidence was largely uncovered through a subsequent police investigation.

Concluding that the fresh evidence could have decisively affected the trial judge's findings on the respondent's credibility and loyalty, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a medical malpractice action on summary judgment.

The respondents had relied on expert opinion evidence that the standard of care was met, while the plaintiffs had no expert evidence supporting negligence.

The court held that neither the alleged "high forceps" theory nor the "excessive force" theory raised a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed and no costs were awarded.

The complainant, a foreign-trained medical doctor, alleged discrimination on the basis of age, place of origin, and ethnic origin after being terminated from an unfunded residency program in ophthalmology at the University of Toronto.

The Board of Inquiry found that the admissions process for funded positions was competitive and non-discriminatory.

The complainant was offered an unfunded position as an act of compassion but ultimately failed his examinations on multiple occasions.

The Board concluded that the complainant was evaluated fairly and dismissed the complaint, finding no evidence of unlawful discrimination.