Thomas R. Lederer

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Davies J. dated May 13, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order that directed estate funds to be paid out of court and removed an estate trustee.

The appellant sought directions and an accounting, effectively attempting to secure funds for a counterclaim against the estate.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the original motion was improperly brought and the appellant had not established the prerequisites for a Mareva injunction to hold the funds as security.

The appellant appealed a Family Court order awarding the respondent spousal support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines for both quantum and duration, as well as a payment for unjust enrichment based on a joint family venture.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by not deducting the respondent's Ontario Disability Support Program benefits from the spousal support calculation and by finding an inability to work without independent expert evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the support award and upholding the trial judge's application of the joint family venture framework to the unjust enrichment claim.

The Ministry of Health applied for judicial review of decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that the Ministry engaged in systemic gender discrimination in setting compensation for midwives.

The Tribunal found that the Ministry had abandoned historical compensation principles that aligned midwives with community health centre physicians, leading to an inequitable compensation gap.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's findings of adverse treatment and the connection to sex were reasonable.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's remedial orders, which included a 20% retroactive compensation increase and $7,500 per eligible midwife for injury to dignity.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision that found it lacked jurisdiction to grant interim statutory accident benefits.

Before the appeal could be heard, the appellant's underlying claim was settled, rendering the appeal moot.

The appellant argued the court should still hear the appeal because the issue was evasive of review and of public importance.

Applying the Borowski factors, the Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding that the issue was not evasive of review and that a future, non-moot case would provide a better factual foundation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a notice from the Travel Industry Council of Ontario (TICO) requiring it to register as a travel agent or face potential charges under the Travel Industry Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application at the outset of the hearing, finding it lacked jurisdiction.

The court held that TICO's notice was not an exercise of a statutory power of decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, as TICO only has the power to seek an injunction or initiate a prosecution, not to unilaterally decide the applicant's legal rights.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitral award that found him liable to the respondent unions for damages.

He argued he was denied procedural fairness because he did not receive actual notice of the arbitration hearing, and that the award was unreasonable due to his prior bankruptcy and the damages assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that proper notice was given in accordance with the collective agreement and registered business addresses.

The court also held that the bankruptcy issue was not before the arbitrator and the damages assessment was reasonable.

Furthermore, the application was dismissed on the basis of excessive and unexplained delay.

The moving party sought a stay of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario remedial decision pending the outcome of its judicial review application.

The moving party argued that compliance with the remedial orders would divert critical resources away from the COVID-19 pandemic response.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Divisional Court found that the moving party established a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the public interest, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion was granted, and the Tribunal's orders were stayed until 10 days following the release of the judicial review decision.

The applicant, acting as substitute decision-maker for his incapable elderly father, brought an application for judicial review challenging a hospital's COVID-19 visitor restriction policy and a related memorandum from the Chief Medical Officer of Health.

The applicant argued the restrictions violated his father's rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter by preventing in-person visits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that neither the hospital's policy nor the CMOH memorandum were subject to judicial review as they did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision with a sufficient public character.

Furthermore, the court held that even if reviewable, the policies did not infringe the Charter, as they were based on sound medical and epidemiological evidence rather than discriminatory presumptions, were not arbitrary or overbroad, and did not constitute state-imposed punishment or treatment.

The self-represented appellants sought to appeal a decision of the motion judge, who had dismissed their motion to extend the time to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board decision.

The appellants had delayed six years before seeking the extension.

The Divisional Court found no reasonable explanation for the delay and no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motion judge's decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, ITP SA, appealed a Master's decision granting a stay of an Ontario action commenced by the respondent, Nexen Energy ULC.

The parties' contract contained a forum selection clause designating Ontario courts and Alberta law.

Following a pipeline rupture, Nexen commenced a multi-party action in Alberta and a protective action in Ontario against ITP.

ITP sought to use the Ontario action solely to determine two limitation of liability clauses under the forum selection clause, while agreeing the rest of the action could proceed in Alberta.

The Master stayed the Ontario action, finding 'strong cause' to deviate from the forum selection clause because ITP could not 'slice and dice' the litigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master applied the correct test and made no palpable and overriding error.

The applicant, an international medical graduate, failed her Assessment Verification Period in the university's emergency medicine residency program.

She brought a motion for an interim injunction to prevent the university from reporting her failure to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario pending her internal appeal and judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no irreparable harm and concluding that the balance of convenience favoured the university, which has a statutory obligation to report such outcomes to the College.

The plaintiff brought a class action against the Crown alleging negligent regulation of Vitek Proplast temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants by Health Canada.

The plaintiff claimed that the Crown owed a private law duty of care to the class members and breached that duty by failing to properly regulate the devices, issuing Notices of Compliance negligently, and failing to adequately warn the public or recall the devices.

Following a lengthy common issues trial, the Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action.

The court applied the Anns test and concluded that the Crown did not owe a private law duty of care to the class members, as there was insufficient proximity between the regulator and the unidentifiable group of potential implant recipients.

Furthermore, the court found that even if a duty of care existed, the Crown did not breach the applicable standard of care, as its regulatory actions and responses to the evolving scientific understanding of the implants' risks were reasonable and appropriate.

The plaintiff appealed a trial judge's decision finding she did not meet the threshold requirements under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff argued the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors by failing to explain his preference for conflicting medical evidence and by omitting reference to the evidence of her chiropractor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review is palpable and overriding error, and finding no such error in the trial judge's careful review of the evidence.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a grievance arbitration award that substituted a thirty-day suspension for the termination of an employee.

The Divisional Court stayed the application as premature, noting that the arbitrator had remitted the matter back to the parties and remained seized of the issue of whether reinstatement was an appropriate remedy.

The court held that judicial review should wait until the final disposition of the remedy to avoid overlapping work and inconsistent decisions.

The applicant unit owner commenced a proceeding against the respondent condominium corporation for damages arising from disruptive repair work to the common elements.

The parties settled the underlying dispute but left the issue of costs for the court to determine.

The applicant sought costs of $21,419.81, while the respondent sought costs of $40,069.05 based on an earlier settlement offer.

The court declined to award costs to either party, finding that the dispute could have been settled earlier but that penalizing the applicant for not accepting a withdrawn offer would disincentivize cooperative settlements.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's product liability action as statute-barred.

The plaintiff had killed his son while experiencing a psychotic episode, which he alleged was caused by the defendant's antidepressant medication.

The court found that while the plaintiff had cognitive awareness of his potential claim earlier, he lacked the psychological capacity to commence the action until his absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a receiver and manager of a limited partnership, brought a motion for summary judgment in an action against subscribers to recover alleged debts under "Assumption of Loan and Debt Agreements." The defendants opposed the motion and sought dismissal of the action.

The court found that these agreements were neither guarantees nor indemnities enforceable by the Limited Partnership, but rather primary obligations to the original creditor contingent on the success of the underlying transaction.

Furthermore, the court determined the action was statute-barred, as the limitation period for a claim for contribution and indemnity had expired, having commenced no later than when a Master refused to add the subscribers as defendants in a prior action.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

Mirza Baig appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding his involuntary patient status and incapacity to consent to antipsychotic treatment.

The court examined whether the Board erred in finding the statutory requirements for involuntary status under the Mental Health Act were met and if there was sufficient evidence for incapacity.

The court affirmed that "serious bodily harm" includes psychological harm and found corroborating evidence for the risk of harm to others.

It also upheld the Board's finding of incapacity, noting that the patient's delusional beliefs prevented him from appreciating treatment consequences, despite arguments regarding substance-induced psychosis.

The defendants were successful in defending a defamation action brought by the plaintiffs regarding a scientific controversy.

The defendants sought costs of over $2.2 million, while the plaintiffs proposed approximately $236,000.

The court noted the defendants presented a comprehensive and formidable defence, whereas the plaintiffs' case was not robust and relied on a failed strategy.

Applying the principles for fixing costs, the court balanced the need to indemnify the successful, blameless defendants against the risk of deterring future litigants.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $1,478,766.64, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.