Thomas R. Lederer

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that a document signed by the parties constituted a full and final release settling their real estate development dispute.

The plaintiff argued the document was merely a receipt for a partial payment and that no settlement was reached.

The court found that the document lacked the necessary reciprocity and clarity to be definitively interpreted as a release without a trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, as genuine issues for trial remained regarding the context and meaning of the document.

The plaintiff, a commercial bakery, sought damages for stock spoilage and business interruption following a power outage caused by an ice storm.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the policy's exclusions for loss or damage to electrical transmission or distribution lines not located on the premises applied.

The court found that the policy exclusions clearly precluded coverage for both stock spoilage and business interruption losses caused by damage to off-premises electrical transmission lines.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the insurer.

The defendants brought two motions to amend their pleadings in an action for "section 8" damages under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.

The proposed amendments sought to introduce a defence based on the ex turpi causa doctrine, arguing that the plaintiff's alleged non-infringing alternative (NIA) would infringe a third-party patent, thus making hypothetical sales unlawful and precluding damages.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the amendments were not tenable and would cause non-compensable prejudice.

The court, applying Rule 26.01, found the proposed amendments raised tenable legal arguments, distinguishing and interpreting relevant case law on NIAs and the ex turpi causa doctrine.

The court also found that any prejudice to the plaintiff could be compensated by costs or an adjournment.

The motions to amend the pleadings were granted.

This case involved two consolidated applications, which proceeded as a trial, concerning disputes over an automobile export business.

The applicants, Wangdah Material Toronto Ltd. and Qing Chen, sought damages for unpaid deposits and commissions related to vehicles purchased for export to China.

The respondent, 1691530 Ontario Ltd., counter-claimed for funds retained by Qing Chen from the unauthorized sale of two vehicles.

The court found that the business relationship was based on a series of individual and independent contracts, not an overarching agreement.

Qing Chen breached trust by selling the respondent's vehicles and retaining funds.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims for unpaid deposits and "Captain interest" finding no contractual obligation for the respondent to pay them.

Judgment was granted in favor of the respondent for $79,159.81, plus pre and post-judgment interest, and costs of $30,000.

The plaintiffs, a genetic testing company and its director, sued the defendants for defamation over a magazine article criticizing their non-invasive prenatal paternity test.

The article alleged the test was dangerous, unreliable, and prone to error.

The court found the article was defamatory but dismissed the action, holding that the defendants successfully established the defences of justification, qualified privilege, fair comment, and responsible communication.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to properly validate their test according to accepted scientific methodology, rendering the test unreliable and the article's claims substantially true.

The applicants sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision certifying a bargaining unit for construction labourers.

The applicants argued the OLRB erred by excluding post-application date evidence regarding the composition of the bargaining unit and by finding that the two individuals working on the application date were their employees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the OLRB reasonably applied the statutory framework and its established policy of determining bargaining rights based on the date of application, and reasonably concluded the individuals were employees of the applicants.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding an expired construction lien, the respondent sought costs of $30,470.28 on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, noting the respondent could have acted to mitigate prejudice from the appellant's delay.

The court also reduced the quantum, finding the time spent excessive for a narrow issue and rejecting a disbursement claim for computerized legal research that appeared to be a profit centre for counsel.

Costs were fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff, William Conners, was injured as a passenger in a car accident.

He initiated two actions: one against the driver, owner, and their insurer, Gore Mutual, and another against Unica Insurance, an insurer of a past employer.

Both Gore Mutual and Unica brought motions for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the actions against them.

Gore Mutual argued lack of coverage due to the driver operating the vehicle without the owner's consent.

Unica contended no coverage as Conners was no longer an employee for whom a vehicle was furnished.

The court dismissed both actions, finding that Conners was not an "insured person" under either policy based on the Insurance Act and relevant policy exclusions.

The plaintiff, a travel wholesaler, sought summary judgment against the defendant travel agency for unpaid airline tickets totaling $312,964.10, which were charged back after fraudulent credit card payments.

The defendant argued it was a "middleman" or agent of the plaintiff and not liable.

The court found a direct contractual relationship between the plaintiff as a wholesale seller and the defendant as its customer, making the defendant responsible for payment.

The court rejected the agency argument due to lack of evidence of consent, control, or authority to affect the principal's legal position.

Judgment was awarded to the plaintiff.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (Fund) appealed an arbitrator's decision that allowed it to withdraw its acceptance of priority for accident benefits.

Echelon General Insurance Company (Echelon) had initially notified the Fund that a snowmobile involved in an accident was uninsured, leading the Fund to accept priority.

The Fund later discovered Echelon's policy actually covered the snowmobile and sought restitution.

The arbitrator found Echelon failed to conduct a reasonable investigation as required by O. Reg. 283/95, s. 3.1, making its notice to the Fund improper.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that the Fund was not an "insurer" under the regulation and had specific, different treatment, including an exemption from the strict rules preventing withdrawal of priority acceptance.

The court affirmed that Echelon's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation meant no proper priority dispute was raised, and Echelon remained the priority insurer.

The plaintiff, Aon Benfield Canada ULC, sought an award of costs following a proceeding that involved an interim injunction, an interlocutory injunction, and a settlement of the action.

The defendant, Aamir Vazir, a former employee, had misappropriated highly sensitive proprietary software ("PathWise") and attempted to erase evidence.

The court granted the injunctions and the action settled, with costs being the only outstanding issue.

Aon Benfield sought $269,463.89 in costs, including significant disbursements for technical support.

Vazir opposed, arguing issues related to the plaintiff's conduct and the proportionality of the costs.

The court found the hours worked by the plaintiff's counsel not excessive given the case's importance and Vazir's egregious conduct.

However, to balance the indemnity principle with access to justice and avoid a "chilling effect" the court reduced the legal fees by $20,000, awarding Aon Benfield $249,463.89, payable within 90 days.

The defendants, Balance Residential Management Limited and Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation 2514, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss various claims made by the plaintiff, 1658410 Ontario Inc. (Advance Repairs & Maintenance), following the termination of a janitorial services agreement.

The plaintiff's claims included damages for lack of notice, unpaid invoices, interest, general damages for breach of contract, loss of business reputation, employee poaching, property damage, slander, and breach of a verbal contract for future services.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff only on the claims for 30 days' notice, unpaid invoices, and associated interest, which the defendants conceded.

All other claims, including those for general damages, employee poaching, slander, and breach of a verbal contract for another condominium, were dismissed as not raising a genuine issue requiring a trial, often due to contractual liability limitations or insufficient evidence.

The plaintiff, an accountant, claimed additional compensation for work performed on two land development projects for the defendants, arguing this work was outside his initial accounting retainer.

The defendants contended that the plaintiff's compensation already included this work.

The court found no explicit agreement for additional payment for the development work and awarded the plaintiff damages based on restitutionary quantum meruit, valuing his substantial and substantive involvement in the projects.

The plaintiff, Sirron Systems Inc., appealed a Master's order granting security for costs to the defendants, Scott, Pichelli & Easter Limited, Peter Pichelli, and Joel Easter.

The Master had ordered Sirron Systems Inc. to post $33,252.11.

The appeal challenged the Master's findings regarding the plaintiff's assets, impecuniosity, and the merits of the claim, arguing palpable and overriding errors.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's holistic assessment, particularly noting that the plaintiff did not allege impecuniosity before the Master and that the merits of the case were neutral.

The appellant appealed an order of a master dismissing its construction lien claim but allowing the underlying action to continue.

The lien was perfected in 2011 and referred to the master for trial in 2013, but no further steps were taken until 2017.

The master found the lien had expired under s. 37(1) of the Construction Lien Act because no order fixing a specific trial date was made within two years of perfection.

The Divisional Court upheld the master's decision, confirming that a general order referring the matter to a master for trial under s. 58(1) does not satisfy the requirement of s. 37(1) to set a trial date under s. 60(1).

The appeal was dismissed.

In a defamation action concerning an article criticizing the plaintiffs' prenatal paternity test, the defendants brought a motion to amend their Statement of Defence after the close of evidence at trial.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the amendment introduced new allegations regarding the validity of the underlying science, which would cause non-compensable prejudice.

The court reviewed the existing pleadings and expert reports, concluding that the validity of the science was already a live issue and the amendment merely clarified existing allegations.

The court granted the motion to amend, finding no prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of two Grievance Settlement Board (GSB) decisions reinstating two Transit Safety Officers who were discharged for misconduct.

The GSB had found that the employer breached a sunset clause by considering expired disciplinary records when deciding to terminate the employees.

Relying on the Molson's case, the GSB concluded it was bound to void the discipline entirely and reinstate the employees with full compensation.

The Divisional Court granted the applications for judicial review, holding that the GSB erred by failing to consider all relevant circumstances before applying Molson's and by failing to consider its statutory discretion to substitute a penalty under s. 48(17) of the Labour Relations Act.

The decisions were quashed and remitted to the GSB.

The applicant and respondent, former spouses, entered into an agreement for the applicant to purchase the respondent's home.

The applicant paid a deposit representing half the home's equity.

The transaction failed to close.

The applicant sought an order for the sale of the property under the Partition Act, claiming a one-half interest.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's interest was in the equity of the property, not an interest in the land itself, and he had no right to immediate possession.

Therefore, he did not qualify for an order of partition or sale.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Environmental Review Tribunal's decisions dismissing her application for leave to appeal an Environmental Compliance Approval granted to an adjacent asphalt plant, and refusing to reconsider that dismissal.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal had carefully considered the applicant's submissions regarding zoning, noise, and past environmental breaches.

The Court concluded that the Tribunal's decisions were within the range of reasonable outcomes and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The Law Society sought judicial review of a disclosure order made by the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division during an interlocutory suspension proceeding.

By the time the judicial review was heard, the Law Society had complied with the disclosure order and the interlocutory suspension had been imposed, rendering the disclosure issue moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue, finding that the matter should have proceeded through the Tribunal's internal appeal process and that the Tribunal should be allowed time for its jurisprudence to evolve.