CITATION: Ontario (Metrolinx – Go Transit) v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1587, 2018 ONSC 2342
COURT FILE NO.: 303/17 and 304/17
DATE: 20180417
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
LEDERER, MATHESON and BALE JJ.
B E T W E E N:
THE CROWN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO (METROLINX – GO TRANSIT)
Michael Hines, for the Applicant
Applicant
- and -
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1587 AND GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
Respondents
Dean Ardron and Kristen Allen, for the Respondent Union
No one appearing for the Respondent Grievance Settlement Board
HEARD at Toronto: February 14, 2018
REASONS FOR DECISION
Matheson j.
[1] These two applications for judicial review were heard together given their similar facts, identical parties and legal issues, and related underlying decisions.
[2] Two decisions of the Grievance Settlement Board (“GSB”) are at issue. In Court File No. 304/17, the applicant seeks to set aside the decision of Vice-Chair Gail Misra dated December 13, 2016 regarding the discharge of Clayton Jessett (the “Jessett Decision”). In Court File No. 303/17, the applicant seeks to set aside the decision of Vice-Chair Randi Abramsky dated April 26, 2017 regarding the discharge of Dishan Jebamoney (the “Jebamoney Decision”).
[3] The main issues on these applications relate to the application and interpretation of BFCSD v. Molson’s Brewery (Ontario) Ltd., [1982] O.J. No. 1364 (Div. Ct.), aff’d in part, 1983 CarswellOnt 3357 (C.A.) (“Molson’s”), and its impact on s. 48(17) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A (the Labour Relations Act).
[4] In the Jessett Decision, the Vice-Chair concluded that she was constrained by the Molson’s case to uphold the grievance. In the Jebamoney Decision, the Vice-Chair concluded that she was bound by the Jessett Decision and in turn Molson’s.
[5] These applications are granted for the reasons set out below.
Background
[6] Both Clayton Jessett and Dishan Jebamoney are Transit Safety Officers at Metrolinx. They are members of the bargaining unit represented by the Union.
[7] Metrolinx dismissed Jessett from his employment after an incident that occurred in the course of arresting a 70-year-old female Metrolinx passenger who was understood to suffer from mental health issues. Even though two other Transit Safety Officers had arrived to help, the passenger was put up against a wall to handcuff her and Jessett applied two full knee strikes to her. The incident was caught on videotape.
[8] Metrolinx dismissed Jebamoney from his employment for using profane, rude, abusive and disrespectful language towards a Metrolinx passenger while effecting an arrest.
[9] Steve Weir was the Metrolinx manager who dismissed both of these Transit Safety Officers. Both Jessett and Jebamoney had a history of problems that were already known to Weir as their manager.
[10] Although it was disputed whether the discipline history of these employees actually formed part of the decisions to terminate, the GSB ultimately found that it did so. This was problematic because the Collective Agreement contained a clause that removed records of disciplinary actions, adverse notations and letters of counsel from an employee’s record after a period of time. The Collective Agreement provided as follows in Article 4.14(2):
The record of all disciplinary action and/or any adverse notation shall be removed from the employee’s file eighteen (18) months following such incident giving rise to the disciplinary action. …
Letters of counsel shall come off all corporate files, on application, after 12 months so long as the employee’s record remains discipline free over that period. …
[11] This clause is referred to as a “sunset clause”. The Union characterizes it as giving an employee a “fresh start” after a period of time has passed following misconduct. In the Jessett and Jebamoney grievances that followed their dismissals, the Board found that the employer had breached this clause by taking into account conduct that had been removed from consideration under the sunset clause. The breach of the sunset clause then gave rise to the issue of the Molson’s case, which has been said to prescribe the outcome of a grievance where a sunset clause has been breached.
Decisions below
[12] At the outset of the Jessett and Jebamoney arbitrations, the Union brought a preliminary motion based on the sunset clause. The Union submitted that Metrolinx had, in the course of deciding to discharge these employees, considered past discipline history that should not to have been considered under the sunset clause. The Union argued, relying on the Molson’s case, that the discipline should be voided and the grievors reinstated with full compensation.
(i) Jessett Decision
[13] The Jessett grievance came before the GSB first. Weir testified on the preliminary motion.
[14] At the time of his termination, Jessett had less than five years of service with Metrolinx. Weir had previously issued Jessett a non-disciplinary counselling letter dated September 10, 2014 that made reference to 21 customer complaints dating back to August 30, 2012 (the “Counselling Letter”).
[15] By the time of Jessett’s dismissal, the Counselling Letter had been purged from Jessett’s Personnel File in Human Resources, as had the customer complaints, in accordance with the Collective Agreement. However, a copy of the Counselling Letter remained in Jessett’s work location file maintained in the Transit Safety Office.
[16] Having authored the Counselling Letter himself, Weir was aware of its contents at the time he recommended Jessett’s termination. Weir was also aware of a court decision from April, 2015, in which the trial judge had criticized Jessett for his judgment in use of force and lack of credibility.
[17] In the Jessett Decision, the Vice-Chair found that Weir was “an honest and forthright witness” and made no finding that Weir had actually reviewed the workplace file copy of the Counselling Letter in reaching his decision regarding termination. However, the GSB found that Weir remembered and had “in mind” the previous volume of customer complaints about Jessett and the Counselling Letter in making the decision to dismiss Jessett. The Vice-Chair found that as a decision maker, Weir had no right under the Collective Agreement to give any consideration or weight to those issues because they had come off Jessett’s record. The Vice-Chair concluded that the sunset clause had been breached.
[18] The Vice-Chair then proceeded to the issue that is the main focus of these applications for judicial review, that is, the remedy.
[19] The Vice-Chair rejected the submission of Metrolinx that she should attempt to “carve out” the inappropriate consideration of the expired records and consider what appropriate considerations may have led to the employer’s decision to terminate Jessett’s employment. The Vice-Chair stated that to do so would be much too difficult a task. The Vice-Chair stated that she believed herself to be constrained by the Molson’s case. She indicated that “[n]otwithstanding how serious” the issue of Jessett’s use of force against a 70-year-old woman was, “I feel constrained by the reasoning of the courts.”
[20] The GSB set aside the discharge and ordered Jessett’s reinstatement to employment with full compensation for lost earnings, benefits and seniority, and no discipline.
(ii) Jebamoney Decision
[21] The Jebamoney grievance came before the GSB after the Jessett Decision. Weir also testified in response to the Union’s preliminary motion based on the sunset clause.
[22] On the issue of breach, the GSB agreed with Metrolinx that there were a number of records that were not excluded by the sunset clause, however, the GSB concluded that Weir had considered Jebamoney’s reputation for being a “hot head” and two complaints about excessive use of force that were excluded. The GSB concluded that the sunset clause had been breached.
[23] The Vice-Chair agreed with the Jessett Decision that “it would be much too difficult a task” to try to carve out Weir’s inappropriate consideration and to try to ascertain what appropriate considerations may have led to his decision to terminate Jebamoney’s employment.
[24] On the now central issue of remedy, without determining the gravity of Jebamoney’s misconduct, the Vice-Chair concluded as follows:
The recent GSB decision in Jessett, supra, followed the Molson approach, and under the principle that the GSB is “one Board”, I am bound to follow that decision. … Accordingly, as in the Jessett case, I conclude that I am constrained to grant the Union’s preliminary motion and uphold the grievance, set aside the discharge, and order the grievor be reinstated to employment forthwith, with full compensation for lost earnings (subject to the duty to mitigate), benefits and seniority. [Emphasis added.]
[25] The GSB therefore set aside the discharge and ordered Jebamoney’s reinstatement to employment with full compensation for earnings, benefits and seniority, and without any discipline.
Issues
[26] These applications for judicial review raise the following related issues:
(i) whether the GSB wrongly concluded that it was constrained by the Molson’s case;
(ii) whether the so-called “void ab initio” remedy arising from Molson’s should not have been granted in either the Jessett or the Jebamoney Decisions; and,
(iii) whether the Decisions wrongly fetter the discretion of the GSB under s. 48(17) of the Labour Relations Act, which provides the Board with a statutory discretion to impose a different penalty.
[27] Another issue was raised in the applications, specifically whether the GSB’s interpretation of the sunset clause reasonably did not distinguish between disciplinary records and decisions based on those records. The applicant did not abandon this issue but did not focus on it in oral argument, relying instead on its factum. This issue can be addressed readily. The applicant’s position on this interpretative issue was addressed by the GSB in the Jessett Decision, which was followed in the Jebamoney Decision. The GSB did not accept the applicant’s position, which would have resulted in a narrower interpretation of the materials covered by the sunset clause. The interpretation of a collective agreement falls squarely within the GSB’s expertise and is deserving of significant deference. The applicant has failed to show that the GSB’s interpretation of the sunset clause was unreasonable.
Standard of Review
[28] The applicant submits that the standard of review is reasonableness for the interpretation of the Collective Agreement and for issue (ii), above. The applicant submits that issues (i) and (iii) represent the improper fettering of the Board’s discretion and should therefore be reviewed on the standard of correctness. The Union submits that the standard of review is reasonableness for all issues.
[29] It is not disputed that where the standard of review is reasonableness, a decision will be upheld provided that it is justified, transparent and intelligible and where it “falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47.
[30] With respect to issues (i) and (iii), the distinction drawn by the applicant regarding the standard of review is a distinction without a difference in these applications. The failure to properly apply the Court of Appeal’s decision in Molson’s was both incorrect and unreasonable. The outcome in these applications would therefore be the same with either standard of review.
Molson’s
[31] The applicant submits that the Molson’s case has been misinterpreted or misapplied as requiring a single outcome in the event of a breach of a sunset clause. If it does mandate a single outcome, the applicant submits that it is not good law having regard for modern labour law, applicable contract law and s. 48(17) of the Labour Relations Act.
[32] The Molson’s case arose from an arbitration award rather than a decision on a preliminary motion. Accordingly, in Molson’s there had been an arbitration hearing and full findings of fact by the arbitrator that informed the courts. That is one of the distinctions between Molson’s and the two cases before us.
[33] In the very brief reasons for decision of the Divisional Court in Molson’s, there is a general description of what the employee had done. On one occasion, the employee had attempted to remove unspecified materials from the work premises without the required pass. The employee was fired for attempted theft.
[34] The employee had a discipline record for similar misconduct, and there was a sunset clause that ruled out considering that history. Although the sunset clause was not the same as the clause here, the collective agreement had a clause that imposed a time limit on the previous discipline “offences” that could be referred to in regard to later discipline.
[35] The reasons for decision of the Divisional Court describe the events giving rise to the conclusion that the employer had breached the sunset clause. The arbitrator found that the company’s investigator and the manager who made the recommendation to discharge the employee had both “considered the discipline record of the employee without any limitation as to the period of the record which they considered.” The investigator considered the history for ameliorating factors after making his recommendation. The manager reviewed the whole discipline history in making his recommendation. The ultimate decision maker did not review the out-of-date history, but the Court concluded that the company attached some weight to that prior discipline record in its decision-making process and therefore breached the sunset clause.
[36] The Divisional Court rejected the arbitrator’s decision that the sunset clause was “directory” only, finding that it was a mandatory clause that had been breached. The Court held as follows: “That being so, the discharge of the grievor was not in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement. In our view the respondent company had no right under the collective agreement to discipline or discharge the grievor in circumstances in which it attached significance or weight to his prior discipline record.”
[37] The Divisional Court then addressed remedy, as follows:
For these reasons we quash the arbitrator’s award and remit the matter back to the learned arbitrator …to give proper effect to [the sunset clause] in accordance with our reasons.
It is our view, in the circumstances of this case, that the respondent company cannot now discipline or discharge the grievor by reason of the incident of February 20, 1981. We can see no final result to the proceedings other than that which was requested by the [Union], namely, that the grievor be reinstated with full compensation. The matter is to go back to the arbitrator. That order should be hers, not ours. [Emphasis added.]
[38] The case then went to the Court of Appeal, which rendered its decision in a one-page handwritten endorsement. The Court upheld the Divisional Court on its finding that the sunset clause was not “directory” and on its finding that the clause had been breached. It noted that the company had “deliberately breached” the sunset clause.
[39] The Court of Appeal varied the remedy ordered by the Divisional Court, stating as follows:
We are of the opinion, however, that the Divisional Court should not have ordered the payment of full compensation to the grievor. The order of the Divisional Court should be varied to provide that the matter be remitted to the arbitrator to be considered in accordance with reasons of the Divisional Court to determine the amount of compensation to be awarded to the grievor upon proper principles.
[40] This endorsement together with the Divisional Court decision have been read to mean that the only issue remaining for the arbitrator upon breach of a sunset clause is the amount of compensation to be paid to the employee.
[41] However, the Court of Appeal required that the matter be remitted to be considered “in accordance with reasons of the Divisional Court” and therefore upheld the proviso that the remedy applied “in the circumstances of this case.”
[42] The order made in Molson’s was therefore limited by both levels of court to the circumstances of that case. This requires a comparison between the relevant facts and determinations in Molson’s with the circumstances of any subsequent arbitration in which the Molson’s case is relied upon.
[43] In oral argument, the Union’s position on the application of Molson’s was somewhat contradictory. It agreed that each case should be considered in its own specific context and that the imposition of the Molson’s remedy was not automatic once there was a breach. However, it also submitted that given the importance of the sunset clause, the Molson’s remedy should be the remedy for any breach.
[44] Molson’s does not prescribe an automatic outcome once a sunset clause is breached. When the Court said “in the circumstances of this case” in Molson’s, it did not limit the relevant circumstances to the finding of a breach of a sunset clause. Even in the brief reasons for decision of the Divisional Court, there was mention of other facts relevant to discipline such as the nature of the conduct giving rise to discipline and the nature of the conduct giving rise to the breach of the sunset clause.
[45] The Board did not do a full examination of the relevant circumstances on the Jessett or Jebamoney preliminary motions. Nor does it appear that all the relevant fact-finding was done. For example, in the Jebamoney grievance, what the employee actually did was not the subject of factual findings on the preliminary motion. In the Jessett grievance, there was a videotape of the employer kneeing the 70-year-woman while she was up against a wall, which may have removed much of the uncertainty about what had actually transpired giving rise to the discipline.
[46] Further, even the evidence that was presented for the preliminary motions, as set out in the Decisions, shows a number of potentially significant points of distinction between the circumstances in Molson’s and those at issue here. Molson’s does not address the difficult situation where a manager has been the supervisor of an employee long enough that he or she knows the employee’s work history from memory and not from an improper review of discipline records. In Jessett, Mr. Weir, who was found to be an honest and forthright witness, was found to have had “in mind” the numerous customer complaints and a letter of counsel that he had issued to Jessett. Similarly, in the Jebamoney case, Weir knew the employee’s history but was found to have taken it into account even though not intending to do so. The arbitrator said that while information “cannot be erased from a person’s mind” it cannot be relied upon. Although this led to a breach of the sunset clause, the circumstances were arguably not the same as in Molson’s, where the breach was found to be deliberate, arising from a review of the very discipline records that had been excluded from consideration under the sunset clause.
[47] Although some of the circumstances were touched upon in the Jessett and Jebamoney Decisions, the Vice-Chairs effectively treated the finding of a breach of the sunset clause as the only relevant circumstance. This is illustrated in the Jessett Decision, where the Vice-Chair stated that, “[n]otwithstanding how serious” the issue of Jessett’s use of force against a 70-year-old woman was, “I feel constrained by the reasoning of the courts.”
[48] This problem in the Jessett and Jebamoney Decisions is not resolved by considering the other decisions applying Molson’s that have been put forward by the Union.
Consideration of Molson’s
[49] It appears that Molson’s has not been judicially considered since it was first decided in 1982. However, from the intervening thirty-five-year period, we have been provided with three arbitration decisions that concluded that there would be no discipline after breach of a sunset clause, relying on Molson’s:
(i) Re Rexdale Mobile Truck Wash (1981) Inc. and Brewery, General and Professional Workers’ Union, [1995] O.L.A.A. No. 922 (Ont. Arb.);
(ii) Spartech Color-Stratford v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, (2009) L.A.C. (4th) 55 (Ont. Arb.); and,
(iii) Tri-Kete Ltd. v. Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 506, [2012] O.L.A.A. No. 302 (Ont. Arb.).
[50] In Rexdale, the issue was raised at the outset of the arbitration. The employer relied on arbitration decisions in which discipline was upheld despite a breach of a sunset clause, based on the conduct that was properly considered by the employer: Re B.C. Gas Inc. and Office & Technical Employees’ Union, Local 378 (Unreported, January 10, 1990); Highland Valley Copper and United Steel Workers of America (Unreported, November 16, 1988); The Great Atlantic & Pacific Company of Canada Limited and Retail Wholesale Canada etc. Local 414 (Unreported, November 12, 1994); Regional Municipality of Waterloo and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1656 (Unreported, December 3, 1992). The arbitrator did not accept the approach used in those cases, sometimes called the “proportionate” approach. He found the proportionate approach would be too hard for the arbitrator and was not mentioned in Molson’s.
[51] In Rexdale, the employer relied on Re Ottawa Board of Education and Ottawa Board of Education Employees (1988), 1988 9304 (ON LA), 2 L.A.C. (4th) 27 (Bendell), in which the arbitrator noted as follows:
Innocent errors on the part of managers should not have the inevitable effect of preventing the discharge of employees who have otherwise committed serious breaches of discipline.
[52] However, the arbitrator indicated that he preferred the analysis in Molson’s but did not confront the need to consider all the circumstances in accordance with that case. He concluded that he was “constrained to accede to the argument of the Union that the consequences of a breach of [the sunset clause] is to render the discipline void ab initio.”
[53] Although the phrase “void ab initio” was not used in Molson’s, it has been used to describe the Molson’s remedy, as shown in Rexdale. The phrase is not used in the ordinary contract sense of treating a contract as invalid from the outset. It is used to describe a remedy that, effectively, treats the conduct of the grievor giving rise to the discipline as if it had never happened. This is problematic. It is contrary to the ordinary principles of contract law, which have been applied in the labour context. A remedy for breach of contract is intended to put the party in the position it would have been in if the contract had been complied with, not to punish a party for breach or provide a windfall: James Casey & Ayla Akgungor, Remedies in Labour, Employment and Human Rights Law, eLooseleaf revision (Scarborough: Carswell, 1999)); Association of Radio and Television Employees of Canada (CUPE-CLC) v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1973 182 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 118, at pp. 126-127. The Union does not challenge this general principle but nonetheless submits that the remedy it calls “void ab initio” should be imposed for a breach of the sunset clause.
[54] Moving to the second and third decisions following Molson’s – Spartech and Tri-Kete – the issue arose as part of a full arbitration hearing. In Spartech, in 2009, the arbitrator adopted the reasoning in Molson’s and Rexdale. In Tri-Kete, in 2011, the arbitrator referred to Molson’s, Rexdale and Spartech and concluded that the discipline was null and void. She noted that there were two cases that the employer pointed to “in which the result of an employer violating a sunset clause was for the arbitrator to determine what the appropriate penalty would or should have been if that discipline were not considered” (i.e., the “proportionate” approach). However, she distinguished them on the basis that Molson’s did not seem to have been considered by the arbitrator in one case and the union in the other case did not ask that the termination be voided.
[55] There is also the recent decision in Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Metrolinx - GO Transit), [2014] O.G.S.B.A. No. 97 (Ont. Griev. Sett. Bd.). In this case, Vice-Chair Gray reviewed the Molson’s case and the other three cases cited by the union (Rexdale, Spartech and Tri-Kete). He noted that the three cases following Molson’s rejected the “proportionate” approach that other arbitrators had adopted. However, Vice-Chair Gray concluded that the sunset clause had not been breached. It was therefore “unnecessary to determine whether the appropriate remedy for … a breach [of the sunset clause] would be to treat the discharge as null and void”.
[56] None of the Rexdale, Spartech and Tri-Kete decisions relied upon by the Union include a full consideration of the relevant circumstances and how they compare to Molson’s. The conduct giving rise to discipline in Molson’s and in the cases following Molson’s was, in each case, different, and was certainly not the same as the conduct in Jessett or Jebamoney. The nature of the jobs was different. The conduct giving rise to discipline was different. The nature of the breaches was different.
[57] All relevant circumstances ought to have been considered by the arbitrators in Jessett and Jebamoney in deciding whether or not the Molson’s case had the purported binding effect. It was both incorrect and unreasonable not to do so.
[58] Further, in the Jessett and Jebamoney Decisions, the Vice-Chairs each stated that it would be too difficult to try and ascertain what the employer would have done, carving out the inappropriate considerations. However, in determining the appropriate remedy, the Board is not limited to deciding what the employer would have done.
[59] The Union further submits that if a breach of the sunset clause only results in a reconsideration of the discipline on proper factors, there would be nothing stopping an employer from routinely breaching the clause, with no real consequences to the employer and delay and expense to the Union and grievor. However, the Jessett and Jebamoney findings do not suggest that sort of deliberate practice. Further, to the extent this Union position suggests that a penalty should be imposed for breach, it is contrary to the applicable contract law accepted by the Union. Perhaps more significantly, a practice of deliberate breach is a circumstance that could be considered by the Board when addressing a grievance where there was such a breach, and may have an impact on the outcome in a particular grievance.
[60] As for the use of the term “void ab initio” in some of the above decisions, I note that this term was not used in Molson’s and I find it an unhelpful moniker to the extent that it has been used.
[61] To the extent that Molson’s may still predetermine the remedy arising from a grievance “in the circumstances” of that case, the applicant submits that it is out of step with modern labour law and the requirement for deference within this specialized labour regime under Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick. However, it is not for this Court to purport to overturn Molson’s.
Subsection 48(17) of the Labour Relations Act
[62] One issue remains. The applicant submits that the Jessett and Jebamoney Decisions wrongly removed any role for s. 48(17) of the Labour Relations Act.
[63] Subsection 48(17) provides as follows:
Where an arbitrator or arbitration board determines that an employee has been discharged or otherwise disciplined by an employer for cause and the collective agreement does not contain a specific penalty for the infraction that is the subject-matter of the arbitration, the arbitrator or arbitration board may substitute such other penalty for the discharge or discipline as to the arbitrator or arbitration board seems just and reasonable in all the circumstances. [Emphasis added.]
[64] The parties agree that they cannot contract out of this statutory discretion and that the exception within the subsection (where the collective agreement contains a specific remedy) does not apply under the Collective Agreement.
[65] There was an equivalent statutory provision in 1983, but there is no reference to it in Molson’s.
[66] To the extent that the Union relies on Molson’s to avoid the exercise of the statutory discretion in s. 48(17) it cannot do so. Neither the Divisional Court nor the Court of Appeal address the issue in Molson’s and, given the subsection’s role in the Act, it should not be implied that this statutory discretion was eliminated by the brief endorsements of those courts.
[67] Given s. 48(17), the procedure used in the Jessett and Jebamoney cases is potentially problematic. To deploy s. 48(17), the arbitration must proceed to the point that there can be a determination of whether or not there was just cause. The applicant submits that once the Vice-Chair decided the issue regarding the interpretation of the sunset clause and related breach, the arbitration should have proceeded and s. 48(17) would then arise on a full record.
[68] The Vice-Chairs in Jessett and Jebamoney did not consider s. 48(17) nor did they decide whether or not to exercise their statutory discretion and with what result. This is not a matter of the fettering of a discretion or the standard of review. It appears that the issue was not raised on the preliminary motions. It should not be raised for the first time before this Court. These matters are being remitted back, as set out below, and it will be open to the applicant to raise this issue at that time.
Disposition of the applications
[69] I have concluded that the Jessett and Jebamoney Decisions were incorrect and unreasonable for the failure to consider all the relevant circumstances before treating Molson’s as binding as regards remedy.
[70] These applications are granted. The Jessett and Jebamoney Decisions are quashed and the matters remitted to the GSB to be decided in accordance with these reasons for decision.
[71] The Union shall pay costs to the applicant in the agreed upon amount of $7,500 all inclusive.
___________________________ MATHESON J.
I agree ___________________________ LEDERER J.
I agree ___________________________ BALE J.
Date of Release: April 17, 2018
CITATION: Ontario (Metrolinx – Go Transit) v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1587, 2018 ONSC 2342
COURT FILE NO.: 303/17 and 304/17
DATE: 20180417
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
LEDERER, MATHESON and BALE JJ.
BETWEEN:
THE CROWN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO (METROLINX – GO TRANSIT)
Applicant
- and –
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1587 AND GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
Respondents
REASONS FOR DECISION
MATHESON j.
Date of Release: April 17, 2018