Thomas R. Lederer

The plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by a pothole.

They initially sued the City of Toronto and 'John Doe Maintenance Company'.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiffs successfully moved before a Master to substitute the Region of York and Brennan Paving as defendants, relying on the doctrine of misnomer.

The defendants appealed.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the appeal, finding that the Master erred in law by extending the doctrine of misnomer too far.

The court held that the 'litigating finger' did not clearly point to the proposed defendants, as the Statement of Claim identified the accident location in a different municipality, and it was unreasonable to expect the proposed defendants to connect the claim to a notice letter sent nearly two years earlier.

The plaintiff tenant sued the defendant landlord for wrongful termination of a commercial month-to-month tenancy and conversion of its manufacturing equipment and goods.

The landlord locked out the tenant without the required written notice and subsequently disposed of the tenant's property.

The court found the landlord liable for conversion and awarded damages based on the fair market value of the lost equipment and goods, plus punitive damages for the landlord's egregious conduct, less arrears for rent and hydro.

The parties sought to settle an order following a decision finding the respondent in breach of an indemnity agreement related to a commercial lease.

The applicant landlord requested that the order include rent payable through to the end of the lease term, an issue not raised during the initial application.

The court held that while a lease is a commercial contract allowing for damages post-termination, the landlord has a duty to mitigate.

Because the landlord provided no evidence that the loss of future rent was unavoidable, the court declined to include an award for rent beyond the date previously determined.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal following his termination from the defendant company.

The dispute centered on whether the plaintiff was contractually required to work full-time in Toronto rather than splitting his time with his residence in San Francisco.

The court found that the written employment agreement was never finalized due to unauthorized changes and 'slip-sheeting' of signature pages.

However, an oral contract existed which did not require the plaintiff to work full-time in Toronto.

The court held that the plaintiff's refusal to work full-time in Toronto did not constitute cause for termination and awarded damages based on the termination provisions of the oral contract.

The defendant insurer brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for long-term disability benefits, arguing it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The insurer had initially denied the claim but offered an internal appeal process to review additional medical information.

The court held that it was not 'legally appropriate' for the plaintiff to commence an action while the appeal process was ongoing and the medical record was incomplete.

The limitation period did not begin to run until the insurer issued its final decision.

The motion was dismissed as the action was commenced within time.

The plaintiff sued her former lawyer for negligence after her personal injury action was dismissed for delay.

The defendant lawyer moved for summary judgment.

The court found that the causal connection between the defendant's alleged negligence and the plaintiff's loss was broken when the plaintiff subsequently retained new counsel who had the opportunity to move to set aside the dismissal but did not do so.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant, having been entirely successful in the underlying application, sought partial indemnity costs of $89,703.50.

The respondent argued for no costs or a maximum of $50,000, citing the applicant's failed allegation of bad faith.

The court noted that much of the parties' submissions were not directed to the determinative issue, which the court identified independently based on the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The court also questioned the necessity of multiple counsel.

Costs were awarded to the applicant in the reduced amount of $68,407.68 plus HST.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiff's action as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP), the defendant sought full indemnity costs of $122,286.94 pursuant to section 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff argued the time claimed was excessive and proposed a reduced amount.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, noting that the defendant's use of junior counsel resulted in a total fee comparable to the plaintiff's own costs, which relied heavily on senior counsel.

The court awarded the defendant the full amount claimed.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review concerning the approval of a wind farm project, the successful respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $163,961.25.

The applicants opposed the costs and sought their own costs, arguing the case involved novel heritage issues and public interest.

The court rejected claims of misconduct from both sides that would justify extraordinary costs.

Acknowledging the public interest and novelty of the heritage issues, the majority reduced the costs award and ordered the applicants to pay $75,000 to the successful respondent.

A dissenting judge would have ordered no costs, emphasizing the importance of public participation in judicial review of government decisions.

The applicants sought a Norwich Order against the respondent university to obtain documents and information regarding DNA testing of the applicants' chicken products.

The testing was featured in a media broadcast that the applicants alleged was defamatory.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants had already identified the prospective defendants and could obtain the necessary information through the normal discovery process in their existing or planned litigation against the broadcaster and the university.

However, the court ordered the university to preserve the relevant evidence.

The applicant, owner of two commercial units in a condominium, sought an order to amend the condominium declaration to allow its employees access to the recreational facilities, or alternatively, to reduce its contribution to common expenses.

The applicant argued that the declaration's restriction limiting recreational facility use to residential unit owners was inconsistent with the Condominium Act, 1998.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the declaration properly restricted the use of common elements under section 7(4)(b) of the Act and complied with a site-specific municipal by-law.

The court also affirmed that condominium fees do not need to directly correlate with the actual cost of maintaining common elements.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in an action for defamation.

The defendant, who was the managing director of a charity, published false statements on the internet accusing the plaintiff of stealing from the charity, after the plaintiff confronted him about misappropriating funds.

The defendant also engaged in a campaign of harassment and intimidation against the plaintiff and his family.

The court found that the elements of defamation were met and awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in general damages, $20,000 in aggravated damages, and $20,000 in punitive damages, plus substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant landlord brought an application to enforce an indemnity agreement against the respondent guarantor after the tenant defaulted on a commercial lease.

The respondent argued the application should be converted to a trial, alleging it was induced to sign the indemnity by negligent misrepresentations regarding park signage and access.

The court found no evidence of specific, actionable representations and held that the absolute and unconditional terms of the indemnity agreement, along with the parol evidence rule, precluded the respondent's defence.

The application was granted, and the respondent was ordered to pay rent arrears, restoration costs, and legal fees.

The applicant purchaser and respondent vendor entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for land in Markham.

The agreement required the vendor to obtain a severance at its sole expense, unless the conditions imposed were 'onerous or unreasonable'.

The Committee of Adjustment granted the severance subject to the condition that the owner sign a Cost Sharing Agreement and pay $407,582.

The vendor argued this was onerous and unreasonable, while the purchaser argued it was the vendor's responsibility.

The court interpreted the agreement, specifically the zoning clause, and found that the parties intended for the land to be rezoned and operational at the time of sale, which required the cost sharing payment.

The court held the condition was not onerous or unreasonable and ordered the vendor to repay the $407,582 to the purchaser.

The plaintiff purchased a pharmacy from the defendant and later sued for breach of warranty and breach of a non-competition agreement.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant failed to disclose that a nearby fertility clinic, which provided significant business, was closing.

The court dismissed this claim, finding the plaintiff overvalued the goodwill and would not reasonably have been deterred from the purchase based on the actual profit margins.

However, the court found the defendant breached the non-competition agreement by servicing customers within a 10-mile radius from a new pharmacy location, awarding $11,600 in damages.

Katie Mohammed, a resident of Whitchurch-Stouffville, posted comments on social media expressing concern that an amendment to an agreement between the municipality and United Soils Management Ltd., allowing for the deposition of "acceptable fill" in a gravel pit near a water tower, could lead to groundwater contamination and harm children.

United Soils Management Ltd. sued her for defamation.

Mohammed brought a motion to dismiss the action under anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The court found that the plaintiff's action lacked substantial merit, that Mohammed had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege, responsible communication), and that the harm suffered by the plaintiff did not outweigh the public interest in protecting freedom of expression.

The court also found that the plaintiff brought the proceeding in bad faith and for an improper purpose, awarding Mohammed $7,500 in damages.

The plaintiffs, Suzanne and Joyce Powell, purchased a house that subsequently revealed significant water leakage and mould issues.

They sued the previous owner, Tadeusz Lojko (who settled), and their real estate agent, Barbara Kirby, and her brokerage, Royal Lepage Real Estate Services Ltd., for negligence and breach of professional duties.

The court found that the agent failed to adequately advise the plaintiffs regarding the risks of not obtaining an independent home inspection or reviewing the full seller-provided report, especially given the plaintiffs' financial vulnerability and the summary report's indications of potential issues.

However, the plaintiffs were also found partially responsible due to Suzanne Powell's strong determination to purchase the property.

The court apportioned liability: 25% to the agent and brokerage, 25% to the plaintiffs for their own loss, and the remaining 50% to the seller (Lojko) as per the Pieringer Agreement.

Damages for repairs and lost rent were assessed.

The applicants, owners of a designated heritage property, sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change to issue a Renewable Energy Approval (REA) for a wind farm project.

The applicants argued the Director failed to properly interpret the REA Regulation regarding cultural heritage and breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the standard of review was reasonableness, the Director's decision to issue the REA was reasonable and balanced the statutory priorities, and the comprehensive procedural code in the REA Regulation fulfilled the duty of procedural fairness.

This endorsement addresses two motions to intervene in a land claim action brought by the Cree Nation of Eeyou Istchee against the Crown.

The Moose Cree First Nation sought to intervene as a necessary party, claiming exclusive Aboriginal title to a portion of the disputed lands.

The Nishnawbe Aski Nation (NAN), a political territorial organization representing 49 First Nations, sought to intervene as an added party, asserting a general interest in the interpretation and application of Treaty #9.

The court granted the Moose Cree First Nation status as a necessary party without conditions under Rule 5.03, acknowledging its direct territorial claim.

The Nishnawbe Aski Nation was granted status as a friend of the court under Rule 13.02, with specific limitations on its participation, as it lacked a direct or immediate interest in the substance of the claim independent of its members.

The court emphasized the complexity of multi-lateral disputes between First Nations in the context of reconciliation.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his application under the Hague Convention for the return of his child to Colorado.

The application judge had found that while the respondent mother wrongfully retained the child in Ontario, the appellant subsequently acquiesced to the retention through his prolonged silence and lack of contact.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant's conduct demonstrated acquiescence and that his actions did not constitute bona fide attempts at reconciliation.