Thomas R. Lederer

The Ontario Psychological Association (OPA) sued its former employee, Charlotte Mardonet, for misappropriating over $1.6 million.

Mardonet counterclaimed against the OPA and its individual officers and directors, seeking contribution and indemnity based on their alleged failure to supervise her.

The individual officers and directors moved to strike these paragraphs of the counterclaim, arguing they disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding it plain and obvious that officers and directors owe no duty of care or fiduciary duty to an employee to protect them from their own wrongdoing.

Stephen Doherty appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment, specifically antipsychotic medication.

The court addressed the mootness doctrine, determining the appeal was not moot due to the potential impact on future substitute decision-making.

Applying a reasonableness standard to the Board's factual findings, the court upheld the Board's determination that Doherty lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions, despite some symptomatic improvement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a rear-end motor vehicle collision where he struck the defendants' vehicle from behind.

The defendants and the plaintiff's insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court found that the physical evidence and the consistent testimony of the defendants established that the defendants were stopped at a red light when struck.

The plaintiff's evidence was inconsistent and evolved over time.

Applying the test for summary judgment, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, found the plaintiff entirely at fault, and dismissed the action.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside the discontinuance of their action for misfeasance in public office against the respondents.

The action was discontinued after three days of trial following a settlement.

The applicants sought to adduce new evidence, specifically Canada Revenue Agency re-assessments from January 2016 that allowed their tax objections, arguing these constituted exceptional circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the new evidence did not meet the criteria for setting aside a discontinuance, as it did not refer to events leading to the action and would not have changed the original outcome or proven misfeasance.

The court also addressed the inapplicability of res judicata and issue estoppel regarding findings from prior criminal proceedings.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondent breached a purchase agreement for three properties, leading to the forfeiture of a $400,000 deposit.

The agreement made time of the essence and specified strict notice requirements for waiving or satisfying conditions.

The respondent failed to provide timely written notice that conditions were not waived or satisfied, instead proposing an extension.

The court found that the proposed extension did not constitute proper notice and that the vendors did not breach their duty of good faith by not responding to the extension offer.

Consequently, the conditions were deemed satisfied, the respondent was in default, and the deposit was forfeited to the applicants.

A junior mining company sued Ontario for damages after its relationship with a First Nation collapsed and its exploration program stalled.

The plaintiff argued that the Crown's constitutional duty to consult and related obligations under the Mining Act extended to protect the company as a third-party mining claimant.

The court held that the honour of the Crown and any associated fiduciary or consultation duties run to Indigenous communities, not to mining proponents, and do not create an enforceable private law duty of care in favour of the plaintiff.

Applying the Anns/Cooper framework, the court further found that neither the legislative scheme nor the limited interactions between the parties established sufficient proximity.

The action was dismissed.

The respondent sought costs, including costs against the applicant's counsel personally, following the dismissal of the applicant's unmeritorious claim.

The Divisional Court declined to order costs against counsel, noting that such awards are to be rare.

The court fixed global costs, including costs of the initial application, motion for leave, appeal, and the present motion, at $22,500 payable by the applicant's estate.

A dissenting judge would have awarded $45,000 on a substantial indemnity basis jointly and severally against the estate and the applicant's counsel.

The plaintiff sued ten fuel providers for losses arising from fraudulent fuel card transactions.

The defendants brought motions to sever the proceedings.

The parties agreed to sever the claims against the Imperial defendants and stay the remaining claims pending the outcome of the Imperial action.

Shell brought a separate motion to stay the action against it based on a forum selection clause designating Alberta as the exclusive jurisdiction.

The court dismissed Shell's motion, finding that the policy against a multiplicity of proceedings constituted 'strong cause' to override the forum selection clause.

The plaintiff, a mortgage lender, suffered a loss when a required postponement of a prior charge was not obtained, leaving it as a third mortgagee rather than a first mortgagee.

The title insurer acknowledged coverage and paid the bulk of the loss after the property was sold under power of sale.

The plaintiff sued to recover approximately $40,000 in disputed property maintenance expenses and legal fees incurred by its independently retained counsel, as well as a determination on the interest calculation.

The court reduced the claimed expenses and legal fees, finding that some costs lacked strict proof, involved personal benefit to the plaintiff's principal, and were unnecessary given the insurer's early concession of coverage.

The court also ruled that interest was to be calculated and compounded semi-annually.

The plaintiff, Louise Talbot, brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking repayment of $127,843 owed under two promissory notes from the defendants, Jeffrey Nourse and two corporate entities.

The defendants disputed the validity of one $200,000 note, claiming it was an investment, and argued that outstanding undertakings regarding bank statements precluded summary judgment.

The court, applying the framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin, found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The evidence of a handwriting expert and a witness corroborated the plaintiff's claim regarding the promissory notes.

The court dismissed the defendants' arguments regarding the investment claim and the relevance of outstanding undertakings to the promissory notes.

The court also declined to stay execution of the judgment pending the counterclaim, citing the delay caused by the defendants and the lack of interest on the notes.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiff for $127,843 plus pre- and post-judgment interest.

The plaintiff brought a motion to resolve outstanding issues regarding pre-judgment interest and costs following a settlement of a motor vehicle accident claim.

The court held that the recent amendment to the Insurance Act regarding pre-judgment interest was substantive and did not apply retroactively, meaning the 5% rate under Rule 53.10 applied.

The court also ordered the defendants to pay a portion of the costs the plaintiff incurred in a successful accident benefits arbitration, as the defendants benefited from the resulting deduction.

Finally, the court reduced the overall costs of the tort claim to ensure proportionality.

The plaintiff appealed an order removing its law firm as solicitors of record due to a conflict of interest.

The firm had previously provided employment advice to a former employee of the defendants, who was originally named as a defendant in the action but later discontinued.

The motions judge found a risk that confidential information provided by the former employee could be misused.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that because the former client had settled his issues and dropped his objection to the firm acting, there was no longer a basis to remove the firm to protect his confidential information.

A dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal on the basis of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.

The plaintiff appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to remove counsel for the defendants due to an alleged conflict of interest.

A lawyer who had worked extensively on the plaintiff's file moved to the law firm representing the defendants.

The defendants' firm implemented an ethical screen.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred by focusing on whether the firm had done everything possible to avoid disclosure, rather than whether a reasonably informed person would be satisfied that no use of confidential information would occur.

Given the close working relationship between the migrating lawyer and the defendants' counsel, the court concluded the ethical screen was insufficient to protect the integrity of the administration of justice.

The appeal was granted and the defendants' counsel was removed.

The moving party sought costs against the responding party's solicitor personally and against the responding party's estate following the dismissal of the underlying application.

At the costs hearing, the solicitor attempted to represent both himself and the estate.

The Divisional Court identified a clear conflict of interest, as the solicitor's arguments against personal liability were adverse to the estate's interests.

The court adjourned the motion, directing the solicitor and the estate's representative to obtain independent legal advice.

Telecommunications companies sought leave to appeal certification orders permitting class proceedings concerning cellular phone billing practices.

The proposed class actions alleged that the defendants breached contracts, engaged in deceptive practices contrary to the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, and were unjustly enriched by rounding call durations up to the nearest minute under plans described as billed “per minute.” The moving parties argued that individual contractual contexts prevented the existence of a common issue and that certification was therefore inappropriate.

The court held that the meaning of the contractual phrase “per minute billing” was a common issue capable of resolution across the class, particularly given the standardized and adhesive nature of the consumer contracts.

Leave to appeal was refused and the certification orders were left undisturbed.

Following the settlement and abandonment of an application for judicial review regarding the Crown's duty to consult, the interveners and the respondent Ontario Power Authority sought costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the requests for costs.

The court held that interveners typically do not receive costs and that imposing costs on First Nations in disputes concerning constitutional rights and reconciliation would inappropriately deter such claims.

The court also denied costs to the Ontario Power Authority, noting it played a secondary role and the Crown itself did not seek costs.

The appellant brought a proposed class action against her former lawyer and his firm, alleging they took unauthorized fees, failed to obtain required court approval, and charged illegal interest rates on disbursements under invalid contingency fee agreements.

The motion judge dismissed the certification motion, finding the common issue and preferable procedure criteria were not met.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and certified the class proceeding, finding the motion judge erred in his interpretation of the Solicitors Act and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure to address the common issues.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle collision involving a public transit bus, the jury found that although liability was admitted, the plaintiff failed to prove the accident caused compensable injury.

After a subsequent hearing addressing responsibility for trial costs, the estate and former counsel were ordered to pay certain costs to the transit authority.

The present endorsement addressed a further request by the estate trustee, in her personal capacity, seeking substantial costs for the costs hearing itself.

The court held that proceedings determining costs rarely justify an additional award of costs absent unusual circumstances and found the amount claimed disproportionate to a one‑day hearing.

The court concluded that the ordinary principle that costs proceedings do not generate further costs should apply.

The respondents were successful on a motion for leave to appeal and the subsequent appeal.

They sought costs of $82,692.85 for the leave motion and $108,534.16 for the appeal.

The appellant argued the amounts were excessive and sought its own costs for the leave motion.

The Divisional Court found the respondents' claimed costs excessive given the focused nature of the issues and the number of hours docketed.

The court fixed costs payable to the respondents at $120,000.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following a jury trial concerning a motor vehicle collision in which liability had been admitted, the jury found that the accident did not cause or contribute to the injuries alleged by the deceased plaintiff.

The defendant transit authority sought costs.

The court held that the successful defendant was entitled to costs on a partial indemnity scale but reduced the fees claimed after finding aspects of the bill excessive.

The court further held that the estate trustee should not be personally liable for costs where she merely continued litigation commenced by the deceased.

However, due to counsel’s fundamental misunderstandings in presenting the damages case, the court ordered that a portion of the costs be paid personally by plaintiff’s counsel under Rule 57.07.