Miranda E. Serravalle

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's breach of contract claim.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants, retained by his insurer, breached a contract by failing to remediate an oil spill cost-effectively, causing personal injury and other losses.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial because no contractual relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendants.

The court also noted the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act and that the plaintiff provided no evidence of damages.

The plaintiff, Leon Filbey, brought an action against his ex-wife, Tania Ashe (a financial advisor), her company, Sun Life, and their children, alleging issues with irrevocable beneficiary designations on life insurance policies, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and breach of privacy.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were statute-barred or untenable.

The court found that claims related to the irrevocable beneficiary designations and earlier acts of negligence/breach of duty were statute-barred due to the plaintiff's knowledge of the issues by March 2012, exceeding the two-year limitation period.

For the remaining claims from 2015, the court found no evidence of damage for negligence/breach of duty and determined that the breach of privacy claim did not meet the "highly offensive" threshold established in Jones v. Tsige, as Ms. Ashe's actions were largely justified by her role as mother and former advisor to protect the children's trust.

Consequently, the defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellants appealed from a Superior Court order that set aside a Master's decision permitting amendment of the Statement of Claim to substitute the Regional Municipality of York and Brennan Paving and Construction Ltd. for the originally named defendants based on misnomer.

The original claim arose from an accident allegedly caused by a pothole on McCowan Road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master's inference that the substituted defendants would have known they were the intended defendants was not available on any reasonable view of the evidence.

The Notice of Claim and Statement of Claim, even when read together, were not capable of supporting such an inference without further inquiry.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision interpreting a landlord-tenant agreement as a complete release of the tenant from liability for fire damage.

The appellants argued the release applied only to the tenant personally but preserved a subrogated claim by the landlord's insurer against the tenant's insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding that releasing the tenant precluded any subrogated claim against the tenant's insurer.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by a pothole.

They initially sued the City of Toronto and 'John Doe Maintenance Company'.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiffs successfully moved before a Master to substitute the Region of York and Brennan Paving as defendants, relying on the doctrine of misnomer.

The defendants appealed.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the appeal, finding that the Master erred in law by extending the doctrine of misnomer too far.

The court held that the 'litigating finger' did not clearly point to the proposed defendants, as the Statement of Claim identified the accident location in a different municipality, and it was unreasonable to expect the proposed defendants to connect the claim to a notice letter sent nearly two years earlier.

The defendant, a former tenant, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for damages caused by a fire in his apartment.

The defendant argued that a letter from the plaintiffs, combined with an agreement to terminate his tenancy, constituted a release from liability for the fire.

The plaintiffs contended that the letter was not a release or was only a partial release, preserving their right to pursue a subrogated claim through their insurer.

The court found that the letter and termination agreement, read as an integrated whole, plainly released the defendant from liability for the fire, interpreting the phrase "damages will be dealt with between the insurance companies" to mean without the defendant's involvement.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiffs' action was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff's residential oil tank leaked, causing a significant environmental spill into Sturgeon Lake.

The plaintiff sued the fuel distributor (Thompson Fuels), the regulatory authority (TSSA), and the tank manufacturer (Granby) for negligence.

The court found Thompson Fuels 40% liable for failing to conduct a mandatory comprehensive inspection before delivering fuel.

The plaintiff was found 60% contributorily negligent for improper installation, failing to maintain the tank, introducing water into the tank, and delaying reporting the leak.

Claims against the TSSA and Granby were dismissed.

The court also assessed the reasonableness of the extensive remediation costs and dismissed the plaintiff's claim for statutory contribution under the Environmental Protection Act.

The third party moved for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' third party claim against him.

The plaintiff was injured when he fell from a rented boom lift after instructing the third party to remove a pin from the machine.

The third party argued he was merely following the plaintiff's instructions and could not be found negligent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a genuine issue for trial existed regarding whether it was reasonable for the third party to follow the instructions without making inquiries or assessing the risk.