P. Theodore Matlow

The applicants, Boeing and Bombardier, sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade to disclose three agreements relating to the purchase and sale of the de Havilland business.

The applicants argued the records were exempt from disclosure under the third-party information exemption in s. 17 of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Commissioner reasonably concluded that the complex, multi-party agreements were the product of negotiation and did not contain information 'supplied' to the Ministry by the applicants.

The appellant appealed a Board decision suspending its liquor licence for 14 days due to multiple infractions, including serving alcohol after hours, permitting drunkenness, and failing to clear signs of service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Board's refusal to grant an adjournment, its factual conclusions, or its penalty.

The Court also held that the Board was not functus officio when it issued an amending order to address an issue it had inadvertently omitted, as it was completing its statutory task.

The appellants appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision granting minor variances to the respondents for the construction of a new home.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the OMB erred in law by failing to properly apply the four-part test for minor variances under section 45(1) of the Planning Act.

The Court held that the OMB unreasonably focused almost exclusively on the impact of the variances, neglecting to adequately consider their size, desirability, and whether they maintained the general intent and purpose of the zoning by-law and official plan.

The matter was remitted to a different panel of the OMB.

The landlords appealed an order of the Tribunal regarding the calculation of rent.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to attribute the cost of renovations made by the tenants to the amount of rent payable, as defined in the Tenant Protection Act.

Despite the lack of a transcript due to an inaudible recording, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's order, and fixed the legal monthly rent at $3,000, requiring the tenants to pay arrears.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board suspending its liquor licence for 14 days due to multiple infractions, including serving alcohol after hours, permitting drunkenness, and failing to clear signs of service.

The appellant argued the Board erred by refusing an adjournment, making unreasonable factual findings, and issuing an amending order when it was functus officio.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of natural justice in the adjournment refusal, sufficient evidence to support the factual findings, and that the Board was not functus officio when completing its statutory task by addressing an issue it had inadvertently missed.

The penalty was upheld as reasonable.

The applicant husband appealed a spousal support order that required him to pay support for approximately eleven years before it was reviewable.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the duration excessive and an error in principle given the respondent wife's age, education, and employment history.

The court varied the order to a time-limited duration of three years at $700 per month to promote economic self-sufficiency.

The defendant appealed an order dismissing its motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The plaintiffs sued the provincial government in negligence after the deceased contracted West Nile Virus, alleging the government failed to reasonably implement its prevention plan.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that it was not plain and obvious the claim would fail, as the relevant public health legislation conferred sufficient powers on the government to potentially ground a private law duty of care at the operational level.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding no just cause for the respondent's termination and extending the notice period by two months.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of no just cause, as the appellant failed to show the trial judge was clearly wrong.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the judgment amount by one-third because the trial judge erred in extending the notice period without evidence that the termination prolonged or aggravated the respondent's depression.

The applicant, a child with severe autism, sought judicial review of a Special Education Tribunal decision affirming his placement in a Primary Autism Pilot Project rather than an Intensive Behavioural Intervention (IBI) program.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in finding the requested IBI program was medical treatment rather than education, and in failing to apply the Charter and Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and supported by the evidence that the pilot project was appropriate for the applicant's needs.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) that upheld the Investment Dealers Association of Canada's (IDA) disciplinary actions against them.

The IDA had fined the appellants and terminated their membership for failing to provide documents during an investigation into alleged principal trading in an error account.

The appellants argued the IDA lacked jurisdiction, its by-laws violated the Charter, and the investigation was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding the IDA is not a government entity subject to the Charter, its investigative powers are valid under the regulatory scheme, and its disciplinary process and penalties were reasonable.

The Children's Aid Society applied for judicial review of a Director's decision under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act to review the Society's refusal to place Crown ward children with extended family members for adoption.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, holding that the Director's decision to conduct a review was not a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because it did not decide or prescribe anyone's legal rights.

In the alternative, the majority found the Director's decision to be reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal which upheld the Director's finding that she was not a 'person with a disability' under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to properly interpret and apply all three subparagraphs of section 4(1) of the Act.

The court held that the Tribunal improperly stopped its analysis after finding no 'substantial' impairment under subparagraph (a), without considering the impact of the impairment on activities of daily living under subparagraph (b).

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The applicants, an employer and its manager, settled a sexual harassment complaint with the complainant.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission then referred the complaint solely against another respondent to the Human Rights Tribunal.

Despite the applicants not being parties to the hearing, the Tribunal made adverse findings of fact and liability against them.

The Divisional Court granted judicial review, holding that the Tribunal breached natural justice and exceeded its jurisdiction by adjudicating matters not referred to it and making findings against non-parties who had settled.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to amend its decision.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering him to pay $2,000 per month in spousal support and to secure the payments with life insurance.

The parties' separation agreement had set spousal support at $1.00 per month but allowed for variation in the event of a material change in circumstances.

The trial judge found that the cessation of child support constituted a material change.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding, concluding that the agreement implicitly gave priority to child support and that the cessation of child support was a material change warranting variation.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the requirement for life insurance, finding no evidence that the appellant had a history of failing to meet support obligations.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order varying child support, arguing errors in income calculation, the inclusion of a collapsed pension in income, and the costs award.

The respondent mother cross-appealed the retroactive reduction of child support.

Applying the standard of review from Hickey v. Hickey, the Divisional Court found no error in principle or significant misapprehension of evidence by the motion judge.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, with costs of the appeal awarded to the respondent.

The respondent tripped and fell on a city sidewalk, sustaining a shoulder injury.

She commenced an action against the city six months later, beyond the three-month limitation period in the Municipal Act.

The motion judge dismissed the city's motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding when the respondent discovered the severity of her injury.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the limitation period begins when the plaintiff knows some damage has occurred, not when the full extent of the injury is diagnosed.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

Following a successful appeal regarding entitlements under the Employment Standards Act, the appellant sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $31,000 for the entire action.

The respondent argued for no costs or partial indemnity costs of $5,000.

The Divisional Court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, noting the offers to settle did not strictly comply with Rule 49.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonable expectations, the court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs fixed at $4,500 for the motion and $6,000 for the appeal, plus disbursements.

The applicant, which operates both a nursing home and a retirement home, sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision.

The Tribunal had ruled that because the applicant held a nursing home license, its entire operation, including the private retirement home, was a 'public sector employer' subject to the proxy method of comparison under the Pay Equity Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding that a literal interpretation of the statute led to absurd and unfair results, such as forcing a private, unfunded retirement home to use a public sector pay equity method simply because of common ownership with a nursing home.

The Court held that the definition must be read to apply only to the extent of the nursing home operations.

The applicant police services board sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award that allowed a grievance by a police officer who was denied selection for a canine officer training course.

The arbitrator found the applicant violated the collective agreement by not giving the officer an opportunity to respond to performance concerns before making the decision.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and set aside the award, holding that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was unreasonable.

The Court found no requirement in the agreement to engage the officer in the selection process in that manner, and noted the arbitrator failed to address the core issue of whether the applicant's decision was made with just cause.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for leave to appeal a summary judgment costs decision to the Divisional Court.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff claimed $1.5 million in damages.

The motion judge dismissed the motion for want of jurisdiction, finding that the proposed appeal did not fall within the monetary limits or other provisions of section 19(1) of the Courts of Justice Act governing the Divisional Court's jurisdiction.

No costs were awarded for the motion as the responding parties failed to address the jurisdictional issue.