P. Theodore Matlow

The appellant, a staff sergeant, appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services upholding his conviction for discreditable conduct.

The charge arose from a meeting with a constable who had previously filed a racial harassment complaint against him.

The hearing officer found the appellant's conduct constituted a reprisal based on the constable's subjective perception, despite accepting the appellant's evidence denying any reprisal intent.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the hearing officer and Commission erred by focusing on the constable's subjective perception rather than the appellant's intent, and by failing to consider whether the conduct was likely to bring discredit upon the police force.

The conviction was set aside.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Director under the Business Corporations Act ordering them to change their corporate names to names distinguishable from 'Unity Insurance'.

The Director found that the similarity in names caused confusion among insurers, reinsurers, and brokers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the class of persons likely to be deceived includes anyone with an interest in dealing with the corporation, not just customers.

The court also held it lacked inherent jurisdiction to order the appellants to cease using the unregistered business name 'Unity Insurance'.

The successful appellant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $27,295.59.

The respondent argued the claimed hourly rates and preparation time were excessive, suggesting $5,000 all inclusive.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the Divisional Court fixed costs at $12,000 all inclusive, finding this amount fair and reasonable given the nature and complexity of the matter, the number of appearances, and reasonable preparation time.

The Director of the Ministry of the Environment appealed a decision of the Environmental Review Tribunal that revoked remedial orders against a former corporate officer (Lee) and an innocent current property owner (Montague) regarding historical contamination.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal regarding Lee, finding the Tribunal erred in law by applying too narrow a test for 'management or control' and failing to consider his liability for waste removal.

The appeal regarding Montague was dismissed, as the Tribunal correctly found she did not cause or permit the discharge and properly exercised its discretion on fairness grounds to relieve her of financial responsibility for the cleanup.

The appellant real estate agency appealed the dismissal of its claim for commissions against the respondents.

The trial judge found the listing agreement invalid because the agent failed to leave a copy with the vendor, as required by section 35 of the Business Brokers Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the Court noted the trial judge erred in concluding that failure to post the listing on MLS within two days invalidated the agreement, and that agents are required to verify a vendor's authority or sole ownership before signing a listing agreement.

The appellant employee appealed a decision dismissing his motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal damages and ESA entitlements.

The motion judge had held that ESA standards were only enforceable through administrative procedures and were alternatives to common law damages.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that ESA entitlements can be claimed in a civil action and are not subject to mitigation, as they are statutory minimums, not damages.

The Court granted summary judgment for the outstanding balance of the appellant's ESA entitlements.

Following an appeal of a professional discipline decision where the appellant succeeded on one of twelve grounds, both parties sought costs.

The Divisional Court found that success was not evenly divided, as the appellant failed to upset the basic findings of professional misconduct against him.

The Court awarded costs to the respondent College on a partial indemnity basis, reduced to reflect the appellant's limited success, fixing the amount at $9,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board decision that upheld a union grievance after the employer's consultant destroyed interview notes.

The Board found that the destruction of these documents irreparably prejudiced the union's case and prevented a fair hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Board did not deny natural justice by deciding the matter on a preliminary fairness issue without hearing the merits.

The Court further held that the Board had the implied statutory authority to enforce disclosure obligations by allowing the grievance.

The Municipality of Bluewater appealed a decision of the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board, which had granted the respondent farmer an exemption from the minimum distance separation requirements in the municipality's zoning by-law.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction to interfere with land use planning matters, which fall exclusively under the Planning Act.

The Board's authority is limited to protecting farmers from nuisance claims regarding normal farm practices, not granting zoning variances.

The plaintiff sued the defendant lawyer, Highley, and his insurer, LPIC, for professional negligence based on discussions Highley had with the plaintiff's lawyer concerning a priorities motion.

Highley had been retained by LPIC to defend another lawyer in a related matter, and the interests of Highley's client and the plaintiff were aligned at the time.

The motion judge refused to grant summary judgment dismissing the action against Highley and LPIC.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and granted summary judgment, holding that a lawyer does not owe a duty of care to a non-client represented by their own counsel, even when their interests are aligned, due to a lack of proximity and compelling policy reasons.

The appellant denturist appealed a Discipline Committee's findings of professional misconduct and the resulting penalty.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings of misconduct, which included fabricating inadequate dentures, poor record-keeping, and secretly tape-recording a conversation with a patient.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that evidence was obtained through an unlawful warrantless search and seizure, noting the items were voluntarily supplied or in plain view.

However, because the Committee's reasons contained factual errors regarding the timing of the denture fabrication and the appellant's practices after taking remedial courses, the court remitted the matter of penalty to the Committee for reconsideration.

The plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries to her neck in a motor vehicle accident.

At trial, the judge found she had suffered a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function, meeting the threshold under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, and the jury awarded her $7,000.

The defendant appealed the threshold determination.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that while the impairment was permanent and affected an important function, the trial judge failed to properly analyze whether the impairment was 'serious' as required by Meyer v. Bright.

The court concluded the plaintiff's impairment, which primarily reduced her frequency of ballroom dancing, did not meet the threshold of seriousness.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family property and time-limited spousal support.

The Divisional Court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 19(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the net payment ordered by the trial judge was under $25,000, despite the amount in dispute being much higher.

On the merits, the court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's property division was supported by evidence and that time-limited spousal support was appropriate given the husband's failure to rehabilitate himself and his persistent prescription drug abuse.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claims for spousal support, a restraining order, and a $24,000 lump sum pursuant to a marriage contract.

The Divisional Court determined it lacked jurisdiction under section 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act because the total monetary value of the claims could not be ascertained to be under $25,000.

The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario pursuant to section 110 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent worked as an illustrator for the appellant until her employment was terminated.

She initially filed an Employment Standards Act complaint against the employment agency that placed her, but later withdrew it and commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal against the appellant.

The appellant moved to dismiss the action, arguing it was barred by s. 64.3(2) of the ESA, which prevents an employee from commencing a civil action relating to the same termination if they have filed a complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory bar only prevents a civil action against the same alleged employer against whom the complaint was filed.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a noting of default and a default judgment of over $2.5 million in a construction lien action.

The appellants argued the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to sign the default judgment because the claim was not for a liquidated demand.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was for a liquidated demand supported by detailed invoices and a signed change order.

The court also upheld the motions judge's finding that the appellants had no arguable defence on the merits.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a default judgment signed by the Registrar for over $2.5 million.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal.

In these dissenting reasons, Matlow J. would have allowed the appeal and set aside the default judgment, finding that the plaintiff's claim for increased construction contract costs was for unliquidated damages, not a liquidated sum, meaning the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to sign the judgment under Rule 19.04(1)(a).

The applicants, chartered accountants charged with professional misconduct, brought a motion for review of an order dismissing their request to compel the respondent's Professional Conduct Committee to file a record of proceedings under section 10 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the committee's power to investigate and charge is not a 'statutory power of decision' as defined in the Act, and therefore section 10 does not apply.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision vacating a land transfer tax assessment against Upper Valley Dodge Chrysler Limited.

The sole shareholder of the corporation had transferred land to the corporation and claimed an exemption under s. 3(1) of Regulation 697, which applies to transfers from an 'individual' to a 'family business corporation'.

The Minister argued the corporation could not be an 'individual' or 'operator' under the strict wording of the regulation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, applying a purposive approach to statutory interpretation to find that the transfer fell within the intended scope of the family business exemption.

The applicant's driver's licence was suspended for failing to submit a satisfactory medical report.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal declined jurisdiction to hear the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction over suspensions under s. 32(12)(b)(ii) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal could only decline jurisdiction if it was satisfied that the Minister made the order or that there was a valid delegation of power to the Registrar.

As there was no evidence of such delegation in the record, the Court remitted the matter to the Tribunal to assess its jurisdiction.