P. Theodore Matlow

The applicant sought judicial review to quash an arbitration award that ordered it to pay the respondent $5 million pursuant to a share purchase agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Arbitration Act and the parties' agreement, which explicitly prohibited appeals, barred the application.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to pursue any potential statutory appeal rights within the prescribed time limits.

On the merits, the court found the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement was not patently unreasonable and the process was procedurally fair.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Fire Safety Commission upholding an Inspection Order that imposed conditions on burning brush on his farm.

The appellant argued the Inspector lacked jurisdiction and that the Commission's decision was procedurally unfair because it failed to provide reasons for upholding the conditions.

The Divisional Court found the Inspector had jurisdiction but agreed that the Commission's failure to provide reasons regarding the reasonableness of the conditions breached the duty of procedural fairness.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Commission for reconsideration.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal ordering rent reductions for two tenants due to their inability to use their balconies during a restoration project.

The Tribunal had rejected the landlord's proven costs and instead based the reduction on the 'value' of the balconies, awarding a 10% rent abatement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal breached natural justice by adopting a new interpretation of the regulation and calculating value without giving the parties an opportunity to call evidence or make submissions on that issue.

The matter was remitted to a different Tribunal member.

The Ministry of the Attorney General brought an application for judicial review regarding a freedom of information request.

During the hearing, the Divisional Court panel asked counsel whether the requester should be permitted to bring an application under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act that would breach a confidentiality undertaking previously given by his lawyer during negotiations.

The court adjourned the application to allow counsel time to prepare an answer to this pivotal question.

In supplementary reasons, the Divisional Court amended its previous ruling on costs at the request of the respondents.

The court deleted the original paragraph regarding costs and substituted a new paragraph directing all counsel to address the court in writing on whether costs should be assessed or fixed, and if fixed, the quantum of such costs.

The applicants had filed a bill of costs seeking partial indemnity costs of $308,926.84.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment that dismissed his $22,000 claim and awarded the respondents $19,260 on their counterclaim.

At the commencement of the appeal, the Divisional Court raised the issue of its jurisdiction under section 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Following a recent ruling, the court held that it lacks jurisdiction when the combined total of the dismissed claim and the awarded counterclaim exceeds the $25,000 monetary limit.

On consent of the parties, the appeal was adjourned to the Court of Appeal.

The applicants, who were social assistance recipients, brought a Charter challenge against a 'lifetime ban' on benefits imposed after convictions related to their benefits.

Before the hearing, a newly elected government repealed the regulations, and the parties settled all issues except costs.

The applicants sought their costs on a public interest basis.

The Divisional Court (majority) awarded the applicants partial indemnity costs of $308,926.84, finding that the litigation was meritorious, the issues were of public importance, and the applicants could not have proceeded without pro bono counsel.

A dissenting judge would have made no order as to costs.

The respondent/defendant brought a cross-appeal regarding costs following a wrongful dismissal action under the Simplified Procedure Rule where the plaintiff sought $25,000.

The defendant had made a Rule 49 offer of one month's salary which the plaintiff did not accept.

The Divisional Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding no reason to deny the successful party its costs.

The court fixed costs for the trial, appeal, and cross-appeal at $10,000 all-inclusive, payable by the appellant/plaintiff to the respondent/defendant.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that failed to order the return of a converted vehicle or its value.

The trial judge's factual findings were unchallenged, and the respondent did not cross-appeal.

The Divisional Court found that the appellant was entitled to the vehicle's return or its value of $6,500 at the time of conversion.

Since the respondent had sold the vehicle for salvage, the court varied the trial judgment to award the appellant $6,500 plus pre-judgment interest.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal claim.

The trial judge had found that a mutual release signed by the appellant was a complete defence to the action, as there was no evidence of coercion or unconscionability.

The appellant also appealed the trial judge's decision to allow an amendment to the statement of defence at the opening of the trial.

The Divisional Court found no merit in either ground of appeal and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a registered practical nurse, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Discipline Committee of the College of Nurses of Ontario.

The Committee found that the appellant yelled at a cognitively impaired client and forced her to clean up her own faeces.

The appeal was based on the Committee's credibility findings and its refusal to re-open the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no palpable and overriding error in the credibility findings and no error in refusing to re-open the hearing.

The General Manager of OHIP appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board ordering that the respondent, a U.S. citizen whose husband held dual U.S. and Canadian citizenship, be enrolled in OHIP.

OHIP argued that because the husband was a Canadian citizen, he did not require an employment authorization, and therefore his spouse could not qualify for OHIP under the regulation requiring such authorization.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reason why the husband could not be treated as a U.S. citizen for the purpose of qualifying under the regulation, thereby qualifying his wife.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to vary child support and rescind arrears totalling $21,343.40, alongside ongoing support of $425 per month.

The Divisional Court considered whether it had jurisdiction under section 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, given the combined amount in issue exceeded $25,000.

The court held that the monetary limit applies to the total amount in issue across all subclauses, concluding it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The appellants, developers of a residential subdivision, appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision requiring them to pay $568,391 as their proportionate share of municipal infrastructure costs previously front-ended by a neighbouring developer.

The appellants argued that the Development Charges Act, 1989 prohibited the imposition of such charges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the Act prohibited imposing a charge by way of agreement, it did not prohibit the OMB from imposing the charge directly as a condition of draft plan approval under section 51(25) of the Planning Act to ensure a fair and equitable allocation of infrastructure costs.

The defendant insurer appealed an order granting a mandatory interlocutory injunction that required it to pay periodic disability benefits to the plaintiff pending trial.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the motions judge erred in concluding the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm.

The Court held that social stigma, loss of dignity, and potential loss of residence were not supported by the evidence as constituting irreparable harm in this context, and that the policy did not provide for ongoing future benefits without proof of continuing disability.

The plaintiff, who claimed to suffer from chronic fatigue syndrome, was denied long-term disability benefits by the defendant insurer.

The plaintiff commenced an action and successfully moved for a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring the insurer to pay periodic disability benefits and arrears until trial.

The insurer appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction, finding that the motions judge erred in concluding the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm.

The majority held that the plaintiff's financial hardship and potential loss of dignity did not constitute irreparable harm, as damages would be an adequate remedy if the plaintiff succeeded at trial.

The appellant private school appealed a trial judgment awarding $8,800 in damages to the respondents for the expulsion of their eight-year-old daughter without notice or a hearing.

The school argued the trial judge based the decision on a breach of an implied contractual term of natural justice, which was not pleaded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the allegations of procedural unfairness were central to the dispute from the beginning and were sufficiently pleaded in the context of a breach of fiduciary duty, meaning the school knew the case it had to meet.

The Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers appealed a decision of the Ontario Licence Appeal Tribunal, which ordered the Registrar to grant a registration with conditions to the respondent.

The issue was whether the Tribunal applied the proper test in determining whether the Registrar's proposal to revoke registration should be carried out.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal correctly identified and applied the test from Brenner v. Ontario, which asks whether past conduct affords reasonable grounds for belief that the applicant will not carry on business in accordance with law and with integrity and honesty.

The court held that it could not interfere with the Tribunal's exercise of discretion unless it was clearly wrong, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial decision dismissing their application for a declaration that the insured was dead under section 208 of the Insurance Act.

The trial judge had relied on hearsay evidence from an investigator regarding statements made by the insured's sister, which suggested the insured had planned to fake his death.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by using this hearsay evidence for a truth purpose without properly applying the principled approach to hearsay.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Arbitration Board's decision regarding whether the union was entitled to grieve a matter as a union grievance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's disposition of the issue was not patently unreasonable and reflected a careful analysis of the collective agreement.