P. Theodore Matlow

The applicant, a probationary police constable, sought judicial review of the police services board's decision to terminate his employment.

He argued the board breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to require witnesses to give evidence under oath or allow cross-examination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under section 44(3) of the Police Services Act, the board was acting as an employer exercising an administrative function.

The Court held that the board was not clearly wrong or unreasonable in exercising its discretion not to take evidence under oath or permit cross-examination, given the circumstances and the information already before it.

The appellant appealed an order that imputed his income at $65,000, rescinded child support, and transferred a child's education fund to the respondent.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred in finding the appellant in default of financial disclosure obligations, as the order lacked a specific time limit and the hearing date had been advanced.

The court also found no basis for imputing the appellant's income at $65,000, noting that his actual income was $28,400 while the respondent's was $64,300.

The court allowed the appeal, recalculated child support based on the parties' actual incomes, and set aside the transfer of the education fund on the condition that the appellant maintain it for the child's benefit.

The defendants appealed an order dismissing their motion to enjoin the plaintiffs from seeking access to discovery evidence in parallel U.S. anti-trust litigation.

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were attempting to circumvent Ontario's discovery rules by obtaining discovery in the U.S. before certification of the class action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the plaintiffs were merely seeking passive access to evidence already discovered in the U.S. litigation, rather than actively conducting discovery.

The court held that such evidence gathering does not offend Ontario's discovery rules or the implied undertaking rule, and that the U.S. court should determine whether to grant access under its own protective order.

The Superintendent of Financial Services appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal regarding the partial wind-up of a pension plan by Monsanto Canada Inc. The Tribunal had ruled that Monsanto was not required to distribute pension surplus on a partial wind-up and that Monsanto had a legitimate expectation based on past regulatory practice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of the Tribunal.

The Court held that section 70(6) of the Pension Benefits Act requires the distribution of surplus on a partial wind-up, and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot justify disregarding the requirements of the law.

The appellant father appealed an order dismissing his application to terminate spousal support and his application to require the respondent mother to pay child support after their daughter moved to his residence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding spousal support, finding no material change in circumstances to justify termination, as the mother had not yet achieved self-sufficiency.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding child support, ordering the mother to pay the Table amount of $222 per month, as she failed to establish undue hardship under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The cross-appellant elector appealed a judgment under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent mayor owned additional properties near a proposed highway extension.

The Divisional Court held that the normal test for fresh evidence is modified by s. 11(2) of the Act, which allows a new trial before the same judge to take additional evidence if it might have affected the initial disposition.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the trial judge to reconsider the judgment in light of the fresh evidence.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought an application for judicial review of an interim decision made by the Board of Inquiry regarding the production of records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to justify fragmenting the ongoing hearing before the Board.

The Court held that the Board's decision was a reasonable exercise of its discretion at a preliminary stage, particularly in applying the balancing test from A.M. v. Ryan and considering the confidentiality undertaking in place.

Costs of $3,500 were awarded to the respondent employer against the Commission.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a final child support variation order made after he moved to British Columbia.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and extended the time to appeal the original variation order.

The majority held that under sections 17(1) and 18(2) of the Divorce Act, a final order cannot be made against an out-of-province respondent unless they attorn to the jurisdiction or consent; otherwise, only a provisional order can be made.

The matter was remitted for a rehearing.

The plaintiffs, four Ford dealerships, appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class proceeding against Ford Motor Company of Canada.

The motions judge had found that all certification criteria were met except the preferable procedure requirement, concluding that an application under Rule 14.05(3)(d) would be more efficient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a Rule 14.05(3)(d) application would not resolve the common issues for the entire class, as Ford refused to be bound by the result for non-parties.

The Court concluded that only a class proceeding would bind the class and avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The cross-appellant, an elector, appealed a judgment that found the respondent mayor breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act but excused the breach as an error in judgment.

The cross-appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal showing the mayor had interests in other properties affected by the highway extension vote.

The Divisional Court modified the traditional test for fresh evidence due to the unique powers under s. 11(2) of the Act, admitted the evidence, and remitted the matter to the trial judge for reconsideration.

The minority shareholder applicant brought an oppression application under the Business Corporations Act after being dismissed from the respondent corporation.

The shareholders' agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause and a specific mechanism for valuing and redeeming the shares of a departing employee.

The motions judge allowed the applicant's motion to have the dispute heard in court rather than by arbitration, relying on the Weber principle to avoid a potential deprivation of ultimate remedy.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the Weber principle does not generally apply to voluntary private arbitration agreements and that the parties must be held to their freely chosen dispute resolution mechanism.

The appellant university landlord appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal which found that the university's 'no pet rule' and refusal to renew a tenancy agreement substantially interfered with the tenants' reasonable enjoyment.

The tenants, who kept cats in their student housing unit, had signed an agreement to terminate the tenancy at the time of entering the lease.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that while the 'no pet' provision was void under the Tenant Protection Act, the university was exempt from the prohibition against agreements to terminate signed at the inception of a tenancy due to the student housing exemption in O. Reg. 194/98.

Consequently, the university was entitled to rely on the agreement to refuse a new tenancy at the end of the term.

The applicants, inmates awaiting trial at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre, brought an application for judicial review challenging the implementation of a new telephone system that imposed an automatic twenty-minute time limit on outgoing calls.

They argued this restriction violated their freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter and section 5 of the Ministry of Correctional Services Act.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no statutory or Charter breach, and held that any such breach would be saved by section 1 of the Charter.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the application for pre-trial inmates, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.

The appellant employer appealed a decision of the Ontario Human Rights Board of Inquiry, which found it liable for racial discrimination and a poisoned work environment.

The employer argued the Board erred by not dismissing the complaints due to institutional delay, by refusing to apply issue estoppel to a prior labour arbitration decision, and by imposing direct employer liability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the test for delay, properly rejected issue estoppel due to a lack of mutuality of parties, and reasonably inferred a causal connection between the poisoned environment and the employee's termination.

The appellant appealed a decision appointing the deceased's spouse and another individual as estate trustees.

The Divisional Court held that under s. 6(8) of the Family Law Act, a surviving spouse who elects to take their share under the Act rather than the will cannot act as an executor, as the will is interpreted as if they had predeceased the testator.

Furthermore, due to conflict between the parties, the court found it preferable to appoint an independent executor.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment varied to appoint an independent estate trustee.