P. Theodore Matlow

The applicants sought costs against the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario following successful applications for judicial review.

The Divisional Court awarded costs of $20,000 on a partial indemnity scale against the Tribunal.

The court noted that while costs against a statutory tribunal are rare, the Tribunal's fully adversarial stance and unsuccessful arguments on all issues justified the award.

The appellants, tenants of a mobile home park, appealed an order of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal.

The tenants sought punitive damages and a rebate for water testing charges invoiced by the landlord after the park's water supply became contaminated.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal, as a statutory body, lacks jurisdiction to award punitive damages.

The Court also found that section 115(5) of the Tenant Protection Act explicitly permits landlords to charge tenants for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses for water testing, regardless of whether it is a mandated maintenance activity or if there is a contractual agreement.

The respondents, the City of Toronto and the Toronto Transit Commission, brought a motion for the recusal of Justice Matlow and to strike the panel that had previously granted an application for judicial review.

The moving parties argued that Justice Matlow's prior involvement in contentious issues with the City created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Justices Greer and E. Macdonald, the other members of the panel, were unaware of the extent of Justice Matlow's involvement prior to the motion.

They concluded that an objective third party would find a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Consequently, they decided to stand down, strike the panel, and declare their previous decision null and void to ensure the matter did not proceed in breach of natural justice.

The respondents, the City of Toronto and the Toronto Transit Commission, brought a motion requesting that Justice Matlow recuse himself from a judicial review panel due to a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from his prior advocacy against a City development project.

Justice Matlow, deciding the recusal issue alone, dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and that the respondents had waived their right to object by delaying.

However, the other two panel members, Justices Greer and E. Macdonald, concluded that a reasonable apprehension of bias did exist.

Because they could not order Justice Matlow to recuse himself, they stepped down from the panel to prevent a breach of natural justice, resulting in the panel being struck and the application ordered to be heard de novo.

The Director appealed an order of the Environmental Review Tribunal awarding costs to the respondents after the Director revoked the underlying environmental orders.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to award costs.

The Environmental Protection Act does not confer costs jurisdiction, and the Tribunal could not rely on section 17.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act because it had not enacted rules regarding costs that complied with the requirements of section 17.1(2)(b).

The applicant sought judicial review of the City of Toronto's decision to proceed with the construction of a dedicated streetcar right-of-way on St. Clair Avenue West, arguing it contravened the Planning Act and the Environmental Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court released a short endorsement granting the application and setting aside the City's decision to proceed with the project, with formal reasons to follow.

The court noted the urgency of the matter to avoid wasted construction costs.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him in contempt of court and imposing costs sanctions.

The Divisional Court raised a preliminary issue regarding its jurisdiction under s. 19(1) of the Courts of Justice Act to hear an appeal from a contempt order.

Noting confusion over whether the motion judge actually intended to make a contempt finding, the Court adjourned the appeal to allow the parties to seek clarification from the motion judge and to address potential leave to appeal requirements if the contempt finding is removed.

The applicant's solicitor appealed an order requiring him to personally pay $1,000 in costs for unreasonably refusing an adjournment after serving a late affidavit.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the solicitor paid the costs and advised the court that the appeal was purely academic.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no public interest reason to hear a purely academic appeal regarding an interlocutory costs order in private litigation.

The appellant client appealed an order of a Superior Court judge dismissing his motion to set aside a certificate of costs in favour of his former solicitor.

The Divisional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 19(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the order appealed from was not an order 'for a single payment'.

The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 110(1) of the Act.

The appellant homeowner appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent contractor damages for unpaid holdbacks and construction extras, while the contractor cross-appealed the partial allowance of the homeowner's counterclaim for deficiencies and delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in her assessment of the conflicting evidence regarding the construction of the new home, including the parties' failure to strictly follow the contractual procedure for requesting extras.

The applicant ratepayer sought a mandatory order (mandamus) to compel the respondent municipality to enforce its by-laws regarding sight lines at two intersections.

The municipality had inspected the intersections and determined they were not hazardous.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that a municipality cannot be compelled by mandamus to enforce a by-law enacted under a discretionary power, and courts should not interfere with the exercise of municipal discretion.

The appellant resort appealed a Board decision suspending its liquor licence for seven days for allegedly serving an intoxicated person and permitting drunkenness.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Board's decision.

The Court found no evidence that the appellant's employees supplied liquor to the intoxicated patron, noting the drinks were ordered by another guest.

Furthermore, the Court held the Board failed to properly interpret 'permitted drunkenness', as the appellant's staff had taken reasonable steps to deny service and remove the patron shortly after her arrival.

The appellant Township appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision that approved a zoning by-law amendment for a specialty stone quarry without requiring the respondent to rebuild an access road to current municipal standards.

The Township argued that its Official Plan mandated a road maintenance agreement prior to rezoning.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable.

The Court held that the Official Plan provision was discretionary and specifically applied to gravel trucks, which was inapplicable as the site would not extract gravel.

The Board properly considered the Planning Act requirements regarding transportation needs and municipal finances.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of an Order in Council removing him from office following a public inquiry.

The inquiry commissioner found that the applicant had engaged in a pattern of misconduct, including denying due process and abusing judicial power in three separate incidents.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the commissioner's findings, concluding that it was reasonable to hold a justice of the peace to the same high standard of conduct as a judge.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, a deputy judge of the Small Claims Court, sought judicial review of the senior regional judge's decision not to renew his appointment upon his turning 75 years old.

The applicant argued that age was an irrelevant factor since the Courts of Justice Act does not prescribe a mandatory retirement age for deputy judges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review was patent unreasonableness and that the senior regional judge was entitled to consider age and the need to provide experience to younger judges as relevant factors in her administrative discretion.

The appellant dentist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct regarding his treatment of temporomandibular joint disorders.

He argued that a committee member's prior involvement with a Quality Assurance Committee created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the committee erred in refusing to qualify his proposed expert witness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the bias claim but found the committee erred in refusing to qualify the expert witness.

The findings of misconduct that depended on expert testimony were quashed, and the penalty and costs were set aside and remitted to a newly constituted panel.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision discharging a tax assessment against a vendor operating 25-cent single-coin vending machines.

The vendor argued it was impossible to collect and remit retail sales tax because the machines could not accept more than 25 cents or give change.

The Divisional Court held that compliance was possible if the vendor had applied for and used tax-included pricing under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

However, because the vendor was not actually using tax-included pricing during the relevant period, the Minister was not entitled to issue the assessment under section 18(3) of the Act.

The appeal was allowed in part to vary the judgment below, but otherwise dismissed.

A former student of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario sought judicial review of an Appeal Committee decision that overturned a publication ban on his name following a finding of professional misconduct.

The student had misappropriated $20,000 from a client.

The Discipline Committee had ordered a publication ban to aid his rehabilitation, but the Appeal Committee found this was an error in principle, as the conduct involved moral turpitude requiring general deterrence.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, upholding the Appeal Committee's decision to publish the student's name.

The applicant sought to enforce an order of the Ontario Labour Relations Board requiring the respondents to produce certain documents.

The respondents failed to comply with the Board's order and subsequently failed to produce the documents after being given an extension by the Divisional Court.

The Court found all three respondents in contempt, fining each $5,000 and ordering them to pay $5,000 in costs jointly and severally.

The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing a motion to set aside a default judgment of $15,000.

The Divisional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under section 19(1)(a)(i) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the order appealed from was not an order 'for a single payment'.

The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Act.