Richard Clark Culpeper

The trial addressed decision-making authority and parenting time for two children of the relationship, and child support for one child from the Mother's previous relationship.

The court granted the Mother sole decision-making authority and primary care of the children, finding that the Father's actions, including involving children in adult conflict and demonstrating a lack of insight into his detrimental behaviour, rendered shared parenting unworkable and contrary to the children's best interests.

The Father was ordered to pay child support for both the children of the relationship and the Mother's non-biological child.

A restraining order against the Father was continued due to concerns for the Mother's psychological safety.

The father sought to change the children's primary residence from Thunder Bay to London, Ontario, and sought sole custody, alleging the mother had mental health issues and failed to address the children's special needs.

The mother opposed the relocation and sought to retain primary care and decision-making.

The court found the mother was the primary parent and the children's status quo was with her.

Applying the Children's Law Reform Act and common law principles, the court determined that the father failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances or that the relocation was in the children's best interests, noting his history of undermining the mother and his own move from Thunder Bay.

The court dismissed the father's request for relocation and granted the mother sole decision-making authority and primary residence, with specified parenting time for the father and an order for child support arrears and ongoing support.

Maternal grandparents brought a motion for interim custody of a young child following an ex parte order obtained after the mother attempted suicide.

The mother brought a cross‑motion seeking the child’s return.

The court considered the best interests of the child under the Children's Law Reform Act and emphasized that interim custody decisions should generally maintain the true status quo unless strong evidence justifies disruption.

The court found the status quo was the child’s care with the mother since birth, and that the suicide attempt was not serious and was connected to a volatile relationship with the child’s father rather than parenting incapacity.

Evidence from child protection services and support workers indicated no concerns with the mother’s parenting.

Interim custody was returned to the mother with structured access for the grandparents.

In a family law motion concerning a young child, the paternal grandparents obtained an ex parte order granting them interim custody following the mother's apparent suicide attempt.

The mother subsequently brought a motion seeking the child’s return.

Given the conflicting affidavits, extensive hearsay, and lack of detailed evidence, the court declined to make credibility findings and scheduled an expedited hearing with viva voce evidence.

Pending that hearing, the court fashioned an interim access arrangement allowing the mother supervised parenting time while the grandparents retained primary care.

The order was made on an interim, interim basis in the best interests of the child pending a fuller evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside an assessment order obtained by his former solicitor.

The appellant argued he was never properly served with the notice of assessment, rendering the proceedings a nullity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under Rule 2.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure to properly serve the documents was an irregularity, not a nullity.

Given the appellant's excessive delay of over ten years in moving to set aside the order after becoming aware of it, the court declined to exercise its discretion to set the order aside.

The appellant client appealed an order of a Superior Court judge dismissing his motion to set aside a certificate of costs in favour of his former solicitor.

The Divisional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 19(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the order appealed from was not an order 'for a single payment'.

The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 110(1) of the Act.