Stephen J. Moreau

The proposed intervener coalition sought leave to intervene in an employment-contract appeal concerning enforceability of termination provisions.

The court held the coalition would provide a distinct perspective on the effects of termination clauses on vulnerable and low-wage workers and granted leave on terms aligned with a prior intervener order.

The defendant employer brought a motion to dismiss or permanently stay an employment action on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens.

The plaintiff, a former employee, commenced an action in Ontario alleging breach of contract, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and discriminatory treatment arising from her dismissal without notice.

The defendant argued that the action should be stayed in favor of Manitoba courts, where the plaintiff was employed and where the alleged misconduct occurred.

The court found that a forum selection clause in the plaintiff's original employment contract with Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL) designated Ontario as the exclusive jurisdiction and remained enforceable against the defendant, a wholly-owned subsidiary of AECL that assumed the plaintiff's employment.

The court also found that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter based on multiple presumptive connecting factors.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendants appealed an associate justice's decision dismissing their rule 5 motion to remove individual defendants and professional corporation defendants from a wrongful dismissal and breach of contract claim brought by former partners of a law firm.

The defendants also brought a pleadings motion under rules 25.06 and 25.11 to strike the statement of claim.

The court upheld the associate justice's decision, finding that the individual defendants and professional corporation defendants were properly joined under rule 5.02(2)(c) because there was doubt as to the person or persons from whom the plaintiffs were entitled to relief.

The court rejected arguments that the pleading was vague or scandalous, finding it adequately pleaded the claims against all defendants.

The court dismissed both the appeal and the pleadings motion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether an injunction restraining secondary picketing by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers at a Purolator facility was governed by section 101 or section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The majority held that the definition of "labour dispute" in section 102 encompasses secondary picketing, and therefore, the appeal route lies to the Court of Appeal without leave under section 102(10).

The dissenting judge would have quashed the appeal, holding that the order was made under section 101 and thus appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to remove all defendants except Diamond & Diamond Lawyers LLP from the action, or alternatively to stay the action against those defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs’ pleadings provided a basis for claims against the individual and professional corporation defendants, and that joinder was permissible under Rule 5.02(2)(c) due to doubt as to the proper party from whom relief may be obtained.

The court also found that the inclusion of these parties would not unduly complicate or delay the proceedings or cause undue prejudice.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Moyra Miller, finding that she was wrongfully dismissed by Alaya Care Inc. The court held that the termination provisions in the employment agreement and offer letter were unenforceable as they violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000, and did not clearly rebut the presumption of reasonable notice at common law.

The court found that Miller was induced to leave secure employment, and awarded her damages based on a 14-month reasonable notice period, including lost salary, benefits, bonus, and RSUs.

The plaintiff sought to extend an ex parte interim injunction restraining the respondents from picketing at its premises in a manner that blocked vehicles.

The respondent union requested amendments to the order, specifically to remove a provision precluding the inducing of breach of contract and to narrow the scope of the order to the specific premises rather than province-wide.

The court dismissed the union's requests, finding that the tort of inducing breach of contract does not capture legitimate free speech or boycotts, and that a province-wide order was a preferable use of judicial resources.

The injunction was extended for a further 30 days.

The University of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to dismantle a protest encampment set up by students and others on Front Campus.

The protesters argued the encampment was a protected exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.

The court granted the injunction, finding that the University established a strong prima facie case of trespass and ejectment.

The court held that the protesters' appropriation of University property to the exclusion of others constituted irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured the University, as the injunction only prohibited camping and erecting structures, while allowing the protesters to continue demonstrating elsewhere on campus.

In an alternative analysis, the court found that the Charter does not apply to the University's management of its property, and even if it did, the trespass notice was a justified limit under section 1.

This appeal concerned an alleged contract for the purchase and sale of goodwill in an investment business, with an alternative claim for unjust enrichment.

The trial judge found a binding contract or, alternatively, unjust enrichment.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on contract formation (intention and essential terms), unjust enrichment, and mitigation of losses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of a binding contract and declining to rule on the unjust enrichment finding.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding on mitigation, noting the appellant failed to meet the onus to show mitigation was possible.

The plaintiff in a certified class action regarding unpaid statutory vacation and holiday pay moved to settle the Notice Plan and Notice of Certification.

The parties disagreed on the opt-out deadline, the contents of the opt-out affidavit, and the text of the Notice of Certification.

The court held that the opt-out deadline should be 60 days after the last notice is published and that the opt-out affidavit must identify the individuals who opted out.

However, the court rejected the defendants' proposed revisions to the Notice of Certification, finding them to be unnecessary, unfair, and potentially intimidating to class members.

The Notice of Certification was approved substantially in the form drafted by class counsel.

Following the death of the judge who certified this national class action regarding vacation and public holiday pay, the parties could not agree on the terms of the certification order.

The plaintiff brought a motion to settle the order under rule 59.04(14).

The court settled the class definition start dates by applying the ultimate limitation periods for provinces that have them, and the basic limitation periods (adjusted for Covid-19 suspensions) for provinces that do not.

The court also compendiously restated the liability common issue to include unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a national class action alleging that the defendant brokerage firm failed to provide vacation and public holiday pay to commissioned employees in breach of employment standards legislation.

The defendant argued that commissions continued to be paid while employees were on vacation and that the onus was on employees to prove non-payment.

The court found that the employer bears the burden of proving statutory payments were recorded and made, and that the absence of a class-wide system to record and report these obligations provided some evidence of commonality.

The court certified the class action, finding all requirements under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met.

This appeal concerns the Divisional Court's quashing of three Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decisions, which had declared Tomasz Turkiewicz Custom Masonry Homes (TTCMH) and Brickpol Masonry Corporation (Mr. Turkiewicz's former business) a single employer under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, bound TTCMH to a collective agreement, and awarded damages to the Unions.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred in its application of the reasonableness standard of review, as articulated in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov.

The Court of Appeal held that the OLRB's decisions were reasonable, as the Board properly considered the erosion of bargaining rights as a valid labour relations purpose for the related employer declaration, adequately addressed the hiatus between businesses, and made a reasonable damages award.

The appeal was allowed, and the OLRB decisions were restored.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment claiming constructive dismissal after his employer unilaterally cancelled his company vehicle benefit.

The court found the cancellation constituted a significant reduction in compensation and amounted to constructive dismissal.

The employment contract's termination clause was deemed void for ambiguity regarding statutory minimums.

The court set a reasonable notice period of 10 months, but reduced it by 30% to 7 months because the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by moving away from the job market.

The parent company was found to be a common employer.

Damages were awarded in the amount of $56,025.

Farah Rahman appealed a summary judgment dismissing her wrongful dismissal action.

The motion judge had found her employment contracts' termination provisions valid under the ESA and that only one entity, CDAI, was her employer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the "just cause" termination provision in the employment contract violated the ESA by allowing termination without notice for conduct less than "wilful misconduct," rendering all termination provisions void.

The Court also found that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in determining the employer, concluding that the corporate respondents were common employers due to their high level of integration and control over Ms. Rahman.

The case was remitted to the Superior Court for damages quantification.

The defendants moved to dismiss the proposed class action for delay under section 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The plaintiff failed to file her certification motion record or establish a court-ordered timetable by the one-year anniversary of the action's commencement.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a vague direction to file 'when she can' constituted a timetable, emphasizing that section 29.1 is mandatory and must be strictly applied to advance class action litigation.

The motion was granted and the proposed class proceeding was dismissed.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion to approve a class action settlement regarding unpaid overtime and holiday pay for television production workers misclassified as independent contractors.

The settlement provided for a $1 million payment if a proposed collective agreement was ratified, or $2.5 million if it was not.

The court approved the settlement as fair and reasonable, noting it avoided significant litigation risks regarding certification and individual damages proof.

The court also approved a 30% contingency fee for class counsel and a $7,500 honorarium for the representative plaintiff due to her exceptional involvement in collective bargaining.

The Court of Appeal heard motions for leave to intervene from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC) in a class action appeal concerning the Basic Income Pilot Project.

The CCLA's unopposed motion was granted, allowing it to file a factum and present oral arguments under specific terms.

The ISAC's motion was dismissed without costs because its direct involvement in shaping the factual matrix of the Basic Income Pilot Project, including consultations and advice to participants, made it too closely associated with the potential class members and the underlying factual issues, thus compromising its role as an intervener.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action, arguing that the termination provisions in her employment agreement violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA) and were therefore void.

The court found that the plaintiff, a sophisticated employee who received independent legal advice, entered into an agreement that explicitly incorporated ESA minimums and provided greater benefits in certain circumstances.

The court held that the 'just cause' provision did not contravene the ESA and dismissed the action against the parent and affiliate companies, finding no joint employer relationship.

The termination provisions were upheld as valid.