Human Rights - SCJ

The accused was charged with murder and brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on late disclosure and abuse of process.

The Crown failed to disclose critical DNA evidence identifying the victim's brother's DNA on a mask recovered at the scene, which had been in police possession since January 7, 2025, but was not disclosed until September 9, 2025, on the eve of trial.

Additionally, the Crown failed to timely disclose cell tower evidence and corresponding witness statements necessary to establish the accused's identity as the suspect.

The court found serious violations of the accused's section 7 Charter rights and determined that the Crown's pattern of negligence, apathy, and late preparation constituted an abuse of process that undermined the integrity of the justice system.

A stay of proceedings was granted as the only appropriate remedy.

The defendant, Andre Evans, was charged with 15 counts including procurement, human trafficking, assault, criminal harassment, drug trafficking, and various firearms offences involving two complainants, KJ and AB.

The court acquitted Evans on the procurement charges (counts 1 and 13) for both complainants, finding insufficient evidence of inducement.

However, Evans was found guilty of human trafficking (counts 2 and 12) for both complainants, as the court determined he exercised control and influence over their movements for exploitation, creating a culture of dependence and fear.

He was also found guilty of assault (counts 3 and 14) against both complainants, criminal harassment (count 4) against KJ, breach of a non-communication order (count 15), possession of marijuana and cocaine for trafficking (counts 5 and 6), and all five firearms offences (counts 7-11).

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to amend his statement of claim to include further claims under the Human Rights Code and to add David M. Fine as a defendant on a common employer basis.

The plaintiff also sought an order for a further and better affidavit of documents from the defendant and a litigation timetable.

The court granted leave for the Human Rights Code amendments, finding they did not constitute new causes of action.

However, leave to add David M. Fine as a defendant was denied because the limitation period had expired, and the plaintiff had always been aware of Fine's role.

The court ordered the defendant to provide a further and better affidavit of documents for specific items and established a comprehensive litigation timetable, including mandatory mediation before examinations for discovery.

The applicant, Christopher Goulbourne, sought a stay of criminal proceedings for serious offences (robbery, use of imitation firearm, breaking and entering) based on alleged Charter breaches under sections 7 and 24(1).

He claimed he was assaulted by court officers and that police failed to investigate the incident.

The court found the applicant's evidence lacked credibility and that the force used by correctional officers was reasonable and necessary given his disruptive and aggressive conduct.

The court also found no intentional or malicious failure to investigate, but rather a miscommunication.

Ultimately, the court concluded that no Charter breach occurred, and therefore no remedy, including a stay of proceedings, was warranted.

The applicants, Brandon Dean Brooks and Bryan Frederick Styles, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing their drug-related charges to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was approximately 36 months.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, deducting periods attributable to a discrete event (judge's illness) and defence delay (one applicant's failure to appear).

After deductions, the net delay was 28 months, which did not exceed the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court also found no proven prejudice under the R. v. Morin principles.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed for both applicants.

The applicant, Cody McNeil, brought an application challenging the lawfulness of a search incident to his arrest for trespassing, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights and seeking exclusion of seized drugs (cannabis and methamphetamine) under s. 24(2).

Police arrested McNeil for trespassing after he re-entered a building from which he was banned.

During a search conducted in a secure police office, drugs were found.

The court found the initial search for officer safety was justified given the location's history of criminal activity and McNeil's criminal record, which included a weapons conviction.

The subsequent discovery of methamphetamine provided new grounds for arrest and justified the continuation of the search.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant, Rahman Wahab, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood/alcohol, arguing that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice was violated.

The trial judge had misapprehended the timing of the appellant's assertion of this right.

However, the appeal court found that the appellant was not reasonably diligent in communicating his request for specific counsel, and the police had made reasonable efforts to facilitate counsel.

Therefore, no s. 10(b) Charter violation occurred.

Even if there had been a breach, the breath sample analyses would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, given the minimal impact on rights and the strong societal interest in adjudicating drinking and driving cases.

The appeal was dismissed.

This application, involving a constitutional challenge to parts of the Human Rights Code, was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01(6) as an abuse of process.

The applicant had previously brought a similar constitutional challenge that was dismissed for lack of standing.

The court affirmed that it lacked jurisdiction to review the prior decision and that commencing a second proceeding for the same relief constituted an abuse of process.

The applicants, jointly charged with drug trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop.

The court found that the police stop was a pretext based on racial profiling, constituting arbitrary detention (s. 9) and an unlawful search (s. 8).

Additionally, the applicants' rights to be informed of the reason for detention and to counsel (s. 10(a) and (b)) were infringed.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the serious Charter violations, particularly racial profiling, warranted the exclusion of all evidence obtained from the vehicle search and any subsequent utterances.

The applicant, Adrian Rover, sought to exclude evidence under sections 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unlawful arrest, an invalid search warrant based on illegally obtained third-party information, and a violation of his right to counsel.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for Rover's arrest and for the arrest of third parties, thus upholding the validity of the search warrant.

While acknowledging a breach of Rover's right to counsel due to police delay, the court applied the Grant analysis and determined that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, dismissing the application to exclude evidence.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay an "over 80" charge against the respondent, Hany Ibrahim, due to a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's calculation of institutional delay, finding errors in the characterization of neutral time and inherent preparation time.

After recalculating, the institutional delay was determined to be 10 months, at the upper limit of the Morin guidelines.

The court upheld the stay of proceedings, emphasizing the straightforward nature of the case, the respondent's expeditious conduct, the institutional nature of the delay, and the significant prejudice suffered by the respondent.

The plaintiff, Wylie, brought a motion to amend his Amended Statement of Claim in a wrongful dismissal action.

The proposed amendments sought to increase the prayer for relief and to specifically claim damages for past short-term disability (STD) benefits and past and future long-term disability (LTD) benefits, arguing that the employer failed to provide benefits during the notice period or prejudiced his right to such benefits.

The defendants opposed, arguing that the amendments introduced new causes of action beyond the limitation period and would cause irreparable prejudice.

The court granted the motion, finding that the amendments did not constitute new causes of action but rather provided particulars or different legal conclusions arising from facts already pleaded.

The court also found that any alleged prejudice to the defendants was self-inflicted due to their own actions regarding the plaintiff's termination and benefits.

John Paul Budarick appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The appeal raised two grounds: whether the trial judge erred in finding that Constable Crowhurst had the subjective belief required to make a blood demand under s. 254(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, and whether the trial judge erred in concluding there was no s. 10(b) Charter violation when police did not offer a second opportunity to consult counsel after making a blood demand following a breath demand.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on either ground.

This ruling addresses a voir dire to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of a statement made by the defendant, Dellan McMorris, to police regarding his cell phone number.

The statement was obtained during a traffic stop where McMorris was a passenger.

The Crown sought to admit this statement in a murder trial.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary, alleging a police threat to charge McMorris with possession of a stolen vehicle if he did not cooperate, and also sought exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter for alleged violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10.

The court found the police officers' notes incomplete and their testimony less reliable, while the defendant's testimony regarding the threat was sufficiently credible to raise a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

Consequently, the statement was deemed inadmissible.

The court declined to rule on the Charter application.

The applicant, Jesse Dawson, sought a stay of proceedings, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 7, 9, and 11(e) due to being detained for 40.5 hours before being brought before a justice, exceeding the 24-hour limit under section 503(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded a breach of section 503(1).

The court found that Dawson's rights under sections 7 (liberty) and 9 (arbitrary detention) of the Charter were violated, but not section 11(e) (bail) as the delay did not affect his bail hearing date.

The court denied the stay of proceedings, finding that the police conduct, while negligent, was not intentional or malevolent and did not constitute a systemic problem.

Instead, the court ordered judicial denunciation of the police conduct and a potential reduction in sentence if Dawson is convicted, as appropriate remedies.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's original and amended statements of claim, arguing that the human rights damages claim was defective and that amendments constituted a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act.

The court found that the human rights claim was sufficiently pleaded and that it was not plain and obvious that the limitation period had expired for the human rights damages claim.

The court also declined to strike allegations of bad faith damages.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, Conrad Carter, sought a stay of proceedings or a reduced sentence after being unlawfully detained for approximately 36 hours, breaching s. 503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded the Charter breach.

The court found the over-holding serious, exacerbated by police failure to address the applicant's health complaints, though the conduct was deemed negligent rather than intentional.

Applying the "clearest of cases" test for a stay, the court determined that a stay was not warranted given the societal interest in adjudicating serious drug trafficking charges.

The application for a stay was dismissed, but the court indicated it would impose a significant reduction in sentence as an alternative remedy for the Charter breach.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in their criminal trial for production and possession of controlled substances.

The court found a total delay of 44.5 months, with 10 months attributable to egregious Crown delay and 9 months to institutional delay.

Despite minimal prejudice to fair trial rights, the significant impact on the applicants' liberty and security interests, exacerbated by the Crown's failure to manage the case responsibly, led the court to conclude that the right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The plaintiff, whose claim for statutory accident benefits was denied by the defendant insurer, proceeded through mediation and arbitration.

After the arbitrator issued a decision, the plaintiff commenced a civil action for punitive and general damages, alleging bad faith, negligence, and breaches of the Human Rights Code in the handling of his claim.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiff's claims were "in respect of" entitlement to statutory accident benefits and thus subject to the mandatory dispute resolution scheme of the Insurance Act.

The court found the action barred because the plaintiff had elected arbitration to its conclusion, and the two-year limitation period had expired, with neither the discoverability principle nor the doctrine of special circumstances applying.

Furthermore, the Human Rights Code allegations were struck as disclosing no reasonable cause of action for events predating the relevant statutory amendment.

The Crown appealed Kelly's acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams, which resulted from the exclusion of breath test results due to a s. 8 Charter violation.

The trial judge found that the police officer administered an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test despite knowing the respondent had a lozenge in his mouth, a circumstance the officer himself stated would invalidate the test.

This rendered the subsequent Intoxilyzer demand unlawful.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the officer's credibility, the s. 8 Charter violation, and the s. 24(2) Charter analysis for excluding the evidence, emphasizing the officer's misleading testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.