Human Rights - SCJ

Following their convictions for various prostitution-related offences involving minors, the applicants sought a declaration that sections 286.2(2), 286.3(2), and 286.4 of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional, arguing they violated sections 7 and 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding the impugned sections constitutional.

It held that the sections were not arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate under s. 7, and that while s. 286.4 infringed s. 2(b) freedom of expression, it was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

Samuel Kebede brought a Garofoli application to exclude drug evidence, arguing that the search warrant was invalid due to material misrepresentations in the information to obtain (ITO) and insufficient informant information, thereby violating his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found two minor, good-faith misrepresentations in the ITO that were not material to the justice of the peace's decision to issue the warrant.

The court also determined that the confidential informant tips were sufficiently compelling, corroborated, and credible, despite some weaknesses in credibility and corroboration, especially given the urgency associated with firearms.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, as the process of obtaining the warrant was not found to be subversive of the prior authorization system.

Donald Mackey appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal raised several Charter arguments, including whether the roadside screening device demand was made forthwith, the reasonableness of the breath sample seizure, the destruction of police scratch notes, and compliance with the right to counsel without delay.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the demand was made forthwith, the breath samples were reasonably taken, the destruction of notes caused no prejudice, and the three-minute delay in providing the right to counsel was justified by public safety concerns for a child passenger.

The conviction was upheld.

The defendant, SPS Commerce Canada Ltd., brought a motion to strike paragraphs 33 to 40 of the plaintiff's Statement of Claim, arguing they contained without prejudice settlement discussions protected by settlement privilege.

The plaintiff, Tricia Clayton, opposed the motion, distinguishing between settlement discussions regarding a severance package and communications related to the employer's statutory duty to investigate harassment allegations and a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP).

The court found that the three conditions for settlement privilege were not met for the communications concerning the investigation and PIP, as these were factual and part of the employer's statutory obligations, not attempts to effect a settlement.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim following a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) decision that largely barred their claims against the defendants under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to strike out paragraphs of the original statement of claim and reply that were inconsistent with the WSIAT decision, as well as allegations related to surveillance and Human Rights Code breaches.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to amend, finding the proposed amendments were statute-barred or otherwise untenable.

The court granted the defendants' motion to strike, ruling that the WSIAT decision was final and binding, that the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim related to surveillance was inadequately pleaded, and that the Human Rights Code claims were either barred by WSIAT or could not stand alone.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence and/or obtain a stay of proceedings due to alleged breaches of Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10, including unlawful arrest, arbitrary detention, warrantless vehicle search, delay in right to counsel, unreasonable residence search, and unlawful detention of occupants.

The court dismissed all applications, finding the arrest lawful, the high-risk takedown reasonable, no breach of the right to counsel, the vehicle search lawful incident to arrest, and the residence entry and search reasonable given the circumstances and lack of sufficient evidence of unreasonable damage.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal and Human Rights Code claims, and alternatively, a motion to transfer the proceeding from Thunder Bay to Kenora.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's developmental limitations and the fairness of the termination investigation.

The court also dismissed the venue transfer motion, affirming the plaintiff's prima facie right to choose venue and finding the defendant did not demonstrate Kenora was significantly better than Thunder Bay.

The applicants challenged s. 65(5.7) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA), which excludes all records relating to abortion services, arguing it violated their s. 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression by impeding meaningful public discussion.

The court found that the provision substantially impeded meaningful debate on a matter of public interest, establishing a prima facie breach of s. 2(b).

While the objective of protecting privacy and safety was pressing, the absolute exclusion of all records, including non-identifying statistical information, was not rationally connected, minimally impairing, or proportional to the objective.

The court declared s. 65(5.7) of FIPPA to be of no force or effect, suspending the declaration for 12 months to allow the legislature to enact remedial legislation.

The applicant, Christie Ann Culotta, faced five counts related to impaired and dangerous operation of a vessel causing bodily harm.

Both the Crown and defence brought pre-trial applications.

The Crown sought to admit utterances and a written statement as voluntary.

The defence sought to exclude these statements and evidence derived from seized blood samples and medical records, alleging breaches of Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court ruled that the applicant's utterances in the ambulance and her subsequent written statement were voluntary and admissible.

However, the court found that the sealing of additional blood vials by police, with the lab technician's involvement, constituted an unlawful and warrantless seizure in violation of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights, and this evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

The court also found that the initial arrest for impaired operation lacked reasonable and probable grounds, but this did not lead to the exclusion of the statements.

The search warrant for medical records was upheld as valid.

The plaintiff, a former table games dealer, sued for wrongful dismissal after her employment was terminated due to a permanent shoulder injury.

The defendant employer argued frustration of contract, having provided modified duties for over two years.

The court found that the employer's failure to offer alternative suitable positions within the organization, despite the employee's qualifications and exemplary record, constituted 'self-induced frustration' and prevented the employer from relying on the doctrine of frustration of contract.

The court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, awarding damages for wrongful dismissal based on common-law reasonable notice.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of statements made by the accused, Eric Brown, concerning drug consumption and cell phone use prior to a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of Mr. Brown's Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and (b).

The court found that the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to the police's failure to caution Mr. Brown about the use of his statements and the full extent of his jeopardy, especially after the victim's death was known.

Furthermore, the court determined that Mr. Brown was detained when placed in the police vehicle and that the police breached his ss. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights by not promptly informing him of the reasons for his detention or his right to counsel, nor of the victim's death.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the Charter-infringing conduct was serious, the impact on Mr. Brown's rights significant, and that admitting the statements would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, both the statements made to police and the recorded telephone conversation with his mother were excluded from evidence at trial.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for child pornography charges, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to trial without unreasonable delay.

The court analyzed the 53-month delay under both the Morin and Jordan frameworks, attributing periods to neutral/inherent time, defence responsibility, Crown responsibility, and institutional delay, as well as an exceptional circumstance (police witness illness).

The court found no Charter breach, noting defence consent to trial dates and counsel's schedule contributing to delay, and applied the transitional exceptional circumstance category from Jordan.

The applicant sought sole custody of the child and permission to relocate with the child from Toronto to New Ross, Nova Scotia.

The respondent sought joint custody and opposed the relocation.

The court granted the applicant sole custody, finding her to be the primary caregiver and psychological parent, and permitted the relocation, noting the applicant's strong support system in New Ross and the child's established connection to the area.

The court also ordered child support based on the respondent's income and addressed section 7 expenses, while spousal support was waived by the applicant upon relocation being granted.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, initiated a civil claim alleging trespass, unlawful seizure of his vehicle and its contents, and infringements of his Charter rights.

The Attorney General of Canada and Canada Border Services Agency officers, as moving parties, brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss and strike various aspects of the plaintiff's claim.

The court dismissed claims related to vehicle loss, trespass to property, and Section 8 Charter rights due to the plaintiff's lack of legal standing, finding no ownership or possessory interest in the vehicle or properties.

Claims under Sections 7, 9, and 15 of the Charter were struck without leave to amend for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and lacking a sufficient factual basis.

However, claims for the loss of personal and business inventory found within the seized vehicle were struck with leave to amend, allowing the plaintiff to address pleading deficiencies.

The plaintiff, Dan Bailey, brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer, Milo-Food & Agricultural Infrastructure & Services Inc., and its CEO, Geetu Pathak, after receiving two years' working notice of termination.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim, arguing that the wrongful dismissal and severance pay claims were statute-barred as the limitation period commenced on the date notice was given (March 18, 2013), not the last day worked (March 22, 2015).

The court granted the motion in part, holding that the wrongful dismissal and severance pay claims were indeed statute-barred, consistent with established jurisprudence that the limitation period begins when notice of termination is received.

However, claims for intentional infliction of mental distress and human rights violations were not struck, as they were based on ongoing conduct throughout the notice period and thus fell within the limitation period.

The plaintiff, a salesman with over fifteen years of service, claimed damages for wrongful or constructive dismissal, workplace harassment, and discrimination based on disability under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The defendant denied the allegations, arguing the contract was abandoned or frustrated, and that the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages.

The court found no objective basis for the plaintiff's harassment claims, no constructive dismissal, and concluded that the employment contract was frustrated due to the plaintiff's inability to return to work.

All claims were dismissed.

The defendant, Jacqueline Simone, was charged with attempting to export cocaine, possession for the purpose of exporting, and conspiracy to export cocaine.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of statements made by Ms. Simone to the police following her arrest.

The Defence sought to exclude these statements, alleging violations of Ms. Simone's Charter rights.

The court conducted a blended *voir dire* and ultimately ruled that Ms. Simone's statements were voluntary and admissible, finding no Charter breaches.

The applicant, Gary Phillip Allen, challenged the constitutionality of subsections 171.1(3)-(4) and 172.1(3)-(4) of the Criminal Code, which pertain to internet luring and making explicit material available to a child.

The applicant argued these provisions violated sections 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by creating a reverse onus and reducing the constitutionally required mens rea.

The court dismissed the application, finding the impugned provisions constitutionally valid.

The court held that these provisions impose an evidential burden, not a persuasive one, and are akin to a due diligence inquiry, consistent with prior appellate and Supreme Court jurisprudence on similar "reasonable steps" provisions.

Dion Bacchus and Stephen Motoo brought an application for a stay of charges, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter rights due to an approximately 41-month delay between being charged and the impending trial date.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court calculated the total delay, subtracted defence-attributable delay, and found the net delay for both applicants exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances, particularly regarding a significant delay in DNA evidence disclosure.

The court found the applicants' s. 11(b) rights were infringed and stayed the charges.

The applicant, Mustafa Hassan, brought an application under sections 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude evidence obtained through alleged unreasonable search and seizure.

The application challenged the lawfulness of police video surveillance in the common hallway of a multi-unit apartment building without a warrant, and the subsequent search warrant for his apartment, arguing it was based on unconstitutionally obtained evidence and lacked reasonable grounds.

The court found that the covert video surveillance in the hallway without a warrant violated the applicant's attenuated, but still existing, reasonable expectation of privacy under section 8 of the Charter.

However, the court determined that the search warrant for the apartment was still valid after excising the unconstitutionally obtained video evidence, as sufficient independent grounds remained.

Applying the section 24(2) Grant test, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the seriousness of the breach (low), the impact on the applicant's Charter rights (low, as the apartment was not his primary residence), and society's interest in adjudicating serious drug trafficking offences on their merits (high).

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.