Human Rights - SCJ

The applicant, Hamza Badran, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan and R. v. Cody, calculating the total delay, deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances.

Despite a total delay exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts, the court found that significant portions were attributable to defence delay (including waivers) and discrete exceptional circumstances.

The resulting net delay fell just under the presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to demonstrate that the remaining delay was unreasonable given his lack of sustained effort to expedite proceedings.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking various forms of relief, including advance legal costs, payment of living expenses, reimbursement of social services, waiver of Rules of Civil Procedure, ongoing accommodation, anonymization of proceedings, driver's license renewal, and a court investigation into systemic racism.

The court dismissed all aspects of the plaintiff's motion, finding that the claims for advance payments did not meet the Law v. Canada test for discrimination under the Charter, and the request for advance legal costs did not meet the British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band three-part test for interim costs in exceptional cases, particularly as contingent fee arrangements are available in personal injury litigation.

The applicant, Medha Joshi, brought a motion under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act) to dismiss a $700,000 counterclaim by Allstate Insurance Company of Canada.

Joshi's initial claim was for wrongful dismissal, alleging discriminatory insurance practices by Allstate against residents of Brampton, primarily visible minorities, which she had publicly discussed.

The court found that Joshi's expressions related to a matter of public interest.

Allstate failed to satisfy the court that its counterclaim had substantial merit or that Joshi had no valid defence, particularly regarding the absence of malice for malicious falsehood and the availability of absolute, qualified, and fair comment privileges for defamation.

Allstate also failed to demonstrate sufficiently serious harm.

Consequently, the motion was granted, and Allstate's counterclaim was dismissed as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against Mr. Mansour for drug-impaired driving, based on an alleged breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's calculation of delay, specifically regarding time attributed to defence counsel changes and certiorari proceedings.

The Superior Court, applying new guidance from R. v. Tsega, found that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by incorrectly calculating defence delay and by including the entire period of reasonable certiorari proceedings in the Jordan delay calculation.

The court re-calculated the net delay to be below the presumptive ceiling, thus allowing the Crown's appeal and remitting the matter for trial.

The plaintiff, a third-generation owner of a funeral home, sold his shares to the defendant and entered into a 10-year Transitional Consulting Services Agreement (TCSA).

Unhappy differences arose, leading the plaintiff to go on medical leave and claim constructive dismissal.

The court found the defendant's course of conduct, including improper termination of vehicle use, tracking hours, non-payment of commissions, removal of a photograph, and changing locks, amounted to constructive dismissal.

The plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of mental suffering and discrimination under the Human Rights Code were dismissed.

Damages were awarded for lost salary, vehicle expenses, benefits, golf membership, and commissions.

The accused, Yaas Abdillahi, was charged with possession of controlled substances for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

During his arrest, police officers used excessive force, striking him on the head with loaded firearms, which was found to be a violation of his s. 7 Charter rights.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or, alternatively, exclusion of evidence under s. 24(1) and s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that while some force was justified, striking the accused with loaded firearms was unreasonable.

However, the court denied a stay of proceedings, finding the police conduct, though serious, not egregious enough for such a drastic remedy.

The court also denied the exclusion of evidence, balancing the moderate seriousness of the breach and its impact against society's interest in an adjudication on the merits, noting no causal connection between the breach and the evidence.

The accused was found guilty on the trafficking charge and not guilty on the proceeds of crime charge due to lack of evidence.

The Charter breach's impact on sentencing was reserved for a later hearing.

James Grant brought an application under sections 7 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of criminal charges, alleging numerous Charter violations by state agents following his arrest for importing a controlled substance.

The alleged violations included unlawful detention, search, denial of counsel, excessive force during fingerprinting and strip searches, and judicial bias stemming from his "sovereign citizen" beliefs.

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breaches in the initial border search, fingerprinting incidents, or the courthouse flagpole incident.

It also determined that prison officials were justified in using force for a mandatory strip search in a custodial setting and that there was no reasonable apprehension of judicial bias or discrimination based on the applicant's beliefs.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his vehicle, arguing a six-hour delay in accessing counsel violated his s. 10(b) rights.

The court found the police violated the accused's s. 10(b) rights due to inadequate resource allocation, which constituted a serious institutional disregard for Charter rights.

The evidence was found to be temporally and contextually connected to the breach.

Applying the *Grant* factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, thus excluding the heroin and other items seized from the vehicle.

Randi Wasylyk, charged with firearm offences, applied to exclude a firearm from evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found no breaches of ss. 8 and 9, as the arrest and search incident to arrest were lawful based on reasonable grounds.

However, the court found breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) due to delayed notification of arrest reasons and unreasonable delay in facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that despite the seriousness of the Charter breaches, the reliable nature of the firearm evidence and society's strong interest in prosecuting firearm offences meant its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the firearm was deemed admissible.

The applicant, charged with fraud and breach of trust, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an unreasonable strip search following her arrest.

The court found that the police conducted the strip search without reasonable and probable grounds and in an unreasonable manner, failing to adhere to the principles established in R. v. Golden.

The search was deemed routine, degrading, lacked proper documentation, and was conducted without adequate privacy, exacerbated by a s. 10(b) Charter breach during questioning.

Given the systemic nature of the violations and the severe impact on the applicant, a stay of proceedings was granted as the only adequate remedy.

The applicant, Dylan Travis, sought to exclude evidence (a loaded firearm and other items) under ss. 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unlawful detention, arrest, and unreasonable search.

Police officers, investigating a domestic assault, mistook Travis for another individual (Daymien Kennedy) who was subject to an arrest warrant.

Travis fled upon seeing the police, was apprehended, and a loaded revolver was discovered.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Travis based on his resemblance to the suspect, his presence in the suspect's drop-off vicinity, and his immediate flight.

Consequently, the detention and subsequent search incident to arrest were deemed lawful.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the evidence was ruled admissible at trial.

Siobhan O’Shea, suffering from mental illness, was arrested for impaired driving and refusing a breath sample.

The trial judge acquitted her, finding Charter breaches (s. 10(b)) for police failing to facilitate counsel contact.

The Crown appealed.

The Superior Court found the police erred in not advising O'Shea of her right to contact another lawyer after her chosen counsel was unreachable, especially given her vulnerable mental state.

This constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

The court excluded the evidence of refusal under s. 24(2) but found roadside observations were not obtained in a manner infringing the Charter.

The appeal for impaired driving was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appeal for refusing a breath sample was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, who was charged with "over 80" after being stopped for cell phone use while driving.

The trial judge found racial profiling, excluded breathalyzer readings, and acquitted.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred by misapprehending evidence, failing to consider an innocent mistake as an alternative to racial profiling, and improperly drawing inferences from the police's failure to investigate the cell phone.

The trial judge's finding of "unconscious" racial profiling by an honest officer was deemed a stretch and difficult to substantiate.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The respondent, Jah-Kiyo Desmond-Robinson, brought a Garofoli application challenging the legality of a search warrant under section 8 of the Charter and seeking to exclude evidence (a firearm, ammunition, and drugs) under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defence argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant, which relied heavily on two confidential informants (CIs), was deficient.

The court considered the un-redacted ITO and a judicial summary, and allowed limited cross-examination of the affiant.

Applying the Debot "3Cs" criteria (compelling, credible, and confirmed), the court found that the CI information provided a reasonable basis for the authorizing justice to issue the warrant.

Consequently, the search was deemed lawful, and no section 8 Charter violation occurred.

In the alternative, had there been a breach, the court determined the evidence would still be admissible under section 24(2) due to the good faith of the police, the high reliability of the evidence, and society's strong interest in prosecuting serious offences involving illegal firearms and drugs.

The applicant sought temporary sole custody of the parties' four-year-old daughter in Ottawa, while the respondent sought to return to Belgrade, Serbia, with the child.

The court considered the child's best interests, the status quo, and mobility factors under the Children's Law Reform Act and relevant jurisprudence.

The court found the child's status quo since June 15, 2018, was residence in Belgrade, Serbia, and no compelling circumstances existed to change this temporarily.

Temporary custody was granted to the respondent, permitting her to return to Serbia with the child, with a detailed access schedule for the applicant.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for refusing an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The trial judge found a Charter breach of the right to counsel, reasoning that the officer's subjective belief of a potential delay triggered the right, and his actions suspended the usual suspension of counsel rights during a "forthwith" demand.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by overemphasizing the officer's subjective belief and incorrectly equating a chance to call a lawyer with a "realistic opportunity to consult counsel." The court reiterated that the right to counsel is suspended during a forthwith ASD demand if there is no realistic opportunity for consultation, regardless of the officer's subjective expectations.

The officer's gratuitous offer of counsel rights does not create a right where none exists.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff moved to strike certain portions of the defendants' statement of defence and counterclaim, alleging they were untenable in law, irrelevant, or scandalous.

The court allowed the motion, striking allegations related to stress and anxiety as scandalous and lacking probative value.

Claims of sexual harassment under the Human Rights Code were also struck because the plaintiff corporation was not vicariously liable for a co-worker's alleged harassment under sections 5(2) or 7, and the defendants failed to plead a claim of discrimination based on a poisoned work environment under section 5(1).

No leave to amend the pleadings was granted.

The province enacted Bill 5, reducing Toronto wards from 47 to 25, mid-municipal election.

Applicants challenged its constitutionality.

The court found Bill 5 violated candidates' and voters' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it substantially interfered with campaign communication and denied effective representation due to increased ward sizes.

The violation was not justified under s. 1, as the legislative objectives (better decision-making, voter parity) were not pressing and substantial enough to warrant mid-election implementation, nor was minimal impairment demonstrated.

The impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional and set aside, requiring the election to proceed with 47 wards.

The plaintiffs, current and former female police officers, sought to certify a class action against the Waterloo Regional Police Services Board and Association for systemic gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment.

The defendants challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that labour arbitrators and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario had exclusive jurisdiction.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction, as the claims arose from the employment relationship governed by a collective agreement and the Police Services Act, which provide a comprehensive dispute resolution scheme.

Furthermore, the court determined that even if it had jurisdiction, the claims did not disclose a viable cause of action under common law, as human rights legislation precludes independent civil actions for discrimination and sexual harassment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excessive blood alcohol, arguing that his Charter rights under sections 9 and 10(b) were infringed due to a delay in being informed of his right to counsel in French.

The trial judge admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted in good faith and the breach had minimal impact on the appellant's rights.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's decision, deferring to the trial judge's application of the R. v. Grant analysis.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of police conduct or the impact of the delay on the appellant's ability to exercise his rights, noting that breath samples are considered non-intrusive.