Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault for stabbing the complainant four times during a physical altercation at a homeless shelter.

The Crown alleged the defendant initiated the confrontation and used excessive force.

The defendant claimed self-defence, asserting the complainant attacked him unprovoked and he stabbed in response to being pinned to the ground and punched repeatedly in the head.

The court found the defendant not guilty, determining that while the defendant initiated the confrontation by following the complainant, once the physical fight began, the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe force was being used against him, acted with the subjective purpose of self-protection, and the use of force was reasonable in the circumstances given the defendant's inability to escape and the ongoing threat posed by the larger, stronger complainant.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter, discharging a firearm with intent to prevent arrest, reckless discharge of a firearm, killing a service animal, and possession of a loaded firearm.

The offences occurred over approximately 24 hours: the accused shot and killed the victim in his daughter's apartment after a physical altercation; the following day, he fired at a police officer attempting to arrest him; and subsequently shot and killed a police service dog during his apprehension.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for a 14-year global sentence.

The court accepted the joint submission while providing detailed sentencing analysis for each offence, explaining how the principle of totality reduced what would otherwise have been a 23-year sentence.

Following a seven-day trial, the accused was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against his niece and nephew, contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

Two counts of sexual assault were conditionally stayed.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate punishment for non-penetrative sexual contact with child victims in a position of trust.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of two years less one day concurrent with five months, followed by two years probation, along with ancillary orders including DNA, SOIRA registration, and contact prohibition orders.

The appellant sought to withdraw guilty pleas to one count of threatening and two counts of failing to comply with bail, alleging that the evidence was fabricated, that he was set up, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and that he was coerced into pleading guilty due to threats and abuse by inmates at Maplehurst Correctional Complex.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the guilty pleas were voluntary and unequivocal, that the appellant had ample opportunity to voice complaints during the judicial proceedings but did not, and that the appellant's account was neither plausible nor credible.

The court found no merit to the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court sentenced Fahmid Iqbal, a youthful first offender, for possession of a loaded restricted firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

After a detailed review of the facts, mitigating and aggravating factors, and relevant case law, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, to be served in the community under strict conditions, followed by two years of probation.

The decision discusses the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and the appropriateness of a conditional sentence in the circumstances.

The reasons for judgment in this case are not available at this time.

This endorsement addresses a media request for the release of exhibits from the sentencing hearing in R. v. Ritchie.

The court permitted the release of all exhibits to the media, subject to privacy protections for inmates and the victim’s child, and restrictions on the publication of certain sensitive materials, including medical and psychiatric reports.

The order was made with the consent of all parties involved.

The court sentenced Cyrus Jaison, a youthful first offender, for causing bodily harm while driving with excess blood-alcohol and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The decision details the facts of the offence, the profound impact on the victim, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

After reviewing the applicable sentencing principles and ranges, the court concluded that a conditional sentence would be inadequate to achieve denunciation and deterrence, imposing a 16-month custodial sentence on each count, to be served concurrently, along with a five-year driving prohibition and victim surcharges.

The court sentenced Daniel Thompson, a youthful first offender, for trafficking in cocaine, possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possessing a loaded restricted firearm.

The decision reviews the circumstances of the offences, Mr. Thompson’s personal background, the positions of the parties, and the applicable sentencing principles and ranges.

After weighing aggravating and mitigating factors—including Mr. Thompson’s youth, lack of record, remorse, and the impact of anti-Black racism—the court imposed a global sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment, concurrent on all counts, with credit for pre-sentence custody, and issued ancillary orders.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code to adduce text messages exchanged with the complainant before and after the alleged offence.

The accused argued the sexualized messages formed part of the subject matter of the charge or were otherwise admissible to show the complainant's state of mind and to challenge her credibility.

The court held that the messages did not form part of the subject matter of the charge and were subject to the s. 276 screening regime.

The court ruled the messages were inadmissible to show the complainant's state of mind regarding consent, as this relied on myth-based reasoning.

However, certain messages were admitted for the limited purpose of exploring material inconsistencies in the complainant's preliminary hearing evidence.

The Crown applied to admit the preliminary inquiry testimony of the accused's deceased mother under s. 715 of the Criminal Code or the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The defence opposed, arguing the subpoena compelling her attendance at the preliminary inquiry was invalid because it was issued by a Superior Court judge rather than an Ontario Court of Justice judge.

The court held that under s. 5 of the Justices of the Peace Act, a Superior Court judge has the powers of a justice of the peace and can issue such subpoenas.

Furthermore, the witness testified under oath and was subject to cross-examination, satisfying the requirements of s. 715 and the procedural reliability threshold of the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The application was granted.

The Crown closed its case in a trial where the accused were charged with possession of various prohibited substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The accused brought motions for directed verdicts of acquittal on all counts.

The court granted the directed verdict of acquittal for the charge of possession of property obtained by crime, finding no reasonable inference could connect the seized cash to drug trafficking.

However, the court dismissed the motions for the drug trafficking charges, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of constructive possession and intent to traffic for a reasonable jury to potentially convict.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, sought to exclude a DVD video from evidence at trial.

The DVD, which likely constituted child pornography, had been in the exclusive possession of the defence but was ordered turned over to the Crown pursuant to the ethical obligations of defence counsel regarding physical evidence of a crime.

The accused argued that allowing the Crown to use the DVD would violate his right against self-incrimination under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the requirement to turn over the evidence was based on professional ethical obligations to maintain the integrity of the judicial system, not to assist in convicting the accused, and its use by the Crown would not render the trial unfair.

In a first-degree murder trial involving an East Indian accused and a white victim, the court ruled on jury selection procedures following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan.

The court established specific anti-bias instructions and challenge for cause questions addressing conscious and unconscious bias regarding race, drug use, and the Indigenous status of Crown witnesses.

The court determined that the trial judge, rather than counsel, would ask the challenge for cause questions, and that prospective jurors would be given advance notice of the questions.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit expert evidence and the defence brought applications regarding jury selection, editing a co-accused's statement, and admitting third-party suspect evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court ruled that the accused, an Indo-Caribbean man, could ask the standard Parks question during jury selection.

The court admitted the Crown's expert evidence on bloodstain pattern analysis and handwriting, finding it necessary and reliable.

The court declined to heavily redact the co-accused's police statement, opting instead for limiting instructions.

Finally, the court admitted hearsay evidence implicating a third-party suspect under the state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

The accused was charged with two separate first-degree murders in Toronto and Brampton.

During a pre-trial motion, the court previously ruled that the accused's confessions to undercover officers were admissible.

In this motion, the court determined how to edit the confession for the Toronto trial to prevent the jury from hearing overly prejudicial evidence about the Brampton homicide.

The court ruled that explicit references to the Brampton shooting must be edited out, but circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the car and gun used in both incidents remained admissible due to its high probative value regarding identity.

The accused was tried on charges of extortion and publication of an intimate image without consent arising from communications between former intimate partners and the appearance of explicit images on social media accounts.

The court found serious reliability and credibility problems in the complainant's evidence, the accused's evidence, the documentary record, and the video recordings, including concerns about incomplete electronic messages, disputed authorship, possible editing, and uncertain timing of any withdrawal of consent.

Applying the criminal burden of proof, the court held the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused posted the images at a time when consent was absent or withdrawn, or that the accused used threats to induce payment.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The global delay was 33 months and 6 days.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was caused by the applicant's own conduct, specifically breaching his bail conditions and intimidating the complainant, which necessitated new disclosure and an adjournment.

After subtracting the defence-caused delay, the net delay fell below the Jordan presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

During a trial for possession for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown applied to admit expert opinion evidence from a police officer regarding whether the accused's possession of Oxycodone and fentanyl patches was for the purpose of trafficking.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible.

The officer's opinion on the Oxycodone lacked probative value because he conceded the quantity was equally consistent with legitimate prescription use as with trafficking.

Regarding the fentanyl, the court found the officer lacked the necessary medical knowledge and experience with prescription patterns to provide a reliable expert opinion, noting that a doctor or pharmacist would be the appropriate expert.

The applicant, having been convicted of fraud and money laundering, sought to bring a second s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay the day before his scheduled sentencing hearing.

His first application had been dismissed during the trial for failure to perfect.

The court dismissed the second application, finding it was an attempt to delay sentencing, failed to comply with the Practice Direction requiring such applications to be brought 60 days before trial, and was not perfected with the necessary transcripts.