Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The court ruled on the admissibility of three police statements made by the accused, Rebecca Eden, in a first-degree murder investigation.

The first two statements (audio and video) were made on June 10, 2021, when she was a person of interest.

The third statement was made on March 11, 2022, after her arrest for first-degree murder.

The court found that the accused was detained during the second statement, and her Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) were violated due to police conduct, including failing to inform her of the true reasons for detention and the seizure of her phone without informed consent.

Applying the "tainting" doctrine from R. v. Pino, these Charter breaches retroactively rendered the first (audio) statement inadmissible as part of the same transaction.

For the third statement, the court found that the police violated the accused's section 7 right to silence by persistently questioning her despite her repeated assertions (106-108 times) that she wished to remain silent on advice of counsel.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded that admitting all three statements would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

All three statements were ruled inadmissible.

The Crown appealed acquittals for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the respondent's state (asleep/awake) and provided insufficient reasons.

The appellate court found the trial judge's reasons deficient, failing to articulate findings of fact or explain how the evidence of the respondent's actions could be reconciled with the complainant's testimony about him being asleep.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered before a different judge.

This decision concerns the sentencing of two individuals, Adam Luangphasi and Alexander Le, following their convictions for multiple drug-related conspiracies arising from "Project Southam." Luangphasi was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic cocaine (Carpet Conspiracy) and two counts of conspiracy to import cocaine (Guyana Conspiracy and Plane Conspiracy), where he was identified as a top principal.

Le was found guilty of conspiracy to export cannabis (Cannabis Conspiracy) and also conspiracy to traffic cocaine (Carpet Conspiracy) and conspiracy to import cocaine (Guyana Conspiracy), acting as a close colleague to Luangphasi.

The court applied sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and parity, emphasizing the severe societal harm caused by drug importation and trafficking.

It rejected the argument that a "dry conspiracy" (where drugs were not actually imported) warrants a significant sentence reduction if the conspiracy was not abandoned.

Luangphasi received a global sentence of 18 years imprisonment, while Le received a global sentence of 9 years imprisonment, with specific concurrent terms for each count.

Ancillary orders for DNA and firearms prohibitions were also imposed.

This record indicates a criminal case where the reasons for the decision are not available at this time.

The accused, Nehemy Yogo, pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited firearm without a licence or registration, contrary to section 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The firearm, a fully automatic Glock 23 Gen 4, was found in his bedroom after he displayed it to intimidate a driver over an unpaid debt.

The Crown sought a three-year imprisonment sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence, citing mitigating factors such as the accused being a first offender, his guilty plea, remorse, strong family support, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions due to COVID-19 lockdowns.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less one day imprisonment, to be served as a conditional sentence, followed by two years of probation.

Credit for pre-sentence custody was granted for 237 days, including an additional 60 days for harsh conditions.

A lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of the firearm were also ordered.

The accused, A.H., was charged with three criminal offences: making child pornography, possession for the purpose of distribution of child pornography, and agreeing or arranging to commit a sexual offence against a child.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's testimony, finding it compelling despite minor inconsistencies due to time passage and age.

The court determined that the photographs described by the complainant constituted child pornography, were taken for a sexual purpose, and that A.H. was actively involved in their creation and possession with intent to distribute to an online contact ("Ed").

The court also found that A.H. had agreed and arranged with "Ed" via telecommunication to commit these offences.

A.H. was found guilty on all three counts.

The appellant, convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a 14-year-old complainant, applied for bail pending his summary conviction appeal.

The court applied the criteria for bail pending appeal, finding that while the appeal grounds were weak, they were not frivolous.

The court further held that the appellant's detention was not necessary in the public interest, noting his low-moderate risk of re-offence and his compliance with previous release conditions.

Bail pending appeal was granted on strict terms, including a surety.

The Crown applied for the forfeiture of a $70,000 recognizance after the accused breached his bail conditions by violating his curfew and driving impaired.

The court found that both sureties had been diligent.

The court granted full relief from forfeiture to one surety because the Crown had unreasonably refused to allow her to supervise the accused at night, which might have prevented the breach.

The other surety was ordered to forfeit $10,000, receiving substantial relief due to her diligence and the Crown's role in preventing a more effective release plan.

J.C. was charged with sexual assault and voyeurism (Counts 1 & 2) and extortion and sexual assault (Counts 3 & 4).

The court acquitted J.C. on Counts 1 and 2, finding insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant, H.D., was incapable of consenting or that the video was made surreptitiously.

However, the court convicted J.C. on Counts 3 and 4, finding that he extorted sexual favours from H.D. by threatening to post a compromising video online, and that H.D. did not consent to subsequent sexual acts due to duress and power imbalance.

The Crown applied to admit the accused's statement to police as voluntary.

The accused had asserted his right to silence, but the interviewing officer made two improper inducements: suggesting the accused might not be charged if he gave his side of the story, and stating that an early explanation would be more credible to a judge than a later one presented by a lawyer.

The court found these inducements to be false and a direct assault on the accused's right to silence.

Despite the Crown arguing that the statement was prompted by the presentation of Snapchats, the court concluded that the inducements were significant and contributed to the accused's decision to speak.

Consequently, the statement was ruled inadmissible as the Crown failed to prove its voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Richard Dowdell pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.

The court determined the parole ineligibility period, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's vulnerability, the home invasion, and the brutal nature of the attack, alongside mitigating factors including the offender's immediate admissions, guilty plea, remorse, and long-standing mental illness (Bipolar disorder with psychosis).

The court balanced denunciation, deterrence, and the offender's mental state, ultimately imposing a life sentence with parole ineligibility for 12 years, rejecting the Crown's request for 14 years.

The accused brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained through omnibus warrants and search warrants, alleging insufficient material before the issuing judges and breaches of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court addressed issues of standing, the excision of misleading expert opinion and irrelevant information from the Information To Obtain (ITO), and the sufficiency of confidential informant (CI) information for both predicate warrants (tracking and dialed number recorder warrants) and the main wiretap authorization.

The court found that all accused had standing, excised certain inflammatory and misleading portions of the ITO, but ultimately concluded that the predicate warrants met the lower "reasonable suspicion" standard and the wiretap authorization met the "best interests of justice" standard, supported by credible and corroborated CI information.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Sentencing decision following conviction for conspiracy to export ecstasy contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Criminal Code.

The offender was found to be the mastermind of a scheme to export approximately 57,000 ecstasy pills to the United States.

The court emphasized the need for denunciation and general deterrence in large-scale drug exportation cases, particularly where the drugs target young users and the offender has a related criminal record.

The court rejected arguments for sentence reduction based on disclosure delays and lengthy bail conditions.

A conditional sentence was found inappropriate given the seriousness of the offence and the offender’s leadership role in the conspiracy.

The offender was sentenced following conviction for sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code involving intercourse with an intoxicated and ill complainant who cycled in and out of consciousness and expressly told the offender to stop.

The court considered aggravating factors including the complainant’s vulnerability, the offender’s disregard of her lack of consent, resulting genital injury, and the offender’s dishonesty during the investigation and at trial.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, supportive family, work history, and significant mental health concerns following conviction.

Applying the principles in ss. 718 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code and reviewing comparable sentencing authorities, the court determined that a mid‑range custodial sentence in the reformatory range was appropriate.

The offender was sentenced to two years less a day of imprisonment with credit for pre‑sentence custody, followed by three years’ probation and several ancillary orders.

The Attorney General sought forfeiture of cash seized from a vehicle following a traffic stop under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

Police discovered marijuana and approximately $11,775 in mixed Canadian and U.S. currency in the vehicle, and later found drugs, cocaine, and trafficking paraphernalia at the driver's residence.

The interested parties claimed the money represented savings and loans intended to purchase DJ equipment, but their explanations were inconsistent and unsupported by objective evidence.

The court found on a balance of probabilities that the cash was likely intended to purchase drugs for resale and therefore constituted an instrument of unlawful activity.

No interested party established legitimate or responsible ownership, and forfeiture was not clearly contrary to the interests of justice.

During a jury trial for murder, the defence sought to cross‑examine the deceased’s daughters about threatening phone calls, visits by unidentified individuals, and safety precautions allegedly taken due to the accused’s drug‑related associations.

The defence argued the evidence was relevant to show animus against the accused and challenge the credibility of their testimony regarding the relationship between the accused and the deceased.

The Crown objected, arguing the questioning was an indirect attempt to introduce previously excluded third‑party suspect evidence.

The court held that while defence evidence may be excluded only where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the proposed cross‑examination carried a significant risk of inviting the jury to speculate that unidentified drug associates committed the murder.

The court therefore ruled the prejudicial effect outweighed the limited probative value and prohibited the cross‑examination.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction from the Ontario Court of Justice, arguing the trial judge misapprehended key evidence and applied a different level of scrutiny to defence evidence than to the complainant’s testimony.

The alleged errors concerned the timing of graffiti written by the complainant in the accused’s apartment and inconsistencies in the complainant’s account of when she arrived in the city and how long she remained at the residence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge was aware of the inconsistencies and reasonably resolved them within the credibility assessment.

It further held that the reasons did not demonstrate that different standards of scrutiny were applied to the defence witnesses and the complainant.

The conviction was therefore supported by the evidence and disclosed no miscarriage of justice.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The trial judge had found that the Crown failed to prove the accused had care or control of an operable vehicle within the two-hour statutory presumption period under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Evidence showed the accused was seated in a damaged and potentially inoperable vehicle awaiting a tow truck after a collision, and the timing of the incident relative to the breath samples was uncertain.

The appeal court held that the trial judge correctly applied the law governing care or control and the statutory presumption, and that the factual findings regarding operability and timing were supported by the evidence.

The Crown therefore failed to establish any legal error or unreasonable verdict.

The offender was convicted after jury trial of importing 3.532 kilograms of cocaine into Canada, contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court considered the applicable sentencing range for multi‑kilogram cocaine importation, noting appellate authorities establishing a typical range of six to eight years for couriers importing large quantities for personal gain.

Aggravating factors included the substantial quantity of cocaine, motivation for financial gain, limited remorse, and a prior drug-related conviction abroad.

Mitigating factors included a difficult upbringing and the limited role of the offender as a courier.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, the court imposed an eight-year sentence with enhanced credit for pre‑trial custody.

The accused was charged with trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime following an undercover police drug purchase.

An undercover officer testified that she purchased cocaine from a man matching the accused’s description using pre-recorded marked money, and surveillance officers identified the accused as the person involved in the transaction.

The defence called multiple civilian witnesses who stated the accused did not engage in a drug transaction and remained with them on the way to purchase pizza.

The court found that although the accused matched the description of the person observed by police, the marked $20 bill allegedly recovered from him was neither photographed nor preserved as evidence.

In the absence of this best evidence and given the competing testimony, the court concluded the Crown had not proven identity and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.