Sandra Nishikawa

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal reconsideration decision that barred her application for statutory accident benefits due to late notice.

The appellant argued the Tribunal erred in law in interpreting the notice requirements under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the issues raised regarding the limitation period and the reasonableness of the delayed notice were questions of mixed fact and law, which fall outside the court's statutory jurisdiction to hear appeals on questions of law only.

The court also noted the appellant improperly raised new arguments not advanced before the Tribunal.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Patient Ombudsman's decision to initiate an investigation into their long-term care home's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicants argued that section 13.3(5) of the Excellent Care for All Act precluded the investigation because the matter was already the subject of other proceedings, including a provincial commission, an Ontario Ombudsman investigation, and class actions.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the Patient Ombudsman unreasonably interpreted the statute and was prohibited from proceeding.

The application for judicial review was granted and the decision to investigate was quashed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court order dismissing her $35,000 claim against her landlord for misrepresentation based on testimony given at the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court held that the claim was barred by the doctrine of witness immunity and absolute privilege, and that the underlying issues had already been fully litigated before the Board and on subsequent appeals.

The appellant entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for a property and paid a $40,000 deposit.

The transaction failed to close because the appellant could not secure financing.

The appellant sought the return of the deposit, arguing there was an oral agreement that it would be refunded if the sale failed.

The application judge dismissed the application, applying the parol evidence rule to exclude the oral agreement and finding no grounds for relief from forfeiture.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the written contract governed and that the deposit forfeiture was not unconscionable.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory injunction restraining them from using the name 'Bombay Frankie' for their restaurant business.

The respondent had applied to register the trademark but had not yet opened a restaurant or established goodwill when the action commenced.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and vacated the injunction, finding the motion judge erred in principle by concluding there was a serious issue to be tried.

The court held that a mere trademark application does not confer a right to sue for infringement, and start-up activities do not establish the goodwill necessary for a passing-off claim.

The applicant teachers' association sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision finding he lacked jurisdiction over a grievance regarding preparation, planning, and supervision provisions.

The arbitrator concluded these provisions were local terms, not central terms under the School Boards Collective Bargaining Act, 2014.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard and upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding his purposive and contextual interpretation of 'central terms' was consistent with the statutory scheme and legislative intent.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying him income replacement benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The central issue was the interpretation of the term 'employed' under section 5(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The appellant argued for a broad interpretation encompassing the formal employment relationship, even though he had not worked or received wages for months prior to his formal termination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicators correctly interpreted 'employed' in its statutory context as requiring the exchange of wages for services.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ministry denying it a grant under the Ontario Small Business Support Grant program.

The Ministry determined the applicant was ineligible because its door installation business constituted construction services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Ministry's interpretation of the eligibility criteria was reasonable and did not contravene the Ministry of Revenue Act.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness, as adequate reasons were provided and the non-disclosure of the assessors' identities was justified.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which held it lacked jurisdiction to hear a stand-alone Charter challenge regarding a Ministry of Transportation policy.

Before the judicial review was heard, the applicant succeeded on his Human Rights Code claim, obtained his driver's licence, and the Ministry revised the impugned policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review on the basis of mootness, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case as there was no longer an adversarial context and the issue was not evasive of review.

The applicant brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled hearing because she was working as a medic in Ukraine, citing unstable internet access and security concerns that would make it difficult to instruct counsel.

The respondent opposed the motion, noting the late request and scarce court resources.

Despite concerns about the late request and missed deadlines, the court granted the adjournment in the interests of justice to allow the applicant sufficient time to instruct counsel, making the new date peremptory on the applicant.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating the tenancy.

The tenant, who was incarcerated, failed to appear and had previously failed to comply with strict conditions for an extension of time to appeal, including paying rent and arrears.

The court found the notice of appeal identified no grounds of appeal or questions of law.

The appeal was deemed manifestly devoid of merit and quashed, with the automatic stay lifted.

The appellant appealed a trial decision granting custody, child and spousal support, and equal division of the proceeds of a jointly owned home to the respondent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in treating the home as joint property, enforcing the parties' Islamic marriage contract (Nikah), excluding the Maher payment from net family property, and awarding spousal support.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of family law principles.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of an Integrity Commissioner's decision finding he breached the municipal Code of Conduct by disclosing confidential and solicitor-client privileged information to external legal counsel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Integrity Commissioner's decision was reasonable because the applicant lacked authority to waive the municipality's privilege or disclose confidential procurement documents.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness during the investigation.

The moving party sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a temporary order granting the responding party sole care of their child pending further agreement or order.

The moving party missed the original hearing due to communication issues after insisting on receiving materials by mail or fax.

The court applied the test for extending time and found that the moving party did not form an intention to appeal within the required period, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit as it did not meet the high threshold for leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding party.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, brought a motion for a stay pending the outcome of her application for judicial review of the Justices of the Peace Review Council's recommendation that she be removed from office.

The respondent took no position on the motion.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the applicant raised serious issues to be tried, would suffer irreparable harm if removed from office pending review, and the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The applicant, a non-Catholic student at a Catholic high school, challenged a school board policy requiring student trustees to be Roman Catholic.

The Divisional Court held that the policy was not protected by the denominational school rights in s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867, because the role of student trustee did not exist at Confederation and does not involve governance.

The court found the policy violated the equality rights of non-Catholic students under s. 15(1) of the Charter and could not be justified under s. 1.

Furthermore, the policy was found to be ultra vires the school board as it conflicted with provincial regulations.

The policy was quashed.

The proposed intervener, Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO), brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning an alleged illegal eviction.

The landlords opposed the motion, arguing it was a private dispute.

The court granted the motion, finding that ACTO had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest in the subject matter and could provide a useful and distinct perspective on the interpretation of the Residential Tenancies Act, particularly regarding the remedies available for illegal evictions.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal an interlocutory order that gave the respondent carriage of the sale of a property.

The court applied the factors for granting an extension of time and found that while the delay was short and explained, the proposed appeal lacked merit as it sought to appeal matters not finally determined and took issue with the motion judge's reasons rather than the order itself.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The appellants, former employees of Medcan, appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class proceeding for unpaid vacation and public holiday pay on variable compensation.

The certification judge had found that a class action was not the preferable procedure.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the certification judge erred in principle by failing to conduct the preferability analysis through the lens of the three principal goals of class actions, specifically failing to consider barriers to access to justice and behaviour modification.

The action was certified as a class proceeding.

Air Canada applied for judicial review of an arbitrator's decision allowing a union grievance.

The arbitrator had directed Air Canada to stop applying the off-duty status provision of the collective agreement unless it established a discontinuation of its revenue operations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's conclusion that Air Canada failed to establish a continued 90% reduction in business as of January 2021 was reasonable and supported by the record.