Rodney Morton Godard

Following the dismissal of the moving parties' motion for a Mareva injunction, the respondents sought their costs.

The court awarded substantial and full indemnity costs to the respondents, totaling over $126,000, finding that the moving parties had made serious, unfounded allegations of fraud and breach of trust, and had engaged in inappropriate conduct by raising unrelated regulatory issues to smear certain respondents.

The plaintiffs brought a motion asking the Court of Appeal to reconsider its refusal to grant leave to appeal, arguing that a subsequent decision by the court changed the interpretation of Rule 53.03.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under Rule 61.16(6.1) because a change in jurisprudence does not constitute a 'fact arising or discovered after' an order is made under Rule 59.06(2)(a).

The court further noted that even if it had jurisdiction, it would not exercise its discretion to reconsider the decision, and declined to extend the time for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applicant lawyer sought a declaration that he had priority to non-forfeited cash bail funds based on an alleged assignment from the accused client, and an order setting aside or circumventing an estreatment order that had directed the balance to the respondent who had posted the bail money.

The court held that it had no jurisdiction to review, vary, or reconsider the criminal estreatment order under the Criminal Code, and that the proceeding was in substance an impermissible collateral attack.

In any event, the court found the applicant had no enforceable security interest under the Personal Property Security Act because the debtor had no rights in the collateral to assign after previously relinquishing all claims to the funds to the respondent.

The application was dismissed and the clerk was directed to release the funds to the respondent.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel.

The defendants argued that a partner at the plaintiff's law firm was a compellable witness regarding mitigation efforts in the underlying negligence action.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's approach to determining whether the lawyer was a compellable witness conflicted with existing case law by failing to weigh all relevant factors.

The court concluded that the issue of right to counsel and potential conflicts of interest raised important principles warranting appellate review.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict that assessed their damages from a motor vehicle accident at zero dollars.

The self-represented appellant argued the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance, specifically regarding the exclusion of medical consultation notes and limitations on expert testimony due to non-compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably balanced his duty to assist the unrepresented litigant with the need to ensure fairness to the defendants.

Following an appeal, the appellant sought trial costs based on an offer to settle.

The respondent argued that determining trial costs was premature because her application for support under the Succession Law Reform Act had been remitted to the Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal agreed and remitted the question of all Superior Court costs to the judge hearing the support application.

Following the release of the Court of Appeal's decision allowing the appeal and awarding the statutory pre-retirement death benefit to the appellant, the respondent requested that the court address her entitlement to support under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).

The trial judge had previously dismissed the respondent's SLRA application because she had awarded the death benefit to the respondent, finding no further need for support.

Because the Court of Appeal's decision removed the basis for that dismissal, the court set aside the trial judge's order dismissing the SLRA application and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice for determination.

The deceased was a member of a pension plan who died before the commencement of his deferred pension.

At the time of his death, he was living with a common law spouse but remained legally married to his separated spouse, whom he had designated as a beneficiary along with their daughters.

The Court of Appeal held that because the deceased and his legally married spouse were living separate and apart, the spousal priority under s. 48(1) of the Pension Benefits Act did not apply.

Consequently, the designated beneficiaries were entitled to the death benefit under s. 48(6).

Following dismissal of an application alleging that a municipality and its mayor and councillors conspired in bad faith to block a bridge expansion project through heritage and demolition control by-laws, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found the allegations of conspiracy, illegality, and bad faith against the municipal defendants to be entirely without merit and emphasized that unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty justify elevated costs.

Applying the principles in s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded substantial full indemnity costs to the successful municipal respondents and individual councillors, subject to proportionality considerations reflecting differing levels of participation.

The court held that both the applicants and the Canadian Transit Company—though formally a respondent but aligned with the applicants—were jointly and severally responsible for the costs award.

The plaintiff employer sued its former president for breach of a non-competition covenant and breach of fiduciary duty after he successfully bid against the employer on a public municipal tender.

The trial judge used blue-pencil severance to cure an ambiguous and unreasonable temporal restriction in the non-competition covenant and found the employee liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that blue-pencil severance was unavailable because the severed words were not trivial and there was no evidence the parties would have unquestionably agreed to the contract without them.

The Court also found no breach of fiduciary duty, as the employee did not use confidential information or compete unfairly.

The employee's cross-appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

On a Rule 20 summary judgment motion, moving defendants sought dismissal of claims as statute-barred under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court heard affidavit and oral evidence on discoverability and due diligence, and found the responding parties knew by 2005-2006 of the impugned transfer and related litigation but chose not to investigate potential claims against additional actors.

Applying the objective branch of discoverability and diligence principles, the court held that a reasonable person in their circumstances ought to have known the material facts in 2006.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring trial on the limitations defence and dismissed the action against the moving defendants.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it lacked just cause to terminate the respondent employee.

The employee, a senior manager, had arranged for a company supplier to construct a fence and pool at his home but failed to document payment as required by the employer's Integrity Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in interpreting the Code.

The employee's failure to document payment and the resulting conflict of interest compromised the employment relationship, providing just cause for termination.

The petitioning creditor obtained a judgment against the debtor on a promissory note and subsequently filed a petition for a receiving order based on this single debt.

The bankruptcy judge granted the petition, finding that the unpaid judgment automatically constituted special circumstances under s. 42(1)(j) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while a judgment constitutes a continuing demand, a single judgment debt does not automatically establish an act of bankruptcy.

The court must consider all circumstances, including the size of the judgment, how long it has been outstanding, and collection efforts.

The appeal was allowed, the receiving order set aside, and the matter remitted to the bankruptcy judge.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a contract dispute over manufacturing work.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's findings of fact were inconsistent with his legal conclusions.

Specifically, the trial judge found that the respondent failed to complete work in a timely manner, which constituted a breach of contract, entitling the appellant to damages subject to mitigation.

The Court of Appeal varied the trial judgment to award the appellant damages for the cost of new tools and laser cut parts, while upholding the award to the respondent for compression costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent the balance of a contract price for constructing and installing cabinets, while awarding the appellant damages on its counterclaim for repair costs.

The appellant argued that the respondent's failure to supply defect-free cabinets constituted a fundamental breach and that the trial judge erred in quantifying replacement costs.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to award no costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding no evidence of fundamental breach, sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's damages quantification, and that the trial judge's costs disposition was within his discretion.

The appellant oral surgeon appealed a trial judgment enforcing a handwritten non-competition clause that barred him from practising within five miles of the respondent's office for three years after leaving an associate position.

The Court of Appeal held that although the respondent had some proprietary interest in regular referring dentists, this was not an exceptional employment case justifying a broad non-competition covenant.

Applying the governing framework for restrictive covenants in employment contracts, the court emphasized that non-competition clauses will generally not be enforced where a non-solicitation clause would adequately protect the employer's legitimate interests.

The appellant's role was that of a junior associate, he did not personify the practice, and no confidential information or trade secrets justified the broader restraint.

The appeal was allowed, the action dismissed, and costs awarded to the appellant.

The appellants sought to challenge an order directing that an assessment proceed without consideration of negligence and failure to follow instructions.

The Court of Appeal held that, because leave to appeal from the earlier order had been denied, it was not open to revisit the merits of that order on this appeal.

The assessment officer was therefore bound to proceed on the basis set by the prior order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, although the court expressly stated it was not endorsing the proposition that no solicitor-client relationship existed.