ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: CV-09-13015CM

DATE: 20120215

BETWEEN:

Charan Sian, Pira Sian, Nirmal Kooner and Balbir Kooner Plaintiffs – and – Avtar Kooner, Arthur Weingarden, Raphael Partners LLP, Max Weingarden, Weingarden Investments Limited and 770137 Ontario Inc. Defendants

Myron W. Shulgan, for the Plaintiffs Charan Sian and Pira Sian

Mason Greenaway, Counsel for the Defendants, Arthur Weingarden and Raphael Partners LLP Rodney Godard, Counsel for the Defendants, Max Weingarden and Weingarden Investments Limited

HEARD: January 30, 31, 2012

reasons on rule 20 motion

Thomas J. :

MATTERS AT ISSUE

[ 1 ] The moving parties, Arthur Weingarden and Raphael Partners LLP, and Max Weingarden and Weingarden Investments Limited, have brought two motions for summary judgment (dismissal) on the grounds that this action was commenced more than two years after the date on which the claim was discovered.

[ 2 ] Both sets of moving parties rely upon the affidavit evidence of Dr. Sukdhev Kooner and Paramjeet Pabla.

[ 3 ] Each of the original responding parties have submitted Affidavits disputing the facts set out in the Affidavits of Dr. Kooner and Paramjeet Pabla.

[ 4 ] With the consent and at the request of all parties, I ordered that the question of the limitation period defence be determined after hearing oral evidence pursuant to rule 20.04(2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure . That order was part of my endorsement of January 26, 2012.

[ 5 ] The evidence I received to allow me to determine this issue amounts to a combination of the sworn affidavits and oral evidence. The following background information is not in dispute.

BACKGROUND

[ 6 ] On August 2, 1989, Avtar Kooner, in trust for a group of investors, purchased a property known municipally as Part Lot 13 and 14, Concession 7, in the city of Windsor (“the property”) for $425,000.

[ 7 ] On August 31, 1989, the investors entered into a Trust Agreement whereby it was agreed that Avtar Kooner would hold the property in trust for the investors.

[ 8 ] As of the date of the Trust Agreement, the beneficial ownership of the property was as follows:

PERSON INTEREST

Avtar Kooner and two of his brothers, 1/7

Balbir and Nirmal (both of whom were

plaintiffs herein)

Dr. Sukdhev Kooner 1/7

Ranjit Bhamra 1/7

Balbir Bhamra 1/7

Malkiat Pabla 1/7

Ranjit Kooner 1/7

Dr. Jagtaran Dhaliwal 1/7

[ 9 ] In or about April 1990, Ranjit Kooner, one of the investors, sold his one-seventh interest in the property to the other beneficial owners of the property.

[ 10 ] Thereafter, the plaintiffs, Charan Sian and Pira Sian, purchased Dr. Dhaliwal’s one-sixth share sometime subsequent to June 1995.

[ 11 ] Between September 15, 2000, and November 15, 2002, Avtar Kooner, without the investors’ consent or knowledge, placed mortgages on the property, totalling approximately $550,000. Those mortgages were given to the defendants, Max Weingarden and Weingarden Investments Limited.

[ 12 ] The defendant, Arthur Weingarden, acted as solicitor for Max Weingarden and Weingarden Investments Limited on the mortgages.

[ 13 ] On January 30, 2003, Avtar Kooner, without the consent or knowledge of the investors, transferred the property to the defendant, 770137 Ontario Inc. (“Azar Company”) for $1,500,000.

[ 14 ] The defendant, Arthur Weingarden, acted as solicitor for Avtar Kooner on the transfer.

[ 15 ] In March 2005, at least four of the investors, Dr. Sukdhev Kooner, Ranjit Bhamra, Balbir Bhamra and Malkiat Pabla, learned that Avtar Kooner had sold the property to the Azar Company.

[ 16 ] Within days and certainly by April 2, 2005, these four investors had retained a lawyer, Paramjeet Pabla, who, as a result of performing a subsearch of the property, advised the four investors of the following:

a) That the property had not only been wrongfully transferred by Avtar Kooner, but that prior to transferring the property, Avtar Kooner had wrongfully mortgaged the property;

b) That their loss or damage was caused by Avtar Kooner but that they should explore a cause of action against the lawyer and law firm involved, who should have ensured that the refinancing and transfer was approved by the investors.

[ 17 ] Dr. Kooner, Ranjit Bhamra, Balbir Bhamra and Malkiat Pabla commenced action number 05-CV-4810CM on May 2, 2005, naming not only Avtar Kooner but also the lawyer defendants and the Weingarden defendants.

[ 18 ] Action number 05-CV-4810CM proceeded through various stages and was eventually settled in February 2009.

[ 19 ] The plaintiffs, Charan Sian, Pira Sian, Nirmal Kooner and Balbir Kooner, the other four investors, commenced their action, the action that is the subject of this motion, on May 4, 2009. On January 27, 2012, the claims of Nirmal and Balbir Kooner were dismissed on consent and without costs. It is therefore the claims of Charan Sian and Pira Sian that are considered here.

[ 20 ] The balance of the evidence on this motion was not as easy to reconcile.

The Contested Evidence

Dr. Sukdhev Kooner

[ 21 ] Dr. Kooner’s evidence confirms that at the meeting with lawyer Paramjeet Palba on April 2, 2005, he was told to advise all of the investors of the potential lawsuit against Avtar Kooner and the lawyer and law firm involved in the transaction.

[ 22 ] He admitted that he had not invited Charan Sian, Pira Sian, Nirmal Kooner or Balbir Kooner to the meeting with Ms. Pabla as they were all related to Avtar Kooner, Nirmal and Balbir Kooner being his brothers.

[ 23 ] It is the evidence of Dr. Kooner that sometime in April 2005 he advised two of the plaintiffs herein, Nirmal Kooner and Balbir Kooner, of the sale of the property and of Ms. Pabla’s advice to sue Avtar Kooner and the lawyers involved. Dr. Kooner invited Nirmal and Balbir Kooner to join in the lawsuit but they declined.

[ 24 ] It is also Dr. Kooner’s evidence that in April 2005 he advised Charan and Pira Sian that the other investors were bringing an action against Avtar Kooner and the lawyers. Dr. Kooner invited both Charan and Pira Sian to join in the lawsuit, but they too declined.

Paramjeet Pabla

[ 25 ] Ms. Pabla is a lawyer and was practising in Windsor in 2005. Her father-in-law, Malkiat Pabla, was one of the investors in this land purchase.

[ 26 ] She met with Dr. Kooner, her father-in-law and Ranjit and Balbir Bhamra on April 2, 2005. She discussed with them their potential claims against Avtar Kooner and the lawyers. She advised that litigation was expensive and that all the potential plaintiffs should be notified. She referred these four to McKenzie Lake LLP in London and in fact attended with them there on April 15, 2005.

[ 27 ] Ms. Pabla’s evidence was that within one month of the April 15, 2005, meeting she met with Charan Sian in her office and told him of the action being commenced by Dr. Kooner and the other original plaintiffs against Avtar Kooner and the lawyers.

Nirmal Kooner

[ 28 ] It was the evidence of Nirmal Kooner, one of the plaintiffs in this action, that he knew nothing of the sale of this property until he spoke to a Windsor lawyer, Gino Morga, in 2009.

[ 29 ] He had no conversation about this matter with Dr. Kooner at anytime.

[ 30 ] His evidence contradicted significant portions of his own statement of claim. His claim, as well as that of his brother, Balbir, was dismissed on consent at the start of this motion.

Balbir Kooner

[ 31 ] While Balbir Kooner agreed during oral evidence with the content of his statement of claim, it was unclear if the sale of the property by his brother Avtar came to his attention in late 2005 or 2006.

[ 32 ] It was his evidence that the lawyer Gino Morga with whom he consulted was the first to tell him about the sale. It is clear that he relied upon the promises of his brother to repay him. He was aware that Avtar was selling another piece of property and he had promised to repay them from the proceeds.

[ 33 ] In March 2009 it became clear to Balbir Kooner that Avtar had no equity in the other property that he was selling. It was at that time that he met with Claudio Martini, the lawyer who commenced this action, and a statement of claim was issued. It was only then that he learned about a potential claim against anyone other than Avtar Kooner.

[ 34 ] He denies ever speaking to Dr. Kooner about the property in 2005 or ever being invited to join the original lawsuit.

Charan Sian

[ 35 ] Avtar Kooner is his cousin and they lived together for a time, both working at a local plant called Fabco.

[ 36 ] He testified that in 2005 or 2006, he was told by Nirmal Kooner that the property they owned had been sold by Avtar and that Avtar was being sued by the other investors. He did not know that the lawyers involved in the transactions were being sued.

[ 37 ] Avtar told them they would be repaid and it was not until 2009 that it became apparent that Avtar had no money. At that time, Charan met the lawyer Claudio Martini and the lawsuit was started.

[ 38 ] He denied ever being consulted by Dr. Kooner and maintained that if he had been asked, he would have joined the original action. Further, although he recalls being in Ms. Pabla’s law office to have her assist with a document that needed to be signed by his daughter, he said there was never any discussion about the property that had been mortgaged and sold.

Pira Sian

[ 39 ] Significantly, Pira Sian is a senior investigator and technical advisor for the Canada Revenue Agency. He has knowledge of the workings of land transfers and the importance of limitation periods.

[ 40 ] He testified that in late 2005 or 2006, he was told by his brother Charan that Avtar Kooner had sold their property.

[ 41 ] He travelled immediately to Windsor and met with Avtar and his brothers at Charan’s house. Pira Sian advised that Avtar was ashamed and told them he would repay them from the sale of a second piece of property he owned. It was clear to him at that point that Avtar had no money otherwise.

[ 42 ] It was Pira Sian’s evidence that by 2006 he knew of the existence of another lawsuit against Avtar but he chose to ignore it since they had indicated no interest in having him join them. He acknowledged making no effort to have a lawyer do a subsearch of the property, or to request a copy of the statement of claim, or to speak to the original four plaintiffs.

[ 43 ] He maintained that he always felt that his best bet for obtaining repayment of his original investment would come from Avtar selling the second property.

[ 44 ] In 2009, Pira Sian said he spoke to his manager who first suggested there might be a claim against the lawyers who acted in the transaction. He contacted his brother Charan and contact was made with Claudio Martini. He telephoned Martini on or about May 1, 2009, and the claim was issued on May 4, 2009.

Positions of the Parties

[ 45 ] The moving parties contend that the evidence of Dr. Kooner and Paramjeet Pabla establishes that all the plaintiffs had actual knowledge in 2005 of the companion action and the fact that it named defendants other than just Avtar Kooner. They argue that even if I cannot, on the oral evidence, find that to be so, at the very least it is clear that as of 2006 both Charan Sian and Pira Sian were aware that Avtar Kooner had wrongfully conveyed their property, and was being sued, and yet they decided to negotiate a resolution directly with him.

[ 46 ] The moving parties contend that these plaintiffs had a duty to seek out advice as to their remedies. They cannot simply plead ignorance of the claims against the lawyers and the mortgagees until the statement of claim was issued in 2009.

[ 47 ] While the two sets of defendants take different positions with respect to liability, they perceive their positions on this motion to be the same. They argue that the limitation period in this case should run from early 2006, when the plaintiffs could have been armed with all the information they needed, until early 2008 at the latest.

[ 48 ] The plaintiffs Charan and Pira Sian deny any of the conversations suggested by the defendants’ witnesses. They maintain that the first time any information came to them about potential claims against anyone other than Avtar Kooner was in 2009. Although they had knowledge of the action started by Dr. Kooner and the others by 2006, it was only in 2009 that the limitation period against these moving parties started to run, with respect to their claims, as it was then that they received information about claims to be made against the lawyer, law firm, and mortgagees.

Rule 20 Motions

[ 49 ] Rule 20 in its present form was enacted by regulation effective January 1, 2010. The applicable portions of Rule 20 that relate to this motion are those embodied in rule 20.04 set out below:

20.04(1) [Revoked O. Reg. 438/08, s. 13(1).]

(2) The court shall grant summary judgment if,

(a) the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence; or

(b) the parties agree to have all or part of the claim determined by a summary judgment and the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to grant summary judgment.

Powers

(2.1) In determining under clause (2)(a) whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, the court shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties and, if the determination is being made by a judge, the judge may exercise any of the following powers for the purpose, unless it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial:

1. Weighing the evidence.

2. Evaluating the credibility of a deponent.

3. Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.

Oral Evidence (Mini-Trial)

(2.2) A judge may, for the purposes of exercising any of the powers set out in subrule (2.1), order that oral evidence be presented by one or more parties, with or without time limits on its presentation.

[ 50 ] Where the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence, summary judgment should be granted (rule 20.04(2)(a)).

[ 51 ] The powers of the motions judge contained in rule 20.04(2.1) should only be exercised to “weed out” claims if an appropriate answer is forthcoming on a consideration of the following question: “can the full appreciation of the evidence and issues that is required to make dispositive findings be achieved by way of summary judgment, or can this full appreciation only be achieved by way of a trial?” ( Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch , 2011 ONCA 764 , at para. 50 (“ Combined Air ”)).

[ 52 ] In this case I am directed to the narrow issue of whether the bringing of the action is barred by the operation of ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act , 2002 , S.O. 2002, c. 24, Schedule B (“ Limitations Act ”). The motion records before me contain six affidavits, including affidavits for all four plaintiffs that fully discuss the timing of their knowledge regarding claims against these moving defendants. Upon the urging of all parties I made an order that I hear all six affiants orally, pursuant to rule 20.04(2.2). My reasons are contained in my endorsement of January 26, 2012. Suffice it to say that the issue before me being narrow and discrete, I was content that all the circumstances envisioned by para. 103 of the decision in Combined Air were present here:

1. Oral evidence can be obtained from a small number of witnesses and gathered in a manageable period of time;

2. Any issue to be dealt with by presenting oral evidence is likely to have a significant impact on whether the summary judgment motion is granted; and

3. Any such issue is narrow and discrete – i.e. , the issue can be separately decided and is not enmeshed with other issues on the motion.

The Limitation Period

[ 53 ] On the narrow limitation defence I am completely satisfied, that by combining the oral evidence with the affidavits filed, I can have a full appreciation of the evidence and the issues that might be brought to bear on this defence and that waiting for a trial is unnecessary. In addition, I am in a perfect position to exercise the powers contained in rule 20.04(2.1) with respect to this discrete issue. I come to those conclusions recognizing that it is often inappropriate to dispose of the discoverability issue on motion since a factual analysis is necessary ( Alexis v. Darnley , 2009 ONCA 847 , 100 O.R. (3d) 232, at para. 12 ). However, with the sworn evidence I have received, I am content that I can make the necessary findings of fact.

[ 54 ] Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act say this:

Basic limitation period

4. Unless this Act provides otherwise, a proceeding shall not be commenced in respect of a claim after the second anniversary of the day on which the claim was discovered.

Discovery

5. (1) A claim is discovered on the earlier of,

(a) the day on which the person with the claim first knew,

(i) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred,

(ii) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission,

(iii) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is made, and

(iv) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it; and

(b) the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the matters referred to in clause (a).

Presumption

(2) A person with a claim shall be presumed to have known of the matters referred to in clause (1)(a) on the day the act or omission on which the claim is based took place, unless the contrary is proved.

[ 55 ] The presumption contained in s. 5(2) above makes it clear that a claim is discovered when the criteria in s. 5(1)(a) are satisfied unless the plaintiffs here can prove the contrary. Since the defendants have pleaded the limitations defence, the plaintiffs must prove that the cause of action arose within the statutory limitation period ( Alexis v. Toronto Police Service Board (2009), 187 C.R.R. (2d) 194 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 35 ).

[ 56 ] However, it is clear that the discoverability principle provides that the limitation period only begins to run when the plaintiff has knowledge of the material facts upon which the cause of action is based ( Findlay v. Holmes (1998), 1998 5488 (ON CA) , 111 O.A.C. 319 (C.A.), at para. 28 ).

[ 57 ] Here the plaintiffs contend that since they had no actual knowledge of the potential claims against these defendants, I should find that their claims were not discoverable until they met with a lawyer in 2009. To support this proposition, they point me to the cases that conclude that in some circumstances it will be necessary to obtain legal advice or perhaps an expert opinion to ascertain the material facts on which to base a claim ( Hare v. Grimmett , 2011 ONSC 6699 , at para. 32; Gaudet v. Levy (1984), 1984 2047 (ON SC) , 47 O.R. (2d) 577 (H.C.J.), at p. 581).

[ 58 ] I must consider whether this is a case that requires that kind of advice or opinion to establish the facts. In addition, the issue of the plaintiffs’ duty of due diligence cannot be ignored. Therefore it must be asked whether the plaintiffs with due diligence could have obtained all the necessary information within two years of the time they learned about the sale of the land.

[ 59 ] The issue of due diligence and the potential necessity of an expert opinion was considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Soper v. Southcott (1998), 1998 5359 (ON CA) , 39 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.) at p. 744:

Limitation periods are not enacted to be ignored. The plaintiff is required to act with due diligence in acquiring facts in order to be fully apprised of the material facts upon which a negligence or malpractice claim can be based. This includes acting with diligence in requesting and receiving a medical opinion, if required, so as not to delay the commencement of the limitation period. In some cases, a medical opinion will be necessary to know whether to institute an action. In other cases, it will be possible to know material facts without a medical opinion, and the medical opinion itself will simply be required as evidence in the litigation. In the latter instances, the time of receipt of the medical opinion is immaterial to the commencement of the running of the limitation period.

[ 60 ] The Supreme Court of Canada in M. (K.) v. M. (H.) , 1992 31 (SCC) , [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, at p. 30, said the following about the duty of diligence:

Finally, plaintiffs are expected to act diligently and not “sleep on their rights”; statutes of limitation are an incentive for plaintiffs to bring suit in a timely fashion.

Analysis

[ 61 ] On the evidence, I cannot resolve the issue of whether the plaintiffs had actual notice in 2005 of the original claim by Dr. Kooner and the three other plaintiffs. I have the evidence of Dr. Kooner and Paramjeet Pabla recounting their conversations with the Sians and the Kooners in 2005. Against that, the plaintiffs have denied that those conversations ever took place. While I cannot resolve that conflict as part of a credibility analysis, in the end I find that to be unnecessary.

[ 62 ] On the evidence of Balbir Kooner, Charan Sian and Pira Sian, it is clear to me that by late 2005 they were aware of the impugned conveyance of their property and that by 2006, they had information that Avtar Kooner was being sued. I am able to make those findings of fact.

[ 63 ] As to how the matter played out from there, I choose to rely upon the evidence of Pira Sian and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it. I found Pira Sian to be straightforward and believable.

[ 64 ] He admitted to having a certain business acumen as a result of his long-term employment with the Canada Revenue Agency. Upon hearing of the transfer, he met with his brother and the three Kooner brothers. They were told by Avtar that they would be repaid from the proceeds of sale of a second property. On the basis of that promise they chose to forego any further investigation.

[ 65 ] I find it to be a reasonable inference that they felt if anyone was to be repaid by Avtar, surely it must be them. As suggested by Pira Sian in his oral evidence, they were not interested in the other action by Dr. Kooner and the other investors. They chose to ignore it and decided instead to wait on Avtar Kooner. It was only in 2009 when the second property was sold and it became clear that there was nothing there for them, that they chose to explore alternatives. It was then in May 2009 that they obtained the opinion of Claudio Martini.

[ 66 ] Mr. Shulgan argues that this type of scenario demands the flexibility of the discoverability rule.

[ 67 ] His argument is that it is reasonable in the circumstances that the Sian brothers should have exhausted their potential remedy with Avtar Kooner before they took any further steps, including obtaining an opinion from a lawyer. In fact, he suggests that these are the exact kind of circumstances contemplated by the language of s. 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act . In Mr. Shulgan’s view, it follows that the limitation period did not start to run until the opinion was obtained from Martini in 2009. I disagree. I believe that the inaction of the plaintiffs offends the duty of reasonable diligence discussed in the cases above.

[ 68 ] By 2006, these plaintiffs knew that Avtar Kooner, without any authorization, had conveyed their land. They also knew that he was being sued by other investors in their local Sikh community. It does not satisfy their obligation of due diligence to sit back in a state akin to wilful blindness and wait on Avtar Kooner. A significant amount of investigation was unnecessary. Claudio Martini issued a statement of claim, looking much like the original pleading prepared by McKenzie Lake in 2005. He did so within a few days of meeting with these plaintiffs.

[ 69 ] The factum of the moving parties suggests that any of the following simple steps could have been taken by these plaintiffs in 2006:

1. Asking Avtar Kooner, with whom they frequently spoke about the lawsuit, for a copy of the statement of claim in action number 05-CV-4810; speaking to any of their co-investors, who in fact were the plaintiffs in action number 05-CV-4810;

2. Performing a registry search of title to the property which they knew had been wrongfully transferred out of their hands; hiring a lawyer to perform such a search if they did not feel comfortable doing so;

3. Obtaining a copy of the statement of claim in action number 05-CV-4810 at the courthouse or from any of their co-investors;

4. Hiring a lawyer to obtain a copy of the statement of claim in action number 05-CV-4810, if they did not feel comfortable doing so themselves or speaking to their co-investors;

5. Speaking to solicitor Paramjeet Pabla who was not only a member of the same Sikh community to which these plaintiffs belong but was also the daughter-in-law of one of their co-investors;

6. Seeking legal advice from any lawyer with respect to their ability to recover their losses stemming from the wrongful transfer of their property.

[ 70 ] I agree with the proposition advanced by the moving parties.

[ 71 ] Ignorance of the law or of the legal consequences surrounding the inappropriate transfer and mortgage of the land do not postpone the running of the limitation period when the plaintiffs ought to have known of the constituent elements of the causes of action pleaded in this claim ( Peixeiro v. Haberman , 1997 325 (SCC) , [1997] 3 S.C.R. 549, at para. 18 ).

[ 72 ] The Hare decision of Roberts J. addressed some of the same issues that exist in this case. In Hare , there was a bitter family dispute arising from the transfer of a Muskoka property from the plaintiff’s mother to her brothers, thereby severing the joint tenancy between mother and daughter. The mother commenced an action against her sons in 2005 and settled it in June 2008. In November 2008, the plaintiff commenced her own action. Roberts J. found against the plaintiff and suggested that had she retained a lawyer to carry out a title search of the property, made inquiries of her mother and others, or perhaps obtained a copy of the public record that included her mother’s statement of claim, she could have discovered all the necessary material facts to support her claim well before November 2008. The findings in Hare have application here - Charan Sian and Pira Sian are in a similar position.

Conclusion

[ 73 ] It is appropriate for me at this point to consider the terms of s. 5 of the Limitations Act . The acts or omissions upon which this claim is based took place when the property in question was mortgaged in 2002 and conveyed in 2003. I find on all the evidence that the plaintiffs have rebutted the presumption contained in s. 5(2). However, for the reasons set out above, I find that a reasonable person with the plaintiffs’ abilities and in their circumstances ought to have known all the material facts necessary to bring this claim in 2006. Any cause of action against these moving parties therefore expired before May 4, 2009, when the present claim was issued.

[ 74 ] I conclude that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. I allow the defendants’ motions and dismiss the plaintiffs’ action against them.

Costs

[ 75 ] The parties have not yet been asked to address the costs of this motion and of the action. If counsel cannot resolve the issue of costs, I would expect brief written submissions from Mr. Greenaway and Mr. Godard within 30 days of the release of these reasons. Mr. Shulgan will have 30 days thereafter to respond and then the moving parties will have a further 10 days to reply if necessary. If I have not received submissions within 30 days of the release of these reasons, there will be no order as to costs.

Original signed “ Thomas J. ”

Bruce Thomas

Justice

Released: February 15, 2012

End Matter

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: Charan Sian, Pira Sian, Nirmal Kooner and Balbir Kooner Plaintiffs – and – Avtar Kooner, Arthur Weingarden, Raphael Partners LLP, Max Weingarden, Weingarden Investments Limited and 770137 Ontario Inc. Defendants REASONS ON RULE 20 MOTION Thomas J.

Released: February 15, 2012