Robert F. Goldstein

Wrigley Canada Inc. (moving party) sought an interim injunction and an inspection order under Rule 32 to conduct its own environmental testing on the adjacent property owned by Metrus Properties (responding party).

Metrus had sued Wrigley alleging contamination from Wrigley's property and had refused Wrigley access for testing, subsequently beginning excavation work.

The court granted the injunction and inspection order, finding that Wrigley had demonstrated a serious issue to be tried, would suffer irreparable harm if denied access to conduct independent testing before excavation altered the site, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the order, especially given Metrus's refusal of access and non-disclosure of excavation plans.

The plaintiff, Walsh Construction/Bondfield Partnership, brought a motion to refer its proceeding against Chartis Insurance Company of Canada to Master Albert, who was already hearing related construction lien matters concerning the same project.

The court considered whether the litigation between the general contractor and the performance bond issuer should be heard by the same Master to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent findings.

The motion was granted, finding significant overlap in factual and legal issues and no undue prejudice to the defendant.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant guarantor to collect on a commercial loan in default.

The defendant pleaded non est factum, arguing he signed a $1,000,000 personal guarantee without reading it, mistakenly believing his liability was limited to $500,000.

The court applied the three-part test for non est factum and found no genuine issue for trial, noting the defendant was careless in failing to read the document and there was no misrepresentation by the bank.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff.

The applicant insurer sought leave to appeal an arbitrator's preliminary ruling in a priority dispute.

The arbitrator had found that an ATV incident on private property constituted an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, making the applicant responsible for paying benefits.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the interpretation of 'accident' and 'automobile' under the legislation raised a question of law, and that the determination of this question would significantly affect the rights of the parties and resolve the mediation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the test for impairment and failed to consider evidence consistent with non-impairment.

The appellant had been pulled over for driving 138 km/h in a 90 km/h zone, had bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in assessing the evidence and that any degree of impairment is sufficient for a conviction.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, assault, unlawful confinement, and robbery involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused took all reasonable steps to determine the complainant's age, as she had actively deceived him and presented herself as older, leading to acquittals on the sexual offences.

However, based on surveillance video evidence, the court convicted the accused of assault, unlawful confinement, and robbery for an altercation outside his apartment.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to prove his counsel pressured him or acted incompetently.

The court concluded the appellant's claim was merely 'buyer's remorse' and that his counsel's advice to plead guilty was reasonable given the evidence and the favourable joint submission for a suspended sentence.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking after an undercover RCMP officer conducted a controlled delivery of a package from Tanzania.

The package, containing over a kilogram of heroin, was delivered to the accused's sister's apartment.

The accused had instructed his sister to sign for the package using a false name.

The court found that while actual knowledge of the heroin was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused was wilfully blind to the contents of the package, having admitted he suspected it contained drugs but deliberately choosing not to make further inquiries.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was arrested following a controlled delivery of a package containing heroin.

During a police interview, he made inculpatory statements.

On a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statements, the accused argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached and that police offered an inducement regarding leniency for his sister, rendering the confession involuntary.

The court found no Charter breach, as the accused spontaneously spoke upon arrest without being questioned.

The court also applied the Oickle framework and concluded that the police comments did not amount to a strong inducement or quid pro quo that overbore the accused's will.

The statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

The accused was charged with drug offences after two packages containing heroin were intercepted.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the accused was discharged on several counts, but the Crown preferred an indictment including charges related to both packages.

The accused brought an application to quash the count relating to the second package, arguing there was no evidence of knowledge or control.

The court granted the application, finding that the modus operandi of the two packages was not sufficiently similar to infer knowledge and control of the second package based on the first.

The accused, charged with a 1998 sexual assault identified via a 2014 DNA hit, brought a pre-trial motion under the Mills regime seeking production of the complainant's OHIP billing records, police occurrence reports, and particulars of her testimony in a prior unrelated sexual assault trial.

The court dismissed the requests for the OHIP and police records, finding them overly broad, irrelevant, and an unjustified intrusion into the complainant's privacy.

However, the court ordered the Crown to provide particulars of the time and place of the complainant's prior public testimony, as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information.

Following a Divisional Court decision remitting the matter back to the trial judge to determine damages, the court issued a scheduling endorsement.

The endorsement sets out a timetable for the exchange of valuation reports and directs the parties to schedule a date for the damages re-hearing once the reports are exchanged.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from admitted sexual intercourse with a complainant under 16.

The court found the complainant's evidence on non-consent insufficiently credible and reliable to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt under the W.(D.) framework.

However, the court held that the statutory defence of honest but mistaken belief in age was unavailable because the accused failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain age, having relied only on the complainant's statement that she was 18 despite multiple warning signs.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's claim for post-104 Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) was statute-barred because it had not been mediated and the mediation had not failed.

The court found that the issue of post-104 IRBs was before the mediator and was not resolved, meaning the mediation failed within the meaning of the Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the insurer's motion for partial summary judgment, allowing the plaintiff's claim to proceed.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment when the Crown disclosed a photograph of the complainant's injuries on the day of trial.

The summary conviction appeal judge found that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion, as the appellant could not articulate how the late disclosure prejudiced his ability to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a former director at a charity, was charged with fraud after it was discovered he had requisitioned over $115,000 in payments to two companies he secretly controlled.

The accused claimed the companies were used to pay subcontractors in cash to save the charity money, and that the executive director approved the scheme.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as a fabrication, finding that the companies did no legitimate work, the accused forged the executive director's signature on contracts, and the scheme was a simple case of employee theft.

The accused was found guilty of fraud.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his apartment, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) was insufficient.

The warrant was based on a tip from a confidential informant who had purchased crack cocaine from the accused.

Applying the Debot test, the court found the informant's information was highly compelling and sufficiently corroborated by police surveillance, compensating for weaknesses in the informant's inherent credibility.

The court concluded there was a solid basis for the justice of the peace to issue the warrant and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and robbery, sought a bail review after being detained by a justice of the peace.

He argued the justice of the peace erred in law and that a new plan of release constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court found no procedural unfairness or error of law in the initial hearing, noting the strong Crown case on the tertiary ground.

The court also rejected the new plan of release, finding the proposed sureties unsuitable due to evasiveness and inability to properly supervise the accused.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

On a summary conviction appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, new Crown counsel sought an adjournment in order to cross‑examine the appellant on his fresh evidence affidavit, reversing the position taken by prior Crown counsel who had indicated cross‑examination would not occur.

The appellant opposed the adjournment and argued that the Crown had given an undertaking not to cross‑examine, and that costs should be awarded if an adjournment were granted.

The court held that the earlier Crown communication did not amount to a solicitor’s undertaking and that prosecutors retain discretion to revisit tactical decisions unless doing so constitutes abuse of process or causes real prejudice.

The court further held that an adjournment did not create substantial prejudice and that the circumstances did not justify the rare remedy of costs against the Crown.

The adjournment was granted and costs were refused.

The accused sought a bail review after a justice of the peace ordered detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds in relation to multiple alleged sexual assaults and robberies against sex workers.

The applicant argued that the justice of the peace erred by undermining the presumption of innocence and misapplying the tertiary ground, and that new evidence regarding GPS or RF ankle monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court held that the justice of the peace properly applied the presumption of innocence and was entitled to comment on the strength of the Crown’s case.

Applying the principles from St-Cloud, the court found no error in the tertiary ground analysis and concluded that the proposed electronic monitoring did not constitute a material change affecting the detention decision.

The bail review was dismissed.