Peter Rosenthal

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board.

The Board had directed the Inquiry, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) to reconsider whether the applicant breached s. 7 of the Advertising Regulation regarding steering.

The Divisional Court found that the Board unreasonably focused on only one of the ICRC's reasons for deferring consideration of s. 7, ignoring the ICRC's valid conclusion that a caution for other advertising breaches was a sufficient disposition.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the Board's direction was set aside.

Following a divided outcome on an application regarding taxi licensing by-laws, the intervenor, Taxiworkers Association of Ontario, sought costs against the applicant.

The court denied costs for the intervention and injunction motions because the intervenor was not a necessary party and participated on its own initiative.

However, the court awarded the intervenor $2,500 in costs for the main application, recognizing that its evidence was critical to the court's determination of the notice issue.

The applicant challenged municipal resolutions and by-law amendments implementing a new one-tier taxi licensing regime, alleging lack of notice, breach of the City's procedural by-law, and bad faith.

The court held that City Council was acting legislatively, not administratively, so no common law duty of procedural fairness applied.

The court further held that Council could consider the referred recommendations and that adequate notice had been given for the general TTL reforms, but not for the newly introduced mandatory 2024 deadline requiring all licences to convert.

That notice failure was a substantive breach going to the root of validity, so only the mandatory conversion deadline was quashed; the remainder of the regime was upheld and the bad faith claim failed.

The appellants brought an application alleging that the federal and provincial governments violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to implement effective strategies to reduce homelessness and inadequate housing.

The respondents successfully moved to strike the application on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was not justiciable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application raised political rather than legal issues, lacked a judicially discoverable and manageable standard, and was therefore not justiciable.

Permanent resident applicants challenged the citizenship oath requirement to swear allegiance to the Queen, alleging infringements of freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and religion, and equality rights under the Charter.

The court held that, purposively interpreted, the oath is not allegiance to the Queen in her personal capacity but a symbolic commitment to Canada's form of government and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

Applying the Irwin Toy framework, the court concluded there was no infringement of s. 2(b), and in the alternative any infringement would be justified under s. 1.

The court also held that the oath is secular and does not violate s. 2(a), and that the equality claim failed because it was premised on a mistaken understanding of the oath's meaning.

Appeal dismissed and cross-appeal allowed.

The applicant, a First Nations constable, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal decision dismissing his complaint that his suspension and termination by the OPP Commissioner were discriminatory and acts of reprisal.

The applicant had been terminated after making public comments criticizing the OPP.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's findings that the exclusion of First Nations constables from the procedural protections of the Police Services Act was not discriminatory, but rather respected First Nations self-government.

The Court also upheld the finding that the termination was not a reprisal under the Human Rights Code, as the applicant's public comments were not an assertion of human rights.

A related application by the First Nation Council alleging a denial of natural justice was also dismissed.

Permanent residents seeking Canadian citizenship challenged the constitutionality of the statutory citizenship oath requiring allegiance to the Queen under the Citizenship Act.

The applicants alleged that the oath infringed freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and equality rights under ss. 2(a), 2(b), and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court held that the oath constitutes compelled expression and therefore prima facie infringes s. 2(b), but concluded the infringement is justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit because the oath symbolizes commitment to Canada’s constitutional structure and rule of law.

The court further held that the oath does not violate freedom of religion or equality rights, emphasizing its secular and universal nature and the absence of discriminatory purpose or effect.

The applicants brought an application alleging that the provincial and federal governments breached ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter by making decisions and implementing program changes which eroded access to affordable housing.

The respondents brought motions to dismiss the application on the grounds that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and that the issues raised were not justiciable.

The court granted the motions and dismissed the application, finding that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to provide affordable housing, and the impugned decisions did not deny the applicants a benefit given to others under s. 15.

The court also held that the issues raised were not justiciable as they involved broad policy choices.

The plaintiff brought a motion for civil contempt against the respondent for his participation as a spokesperson in a railway blockade, in defiance of an injunction.

The respondent admitted knowledge of the order and his continued participation, leading to a finding of contempt.

In determining the appropriate sanction, the court declined to issue a continuing restraining order, noting the respondent had helped dismantle the blockade.

Applying principles for aboriginal contemnors and costs rules, the court ordered the respondent to pay costs of $16,584.87 to the plaintiff.

The alleged contemnor, Ron Plain, brought a motion for extensive disclosure in a civil contempt proceeding arising from a railway blockade.

He sought the disclosure to mount a novel Charter challenge and collateral attack against the underlying injunction.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that a collateral attack on a valid court order is not permitted in contempt proceedings.

Furthermore, applying a contextual approach to civil contempt, the court found that the extensive disclosure sought was not necessary, particularly given that the applicant sought only costs as a sanction.

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Canadian citizenship oath under s. 24 of the Citizenship Act, alleging it infringed rights under ss. 2 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by compelling allegiance to the monarch.

After certification of the proposed class proceeding was denied and appeals were dismissed, the plaintiffs sought an order under s. 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to continue the matter as an individual proceeding.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court held that although the litigation had progressed slowly, the delay was not intentional, contumelious, or such as to create a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The motion to dismiss for delay was denied and the plaintiffs were permitted to continue the action individually seeking declaratory relief.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiffs, family members of a young man fatally shot by police, sued the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) for negligent investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The motion judge and Divisional Court allowed the claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck the claim, holding that it was plain and obvious that the SIU does not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime or their families.

The SIU's statutory duty is owed to the public at large, and recognizing a private duty would conflict with its overarching public mandate.

The plaintiffs, family members of a young man shot and killed by police, brought an action against the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) alleging negligent investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claim under Rule 21, arguing the SIU owed no private law duty of care to the family.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was not plain and obvious the claim would fail.

The Divisional Court dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the existence of a duty of care in these circumstances is a novel question of law that should be determined on a full evidentiary record at trial, applying the Anns/Cooper test.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for negligent investigation against the Special Investigations Unit (SIU).

The plaintiffs, family members of a youth killed in a police shooting, alleged the SIU's inadequate investigation compromised their participation in an inquest and civil action.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding conflicting jurisprudence on whether police or the SIU owe a private law duty of care to victims' families, and noting the issue is of general importance to the development of the law.

The appellants applied for admission to a Master's program but were denied because they could not comply with the department's funding policy, which required a portion of external funding to come from the supervising professor's research grants.

The appellants sought judicial review, arguing the policy was an admission standard requiring Senate approval and that its application was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the funding policy was a reasonable administrative supplement to minimum admission requirements, not an admission standard, and that the university's discretionary decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of s. 435.01(1) of the Canada Elections Act, which restricts direct public financing to political parties that obtain at least 2% of the national vote or 5% of the vote in constituencies where they run candidates.

The application judge found the thresholds violated ss. 3 and 15 of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the thresholds violate s. 3 by exacerbating disparities in the capacity of smaller parties to communicate, the infringement is justified under s. 1 as a measure to preserve the integrity of the electoral process and prevent the misuse of public funds.

The Court also found no violation of ss. 15, 2(b), or 2(d), and held that political parties lack standing to sue in their own names outside of proceedings under the Act.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' request for judicial review of a decision denying them admission to a master's program, the successful university sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court weighed the factors under Rule 57, noting the complexity of the issues, the unfounded allegations of bias, and the applicants' failure to mitigate.

The court awarded the university partial indemnity costs fixed at $15,000 for fees and $8,665.31 for disbursements, payable equally by the three applicants.

A dissenting judge would have awarded a lower quantum of costs with an extended time to pay.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $10,000 in damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligent investigation.

The respondent had been arrested for allegedly breaching a bail condition by speaking at a public demonstration.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by inappropriately using hindsight and conflating the test for negligence with the objective test for reasonable grounds for arrest.

The court held that the arresting officers had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the respondent based on the information available to them at the time, and therefore met the standard of care.

The applicants sought judicial review of Laurentian University's decision to deny them admission to graduate studies.

The Divisional Court held that the decision was discretionary and did not attract certiorari or mandamus.

Applying the factors from Khan v. University of Ottawa, the court found that only minimal procedural fairness was required in this context.

The court concluded there was no flagrant violation of the rules of natural justice and dismissed the application, rejecting allegations of bias or retaliation.