Peter Rosenthal

The appellants applied for admission to a Master's program but were denied because they could not comply with the department's funding policy, which required a portion of external funding to come from the supervising professor's research grants.

The appellants sought judicial review, arguing the policy was an admission standard requiring Senate approval and that its application was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the funding policy was a reasonable administrative supplement to minimum admission requirements, not an admission standard, and that the university's discretionary decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of s. 435.01(1) of the Canada Elections Act, which restricts direct public financing to political parties that obtain at least 2% of the national vote or 5% of the vote in constituencies where they run candidates.

The application judge found the thresholds violated ss. 3 and 15 of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the thresholds violate s. 3 by exacerbating disparities in the capacity of smaller parties to communicate, the infringement is justified under s. 1 as a measure to preserve the integrity of the electoral process and prevent the misuse of public funds.

The Court also found no violation of ss. 15, 2(b), or 2(d), and held that political parties lack standing to sue in their own names outside of proceedings under the Act.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' request for judicial review of a decision denying them admission to a master's program, the successful university sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court weighed the factors under Rule 57, noting the complexity of the issues, the unfounded allegations of bias, and the applicants' failure to mitigate.

The court awarded the university partial indemnity costs fixed at $15,000 for fees and $8,665.31 for disbursements, payable equally by the three applicants.

A dissenting judge would have awarded a lower quantum of costs with an extended time to pay.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $10,000 in damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligent investigation.

The respondent had been arrested for allegedly breaching a bail condition by speaking at a public demonstration.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by inappropriately using hindsight and conflating the test for negligence with the objective test for reasonable grounds for arrest.

The court held that the arresting officers had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the respondent based on the information available to them at the time, and therefore met the standard of care.

The applicants sought judicial review of Laurentian University's decision to deny them admission to graduate studies.

The Divisional Court held that the decision was discretionary and did not attract certiorari or mandamus.

Applying the factors from Khan v. University of Ottawa, the court found that only minimal procedural fairness was required in this context.

The court concluded there was no flagrant violation of the rules of natural justice and dismissed the application, rejecting allegations of bias or retaliation.

The applicant sought a stay of a Board order revoking its liquor licence pending an appeal.

The Board had revoked the licence after finding the applicant allowed drug sales and drunkenness on the premises.

The applicant argued it should have been allowed to introduce fresh evidence at the Board hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the applicant failed to meet the three-part RJR-MacDonald test, particularly failing to establish irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario proposed to revoke the liquor licence of the Cabbagetown Restaurant & Bar.

The Board heard evidence from police, local residents, and community representatives regarding rampant drug trafficking, public intoxication, and disorderly conduct at the premises.

The Board found that the licensee permitted drug sales and drunkenness, failed to retain liquor purchase records, and that the continuation of the licence was contrary to the public interest.

The liquor licence was revoked immediately.

The Attorney General brought a motion to stay a Superior Court judgment that declared the threshold requirements for political parties to receive quarterly allowances under the Canada Elections Act unconstitutional and read in a one-vote threshold.

The Attorney General argued the prospective payment order was automatically stayed as an order for the payment of money, or alternatively, that a stay should be granted under the tripartite test.

The Court of Appeal held the prospective order was not an order for the payment of money.

However, applying the test for a stay pending appeal, the Court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the potential politicization of the Chief Electoral Officer, irreparable harm to the public interest, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The licensee brought a motion to reopen the hearing to introduce fresh evidence, including five new witnesses and a petition, regarding the public interest aspect of a proposal to revoke its liquor licence.

The Board applied the two-part test from Sagaz and dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed evidence would not change the outcome of the hearing and could have been obtained prior to the hearing with reasonable diligence.

The appellants were convicted of offences under the Safe Streets Act and the Highway Traffic Act for squeegeeing and soliciting money from drivers of stopped vehicles on roadways.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the legislation was unconstitutional because it was ultra vires the province as criminal law, and that it violated their rights under sections 2(b), 7, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial power to regulate roadways.

While the provisions infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b), the infringement was justified under section 1.

The court also found no violations of sections 7 or 15.

The appellant, a university student, was suspended by the President of York University for alleged misconduct without a hearing.

The appellant sued the President and the University, pleading misfeasance in a public office.

The defendants successfully moved to strike the claim on the basis that the President was not a public officer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was not plain and obvious that the tort of misfeasance in a public office is restricted to public officers subject to the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and the claim was permitted to proceed.

The applicant, a university student, sought judicial review of the university president's decision to suspend him for three years for participating in unauthorized demonstrations.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application, arguing that a newly scheduled university discipline tribunal hearing provided an adequate alternative remedy.

The applicant brought a cross-motion to stay the tribunal hearing pending the judicial review.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, finding the tribunal was not an adequate alternative remedy due to jurisdictional questions and a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the only appeal would be to the president herself.

The court granted the cross-motion to stay the tribunal hearing, applying the RJR-Macdonald test for interlocutory injunctions.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Canada Elections Act requirement that a political party must nominate candidates in at least 50 electoral districts to obtain registered party status and its associated benefits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 50-candidate threshold violates the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process guaranteed by section 3 of the Charter.

The Court found that the threshold diminishes the capacity of marginal or regional parties to communicate their ideas, thereby undermining the right of citizens to play a meaningful role in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter, and the relevant provisions were declared unconstitutional.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment declaring unconstitutional aspects of the federal political party registration regime.

The court held that the requirement that a political party nominate 50 candidates before qualifying for registered party status did not infringe the right to seek election under s. 3 of the Charter because Parliament could distinguish between parties based on meaningful participation in the electoral process.

However, the court held that provisions preventing candidates of non-registered or deregistered parties from listing party affiliation on the ballot infringed the informational component of the right to vote under s. 3 and were not minimally impairing under s. 1.

The appeal was allowed in part, the broader registration ruling was set aside, and a limited declaration of invalidity regarding ballot identification was issued and suspended for six months.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which had overturned a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the Court of Appeal that the delay was not occasioned by a scarcity of judicial resources and did not warrant a stay.