Peter J. Osborne

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for arson, appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention at a psychiatric hospital.

The Board found that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety due to his schizophrenia, ongoing substance abuse, and history of relapses leading to acute psychosis and violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable, internally coherent, and well-supported by the psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment declaring the respondent the sole beneficial owner of a residential property and ordering its transfer, along with general and punitive damages.

The trial judge found the appellant held the property in trust for the respondent, her niece, who paid the deposit and carrying costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation of the trust documents or her rejection of the appellant's illegality defence.

The punitive damages award was upheld as the appellant's high-handed conduct, including failing to pay property taxes and maintain insurance, merited sanction.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) for criminal harassment.

She argued the trial judge made several procedural errors, including improperly raising the NCR issue, extending the assessment period beyond statutory limits, terminating her cross-examination of the assessing psychiatrist, and refusing to allow a psychologist to testify.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence of the psychologist's report but dismissed the appeal.

The Court found the trial judge properly assisted the self-represented appellant and had ample grounds to order the assessment.

While the trial judge erred in extending the assessment beyond 60 days and in refusing to let the psychologist testify, these errors were cured by the proviso as the appellant suffered no prejudice and the trial judge was entitled to prefer the psychiatrist's opinion.

The appellant, a former lawyer, sued the respondent banks for freezing his accounts after he was charged with money laundering and fraud.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action and awarded $225,000 in substantial indemnity costs against the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial despite the respondents' delay in bringing the motion.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award, reducing it to $175,000 on the basis that the unaccepted settlement offer should not have elevated costs incurred prior to the offer being made.

The respondent suffered injuries after slipping and falling on ice in a parking lot while reaching for his vehicle's door handle.

He received statutory accident benefits (SABs) after a LAT adjudicator found the incident was an 'accident' under the SABs Schedule.

He subsequently sued the parking lot owner and winter maintenance provider for occupiers' liability.

The appellants moved to determine whether any damages awarded must be reduced by the SABs received under s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act, and whether OHIP's subrogated claim was barred under s. 30(5) of the Health Insurance Act.

The motion judge found the tort claim did not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile, meaning the statutory deductions and subrogation bars did not apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's substantive approach or her conclusion that the context and purpose of the LAT proceeding differed from the tort action, precluding abuse of process or issue estoppel.

Following the release of its reasons allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal directed the parties to agree on the quantum of trial costs payable to the successful appellant.

The parties agreed on the amount, and the court ordered the respondent to pay the appellant trial costs in the agreed-upon sum of $250,000, all inclusive.

The appellants challenged a municipal by-law regulating short-term rental accommodations (STRs) in the Township of Tiny, arguing it was ultra vires the municipality's business licensing powers and effectively prohibited STRs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the by-law was a valid exercise of the Township's broad statutory authority to license businesses and regulate matters affecting the economic, social, and environmental well-being of the municipality.

The court held that the by-law's restrictions, including a cap on the number of licenses and the total days an STR could be rented, were rationally connected to legitimate municipal objectives and did not amount to an outright prohibition.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) framework, improperly found he fabricated evidence without independent proof, and wrongly drew a negative inference based on a non-existent breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself on the burden of proof, did not use the finding of untruthfulness as circumstantial evidence of guilt, and reasonably assessed the appellant's credibility based on embellishments during cross-examination.

The appellant sought an order to prevent police from continuing to examine electronic devices seized under search warrants, pending an appeal of a decision dismissing an application for certiorari to quash the warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, as certiorari is discretionary and exceptional in ongoing investigations.

The court also found no irreparable harm, as remedies remain available on appeal or at trial, and the balance of convenience favoured allowing the investigation to continue.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of child sexual abuse and exploitation material and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, he sought a conditional sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing his mental health issues, treating the involvement of children as an aggravating factor, and evaluating his risk of reoffending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's application of sentencing principles or her conclusion that the appellant's mental health issues were not operative at the time of the offence.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and imposed a conditional sentence, finding the sentencing judge failed to properly account for the appellant's serious mental illness.

Following a judgment allowing the plaintiffs' action, the parties made written submissions on costs and prejudgment interest.

The parties settled the issue of costs for $6,680,632.45.

On the issue of prejudgment interest, the court determined the start dates for the calculation of interest for each plaintiff.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to average the interest rate or to award compound interest, finding no unusual or special circumstances to justify departing from the presumptive statutory scheme.

The court also declined to reduce the period for calculating interest based on the plaintiffs' conduct.

The appellant landlord appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent tenant damages for overpayment of rent, common area maintenance (CAM) charges, and the cost of replacing a roof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the commercial lease.

The court upheld the findings that the lease unambiguously required the landlord to replace the roof, that the tenant's calculation of additional rent during renewal periods was correct, and that the landlord's claim for historical CAM charges was statute-barred because a party cannot indefinitely toll a limitation period by delaying the issuance of invoices.

The appellant's employee drove a crop sprayer across a private bridge on the respondent's farm.

The bridge collapsed because the outer three feet on either side were unsupported by steel beams, a hidden danger of which the driver was not warned.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the driver's failure to stay centered caused the accident and the lack of warning was not a factual or legal cause.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by conflating causation with the standard of care and by defining the duty to warn too narrowly.

The respondent breached its duty under s. 3(1) of the Occupiers' Liability Act by failing to warn of the hidden danger, which was both a factual and reasonably foreseeable legal cause of the accident.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting the respondent a shortfall of $58,067.48 following the sale of a property under power of sale.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in determining the sale price by 'rectifying' a Land Transfer Tax statement contrary to the Land Titles Act and reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge did not rectify the document but simply weighed the evidence to determine the actual consideration received, and that s. 78(4) of the Land Titles Act did not apply.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal of an order enforcing a settlement agreement in a construction lien dispute.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 71(1) of the Construction Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The Court declined to traverse the appeal to the Divisional Court because the responding parties had failed to oppose the confirmation of the associate judge's report, meaning they must first seek leave in the Superior Court to extend the time to file a motion in opposition.

The motion to quash was granted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for four counts of sexual assault and his 11-year sentence.

He argued that expert evidence on the neurobiology of trauma was improperly admitted and that similar fact evidence was erroneously used across counts.

The Court of Appeal found that while the expert evidence was admitted in error, the error was harmless due to robust jury instructions, applying the curative proviso.

The court also upheld the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding the appellant's deteriorating health was dismissed, as it would not have altered the proportionate sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant developer sued the respondent resident for defamation, economic torts, and trespass after the respondent publicly opposed a mall redevelopment and complained to the city about safety and bylaw issues.

The respondent successfully moved to dismiss the action as a SLAPP under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, and was awarded $25,000 in damages and full indemnity costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and damages award, finding the action was inextricably linked to the respondent's public expression and lacked substantial merit.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs, finding the motion judge erred by pre-determining the costs scale, and reduced the costs award from $156,394.54 to $75,000.

The corporate appellant defaulted on a Canada Small Business Financing Loan and the individual appellant was found liable as guarantor on a summary judgment motion.

On appeal, the appellants argued the action was statute-barred, improperly served, procedurally unfair, and that the bank breached obligations by not disbursing the full loan amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors by the motion judge in concluding the loan was in default, the guarantee was enforceable, and the bank owed no duty of care to disburse the full amount.

The appellant was convicted of arson and unlawfully producing cannabis resin after a fire broke out in his mother's basement.

The Crown's expert testified the fire was caused by the ignition of butane vapours from the production of butane honey oil.

The appellant appealed, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer failed to seek legal aid funding to call a competing fire expert who had concluded the fire was caused by a faulty extension cord.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge had considered the competing expert's report and correctly concluded it was flawed and would not have affected the verdict, as it focused only on the ignition source and ignored the fuel source.

The appellant appealed her nine-year sentence for historic sexual offences against a young child, arguing the sentencing judge double-counted probation breaches, failed to consider her Indigenous background, and imposed overly broad prohibition orders.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's Indigenous heritage but found it would not have altered the sentence, as her moral blameworthiness was not impacted and her difficult upbringing was already considered.

The court upheld the global sentence, the section 161(1)(a) order, and the mandatory lifetime weapons prohibition under section 109(3).

The appeal was allowed only to set aside a section 161(1)(c) order on Crown concession.