Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused was charged with two counts of assault and one count of threatening death arising from incidents in January 2017 involving his then-wife.

The Crown alleged that during an argument over the complainant's infidelity, the defendant grabbed the complainant by the neck on one occasion and by the arm on another, causing a bruise, and threatened to kill her male friend from Trinidad.

The defendant denied the allegations, claiming he only touched the complainant's shoulder lightly and snatched her phone.

The court found the complainant generally credible and her daughter to be the most reliable witness.

The court convicted on one count of assault causing the bruise but dismissed the remaining counts due to lack of corroboration and uncertainty regarding the other allegations.

The defendant was charged with a single count of assault against his former domestic partner.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant, her son, and the defendant, along with photographic evidence.

The central issue was credibility.

The court found the complainant's evidence compelling and credible regarding how she sustained injuries to her face, neck, arm, and knee.

The defendant's explanation of the injuries was rejected as implausible and inconsistent.

The court found the defendant guilty of assault, determining he applied force without consent and without lawful justification or self-defence.

The applicant sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual assault, arguing that the plea was not voluntary, not unequivocal, not informed, and that he did not understand the legal consequences.

The applicant claimed he believed he was pleading to a lesser charge related to photographs rather than sexual assault itself.

The court rejected the application, finding that the applicant was fully informed of the charge, the Crown's evidence, and the consequences of his plea.

The court found the applicant's evidence lacked credibility and was contradicted by written instructions, the preliminary hearing record, and the applicant's own conduct in court.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault for forcing the victim to perform oral sex in an apartment building stairwell.

The Crown sought a sentence of 20-26 months, while the defence sought time served (12 months).

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, exceeding the Crown's recommendation due to the gravity of the offence, the violent nature of the assault, the offender's prior sexual assault conviction, and the need for denunciation and specific deterrence.

The court rejected the distinction between oral and vaginal penetration as a determinative sentencing factor.

The accused applied for disclosure of third-party records held by a shelter and Children's Aid Services.

The court addressed two main issues: (1) disclosure of Children's Aid records, which was resolved by consent of all parties; and (2) disclosure of counselling records from the Yellow Brick House shelter.

The court applied the O'Connor test and considered solicitor-client privilege.

The court rejected the defence argument that the "innocence at stake" exception to solicitor-client privilege applied, finding that speculation about potential contradictory statements was insufficient to overcome the stringent test.

The court ordered partial disclosure of specific portions of the shelter records relating to the mother while protecting the child's privacy and privileged communications.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The trial addressed two Charter issues: whether the police breached the accused's rights under section 10(b) by failing to provide an interpreter or Polish-speaking officer, and whether the police breached section 8 rights by making an illegal demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the accused demonstrated sufficient understanding of English and his rights to counsel.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 8 rights because the officer failed to provide direct evidence of forming a reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body while driving, as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

Following a domestic incident call and traffic stop, police conducted a roadside approved screening device test which resulted in a fail.

The accused was arrested and provided two breath samples at the detachment with readings of 100 mg and 90 mg.

The defence challenged the admission of the certificate of analysis on multiple Charter and non-Charter grounds, including the timing of the roadside demand, the legality of the warrantless search and seizure, the proper operation of the intoxilyzer, and the availability of remedies under sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found no Charter violations and admitted the evidence, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter based on insufficient grounds for arrest and the arbitrariness of the arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired operation and should have instead demanded an approved screening device.

The court excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding the impairment charge based on the limited objective evidence.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a RIDE checkpoint stop on November 8, 2013.

The defendant sought to contact counsel of choice (Shauna Pemberton) but was unable to reach her.

Police made reasonable efforts to contact her, left a message, waited approximately 29 minutes, and then offered duty counsel.

The defendant spoke with duty counsel and subsequently provided breath samples registering 106 and 101.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results, arguing his right to counsel was infringed.

The court found no breach of Charter rights and admitted the evidence.

The defendant brought a Charter application seeking to stay impaired driving and over 80 charges on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that his right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed.

The institutional delay of between 8 months 5 days and 10 months 11 days was found to be reasonable in all the circumstances.

The court found that the defendant declined multiple earlier trial dates offered by the Crown and failed to demonstrate genuine prejudice from the delay.

The accused was tried on charges of assaulting his former spouse on October 16, 2014, and causing unnecessary pain to a family dog by punching and kicking it on October 25, 2014.

The Crown relied on the testimony of the complainant and her mother, while the accused testified in his own defence and denied both allegations.

The court applied the credibility assessment framework from R. v. W.(D.) and found that the accused's evidence, while not necessarily believed, raised a reasonable doubt regarding both charges.

The court considered the timing of the police complaint, which occurred shortly after the accused retained counsel to assert his rights in a custody and access dispute, and noted the lack of impartiality of the complainant's mother, who had been involved in drafting a separation agreement favourable to the complainant.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a suitable sample into an approved instrument following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown alleged the accused deliberately failed to provide a proper breath sample during approximately 10 attempts over 12 minutes at the police station.

The accused testified she was genuinely attempting to provide a sample.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to refuse to provide a suitable sample, as the video evidence (without audio) was not conclusive and the accused's testimony raised a reasonable doubt.

The applicant was charged with having a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration while having care and control of a motor vehicle.

He was arrested on September 28, 2013, with trial initially scheduled for December 11, 2014.

The trial was adjourned due to Crown failure to disclose the correct breath room videotape, and rescheduled to June 2, 2015.

The applicant brought a Charter application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) claiming the delay infringed his right to be tried without unreasonable delay.

The court found that the Crown's conduct was responsible for the adjournment and the subsequent delay, resulting in approximately 19.5 months of total delay, which exceeded the Morin guidelines.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed her speeding conviction from May 29, 2014, on grounds of unreasonable delay affecting her right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The original conviction was registered on January 31, 2011, followed by an appeal and new trial.

The appellant argued that delays in obtaining trial transcripts and the timing of the appeal process constituted unreasonable delay.

The court found that the delay issue had been previously addressed in the first appeal before Justice Mocha, and that the facts regarding the delay were not clearly established.

The court also rejected allegations of misdirection, bias, and misapplication of stare decisis.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant drove his vehicle through a clearly marked emergency scene on the Queen Elizabeth Way, squeezing between pylons and a fire truck to enter the restricted area where emergency services were attending to a motor vehicle collision.

The trial justice found the appellant drove without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway.

On appeal, the court upheld the conviction, finding the trial justice's decision reasonable and that the appellant's conduct fell below the standard of what a reasonable person would do in those circumstances and was worthy of punishment.

The defendant was charged with four offences arising from an incident on October 19, 2013: assault causing bodily harm, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, carrying a concealed weapon, and being unlawfully in a dwelling-house.

The Crown and defence agreed to a directed verdict of acquittal on the weapon charges.

At trial, the court found the defendant guilty of unlawfully entering a dwelling-house with intent to commit an indictable offence (mischief), but acquitted him of assault causing bodily harm due to insufficient evidence regarding how the complainant's arm was cut.

The accused was charged with possessing 2 grams of marijuana contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, allegedly discovered during a strip search at a detention centre.

The accused challenged the legality of the search under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the strip search was unauthorized and based on insufficient grounds, constituting a serious breach of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendants were convicted of willfully evading compliance with the Retail Sales Tax Act by failing to collect, report, and remit retail sales tax totalling $240,866.42 over 54 reporting periods from August 1, 2004 to February 23, 2009.

The individual defendant, Eugena Hayward, was the sole director and operating mind of the corporate defendant.

The court found that the defendants had collected retail sales tax in trust for Ontario but failed to remit it, instead using the funds for personal benefit including dividend payments of $341,000 to Hayward.

The court imposed a custodial sentence and substantial fine on the individual defendant, reflecting the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered whether it had jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim release under section 523(2)(b) of the Criminal Code after the accused had been committed to stand trial and an indictment had been filed with the Superior Court of Justice.

The court held that jurisdiction over interim release transfers to the Superior Court of Justice upon the filing of the indictment, and that the Ontario Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to hear the application once the matter is before the Superior Court.

The defendant corporation brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of section 11(d) rights based on an alleged promise by a Ministry of Labour inspector not to prosecute.

The defendant claimed the inspector's assurance, followed by the laying of charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, constituted an abuse of process.

The court found that the defendant failed to establish a clear agreement or deal with the inspector, that the inspector's conduct did not rise to the level of abuse of process, and that no Charter breach occurred.

The motion was dismissed in its entirety.