Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the mens rea required for attempted murder by wrongly attributing the actions of other shooters to him, and that the verdicts on four of the five convictions were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's specific intent.

The court held that the evidence amply supported the findings that this was a pre-planned, deliberate attack by shooters working in concert, and that the only reasonable inference was that all shooters had the specific intent to kill the victims.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge erred in her analysis of circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied the analytical framework by examining evidence in a piecemeal fashion, scrutinizing individual pieces against a reasonable doubt standard, and requiring the Crown to negate speculative inferences.

The court held that the trial judge failed to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence as a whole and that alternative inferences inconsistent with guilt must be reasonable, not merely speculative.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order for extradition to the United States, arguing violations of Charter sections 6 (right to remain in Canada) and 7 (fundamental justice due to sentencing disparity), and that the surrender would be unjust or oppressive under the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was reasonable, had properly considered the Cotroni factors, and that the potential sentencing disparity did not meet the high threshold of "shocking the conscience" required to violate section 7 or render the surrender unjust or oppressive.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl, raising three grounds: a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel, an unlawful search of a co-accused's cellphone under s. 8, and a misapplication of the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant repeatedly waived his right to counsel until 1:30 a.m., and that the subsequent breach was minor.

The court declined to consider the s. 8 claim due to an inadequate evidentiary record, as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Finally, the court found the circumstantial case for trafficking was strong and the trial judge's reasons were unassailable.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code pending his re-trial on terrorism charges.

Before the terms of release were finalized, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the applicant's convictions, resulting in him serving a life sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 680 application as moot, noting that any future application for release must be brought under s. 679 for bail pending appeal.

A publication ban under s. 517 was also lifted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, mischief, and sexual assault against his former domestic partner.

The complainant had recanted her allegations prior to trial and testified for the Crown, adopting her recantation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in finding the actus reus of sexual assault was proven based on the complainant's initial statement to police.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) principles, his assessment of the complainant's motive to fabricate, or his decision to allow the Crown latitude in cross-examining the complainant on her prior statement.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for breach of probation, appealed a Review Board decision continuing his conditional discharge and denying an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued there was no evidence he continued to pose a significant risk to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence that the appellant lacked insight, was likely to discontinue medication, and would experience worsening persecutory delusions leading to a risk of criminal behaviour.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for home invasion offences and attempting to obstruct justice.

The respondent had been sentenced to eight and one-half years for the home invasion and six months consecutive for attempting to obstruct justice by passing a note to a co-accused.

The Court of Appeal upheld the home invasion sentence, finding it lenient but not demonstrably unfit.

However, the court found the six-month sentence for attempting to obstruct justice to be demonstrably unfit and increased it to two and one-half years consecutive, emphasizing that interfering with a witness normally warrants a penitentiary term.

The appellant appealed his conviction and six-month sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting the legally blind complainant's video recorded statement as her evidence-in-chief under s. 715.2 of the Criminal Code, and in excluding evidence of prior sexual history under s. 276.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or application of the W.(D.) principles, and upheld the sentence and mandatory sex offender registry order.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code after being denied Legal Aid.

The court found that the applicant had at least one arguable ground of appeal regarding after-the-fact conduct instructions and lacked the ability to advance the complex appeal unrepresented.

The court also accepted that the applicant lacked sufficient financial means, finding his prior transfer of matrimonial home proceeds into trust for his children was reasonable.

The application was granted and counsel was appointed.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, sought a review of his detention order under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code.

The detention order had been upheld by the trial judge under s. 523(2)(a) before a mistrial was declared due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown challenged the court's jurisdiction to hear the review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that s. 680(1) does not confer jurisdiction to review a bail decision made by a trial judge under s. 523(2)(a).

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with an offensive weapon, arguing that the trial judge engaged in uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no indication that the trial judge applied different standards in assessing the credibility of the appellant and the complainant.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and entitled to deference.

The appellant was convicted of child luring after communicating online with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The trial judge relied on the statutory presumption of belief in age and the appellant's failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain the interlocutor's age.

On appeal, the court applied the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Morrison, which struck down the presumption of belief in age as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reliance on the unconstitutional presumption and the failure to take reasonable steps to establish the essential element of belief was a reversible error.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and conditional stays were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on multiple charges, including break and enter, which resulted from a trial judge's decision to quash a DNA warrant and exclude the resulting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found insufficient grounds to link the respondent to the crimes.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapplied the standard of review for warrants by substituting his own view rather than assessing whether the issuing judge could reasonably have found reasonable grounds.

The Court found sufficient evidence, including a fingerprint in a stolen truck linked by DNA to the crime scenes, to support the warrant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered on four counts.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of her appeal from a conviction for contravening a municipal zoning by-law regarding accessory structures.

The appeal judge had dismissed her appeal after she failed to file an abandonment of various grounds of appeal as ordered.

The moving party argued the appeal judge was biased and that the justice of the peace erred regarding the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no evidence of bias or denial of natural justice, and noting the limitation period issue was a factual finding rather than a question of law.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and uttering forged documents after defrauding her employer by forging cheques and letters of direction.

She appealed her convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after the complainant made inflammatory comments, by dismissing her Corbett application to exclude her prior fraud convictions, and by delivering an unbalanced jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the mistrial application, his Corbett ruling, or his jury instructions.

The applicant, having been convicted of human trafficking and obstruction of justice, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the primary and secondary grounds but contested the tertiary ground.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that his release would not harm public confidence in the administration of justice, given the seriousness of the offences, the weakness of the proposed grounds of appeal, his prior breach of bail conditions, and an inadequate release plan.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in persons and theft, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the definition of exploitation, prior inconsistent statements, and psychological safety, and erred by amending the indictment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the amendment caused no prejudice.

The sentence appeal was allowed on consent to credit the appellant for 14 days of pre-trial custody, reducing his sentence to 29 months and 7 days.

The appellant appealed a four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to credit twenty-three months of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal agreed that while the global sentence of four years was appropriate, the trial judge erred by not applying the conceded pre-trial custody credit.

The appeal was allowed to apply the twenty-three months credit, resulting in a net sentence of twenty-five months.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the summary conviction appeal court judge dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's conclusion was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the summary conviction appeal court judge's finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.