Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for importing heroin and conspiracy to import heroin.

At the hearing, the appellant abandoned the conviction appeal.

The sentence appeal concerned a 15-year custodial sentence (less credit for 200 days presentence custody) imposed for conspiracy to import heroin and a concurrent 12-year sentence for the substantive importation count.

The sentencing judge found the appellant was part of a broad ongoing conspiracy to import heroin on multiple occasions between October 2010 and March 2011, involving the importation of 2.5 kilograms of heroin valued between $200,000 and $750,600.

The appellant played a significant role well beyond that of a courier, recruiting and organizing multiple couriers to travel to African countries to facilitate importations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in law or principle and concluding the sentence was fit.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for aggravated sexual assault in 2013, appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board requiring his detention in the secure unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant challenged the order as unreasonable and argued the Board should have intervened to break a treatment impasse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the disposition, finding that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety based on his history of elopement, substance use, and limited understanding of sexual consent.

The court determined that detention in the secure unit was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition and that rehabilitative programming was available in that setting.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault of his patient during a medical examination.

On appeal, the appellant sought to admit fresh evidence consisting of affidavits from four independent witnesses who observed the complainant and her sister after the alleged assault.

The witnesses testified that they overheard conversations suggesting the complainant and her sister were planning to fabricate allegations against the appellant for financial gain.

The Court of Appeal found the fresh evidence met the Palmer test for admissibility, as it was reasonably capable of belief, bore on the decisive issue of credibility, and could reasonably have affected the verdict.

The court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual interference and four counts of sexual assault of his daughter between ages 11 and 14.

The four counts of sexual assault were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

He was sentenced to 18 months in addition to pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on two grounds: alleged infringement of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) due to an 11-month adjournment, and alleged errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breach and no error in the trial judge's credibility findings.

Three accused were convicted of first-degree murder following a trial involving an undercover police operation.

The appellants challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the trial; (2) the admissibility of statements made to an undercover officer; (3) jury management issues during sequestration; and (4) various trial procedure matters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that joint trial was appropriate despite cutthroat defences, the undercover operation did not violate Charter rights, and jury management issues did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud and forgery on two grounds: (1) that the verdict was unreasonable, and (2) that the Crown had the burden to disprove the defence of complicity by the complainant once an air of reality was raised.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and his treatment of the complainant's evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to accept only part of the witness's testimony and gave clear reasons for his conclusions.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal her sentence based on delay in proceedings, but this was dismissed as the trial judge had properly considered the delay argument and noted it would be relevant at parole eligibility review.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a former senior advisor to the Prime Minister on a charge of influence peddling contrary to section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent had negotiated a contract providing commissions to his girlfriend on sales of water treatment systems to First Nations communities, with the understanding that he would use his government contacts to promote the company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that there was no "matter of business relating to the government" because First Nations communities had autonomy in purchasing decisions and INAC was not involved in approving such purchases.

The Court of Appeal was divided: the majority allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, interpreting "any matter of business relating to the government" broadly to include the respondent's exercise of influence on government officials regarding the sale of products to First Nations.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's interpretation and reasoning.

Appeal from conviction for robbery, use of an imitation firearm while attempting to commit robbery, obstructing police, and breach of recognizance.

The appellant challenged his convictions for robbery and use of an imitation firearm, arguing that the evidence showed only presence and passive acquiescence in a carjacking.

The trial judge found the appellant was the third perpetrator who entered the victim's vehicle during an armed carjacking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the appellant's conduct in getting into the stolen vehicle, fleeing with the other perpetrators, and the constellation of circumstantial evidence (including cell phone records, similar clothing, and after-the-fact conduct) supported a finding of party liability under section 21 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of arson.

The accused, while highly intoxicated, left a pan of oil on a stove, causing a fire that destroyed his ex-girlfriend's house.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that arson was a specific intent offence in these circumstances and that the accused's intoxication raised a reasonable doubt about his intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The majority held that arson under s. 434 is an offence requiring subjective intent or recklessness, making it akin to a specific intent offence where evidence of intoxication is relevant.

Although the trial judge erred in treating the classification of the offence as a question of fact, the error did not affect the outcome.

The appellant, a former senior officer and director of a publicly held waste management firm, appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and his sentence of eight years' imprisonment, a US $17.9 million restitution order, and a US $15.5 million fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The convictions arose from his undisclosed involvement in copper trading transactions that diverted millions of dollars from his employer to companies he controlled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on the duty to disclose, responses to jury questions, or the overall balance of the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court affirming the fitness of the sentence and the appropriateness of the restitution and fine orders, subject only to a clarification that restitution payments would be credited against the fine to prevent double recovery.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of domestic abuse against his wife, including assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault, and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to warn the jury against propensity reasoning regarding the multiple counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the evidence on each count was admissible context for the others and that a limiting instruction would have required explaining the proper uses of the evidence, which would have operated against the appellant's interest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the global sentence was fit given the aggravating domestic context.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first-degree and second-degree murder arising from a fatal group assault in a mall parking lot.

The Court of Appeal allowed the first appellant's appeal in part, finding the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on the relationship between planning and deliberation and the mental element for murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

A conviction for second-degree murder was substituted.

The second appellant's appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in his instructions regarding the pathologist's evidence, the voluntariness of police statements, or the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for handgun possession.

They argued that their ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were breached during a police search following a taxi stop and their subsequent flight, and that the trial judge should have recused himself for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the police had grounds for an investigative detention and the searches were valid protective pat-downs.

Even if the searches exceeded permissible limits, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The bias claim was also rejected.

The sentence appeals were dismissed, as the sentences of 8 years and 5.5 years, while at the high end, revealed no error in principle given the appellants' prior records and the context of the offences.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a medium secure unit.

The appellant and amicus curiae argued the Board erred by not ordering a hybrid disposition that would allow the hospital to move him to minimum security at its discretion, as recommended by psychiatrists.

The Court of Appeal held the Board was entitled to reject the psychiatric evidence and require an early review hearing instead.

The appeal was dismissed, but the Board was ordered to convene the requested early review hearing forthwith.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application for certiorari to quash a committal for trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the appellant knew death was a likely consequence of the bodily harm inflicted.

The committal for second degree murder was quashed and a committal for manslaughter was substituted on consent.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order dismissing an application under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act and ordering the disclosure of edited police files relating to a confidential informer.

The accused, charged with weapons offences after a police stop based on an informer's tip, sought the files to challenge the search under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in finding that the edited documents would not tend to identify the informer.

Given the precise details provided by the informer, the pool of potential informers was very small, and any disclosure risked violating informer privilege.

The appellant appealed his conviction by Justice Albert J. Roy of the Superior Court of Justice.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The respondent abandoned his conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, finding no basis for a conditional sentence to be added to a penitentiary term.

The sentence was varied to two years' incarceration to be served concurrently with the larger sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in her Vetrovec warning regarding a Crown witness whose evidence partially assisted the appellant, and in her instructions on party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge clearly limited the Vetrovec caution to evidence assisting the Crown and properly instructed the jury that they could only convict if satisfied the appellant was a party to the stabbing perpetrated by his co-accused.

The appellant appealed convictions for obtaining and attempting to obtain for consideration the sexual services of a person under eighteen, and also appealed sentence.

The court upheld the admission of a prior police statement, finding it relevant and not unfairly prejudicial in a judge-alone trial.

The court dismissed an extensive fresh evidence application alleging appearance of unfairness arising from comments by a provincial court judge to defence counsel and a chambers discussion during a pre-trial motion, holding there was no interference with the defence and no prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed because the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's personal mitigation against the seriousness of sexual exploitation offences involving young persons and the need for deterrence.