Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, D.G., appealed his conviction for sexual offences against two foster children, RY and TY, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding collusion among complainants, applied uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and failed to adequately consider tainting of evidence by police questions.

The Court of Appeal found that while there were minor misapprehensions of evidence, they were peripheral and did not affect the material assessment of credibility or the similar act evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of the burden of proof, and rejected the argument of uneven scrutiny.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario adjourned a motion sine die in a criminal appeal.

The adjournment was requested and agreed upon by all counsel after the Toronto Police Service recovered additional emails that may be pertinent to the motion.

The court determined that the parties needed time to explore this new development, and any subsequent matters arising from the recovery should be addressed by the case management judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the 30-month sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on the trial judge's alleged uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, despite a minor misapprehension regarding the planning of the offence.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two years less a day, as the trial judge erred in finding an aggravating factor (methodical planning) that was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also considered the appellant's cognitive deficits and the appropriate sentencing range for similar offences.

The appellant was convicted by jury of sexual assault, attempted choking with intent to overcome resistance to sexual assault, threatening bodily harm, and three counts of breach of recognizance following an attack on a complainant in an apartment building elevator.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and attempted choking, challenging the trial judge's instructions regarding evidence the jury could consider in determining whether the assault was of a sexual character.

Specifically, the appellant objected to the jury being instructed to consider evidence of his interactions with women at a nightclub earlier that evening and evidence of his communications with a body rub service approximately 30 minutes after the assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence was probative of the appellant's state of mind and intent, and that any prejudicial effect was adequately addressed through limiting instructions.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and choking in relation to sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

He argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because the trial judge acquitted on one count while convicting on others, and that the judge scrutinized his evidence more strictly than the complainant's.

The court held that the verdicts were not irreconcilable on any realistic view of the evidence and that there was an evidentiary basis for the choking conviction apart from the acquitted incident.

The court also found no unfairness in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The United States sought the appellant's extradition to stand trial on terrorism charges for his alleged role in attempting to purchase weapons for the LTTE.

The appellant appealed his committal order and applied for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order, arguing that the terrorism provisions in the Criminal Code violated his Charter rights to freedom of expression and fundamental justice (overbreadth).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, finding that the provisions were not unconstitutionally overbroad, the test for committal was met, and the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition, arguing an abuse of process based on an alleged agreement with Hong Kong authorities that he would not be prosecuted if he left the country after being released on bail.

The extradition judge found that the appellant failed to establish the existence of such an agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extradition judge's finding of fact, concluding it was fully warranted on the evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the confirmatory evidence of a witness was not sufficiently cogent to restore the trial judge's faith in another witness's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the weight to be given to the confirmatory evidence was a matter for the trial judge and that it was not unreasonable for the trial judge to find the evidence capable of confirming the central question.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment when he appeared on the trial date with newly retained counsel, forcing him to proceed unrepresented during the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial's fairness was not compromised.

The trial judge had granted a lengthy adjournment after the Crown's case, allowing the appellant to retain counsel who then recalled a Crown witness, called defence evidence, and made submissions.

The overall conduct of the proceedings overcame any perceived unfairness from the initial denial of the adjournment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that improper cross-examination, erroneous jury instructions regarding his criminal record, and limitations on cross-examining a Crown witness undermined his credibility and rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged several errors by the trial judge and Crown counsel, including improper suggestions during cross-examination and incorrect instructions on the use of the appellant's criminal record.

However, the Court concluded that these errors did not affect the fairness of the trial or cause a miscarriage of justice, given the overwhelming Crown case and the appellant's incredible testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

He argued he had already been acquitted of the offence and that the trial judge erred in finding he had care or control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground but allowed the appeal on the second.

The Court held that the trial judge's conclusion that opening a passenger door to deposit a bag constituted a risk of danger was unreasonable, as there was no indication the appellant intended to resume driving.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed from a conviction order and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no merit in either the conviction or sentence appeal and dismissed both.

The Crown appealed a total sentence of 2.5 years imposed for serious historical offences.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit, noting that while the respondent's positive conduct over the twenty years since the offences demonstrated a low risk of re-offending, the seriousness of the crimes required a denunciatory penitentiary term.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentences were made consecutive for a total sentence of 4.5 years.

In this addendum to a previous decision, the Court of Appeal addressed the issue of pre-sentence custody credit, which had not been given by the trial judge.

The Crown conceded that the appellant was entitled to credit on a 2-for-1 basis for the ten weeks spent in pre-sentence custody.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentence and reduced the appellant's seven-year sentence by twenty weeks.

The young person appellant was convicted of sexual assault and related offences against a 13-year-old complainant.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by the complainant.

He also appealed his sentence of three months in secure custody followed by 20 months of probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also rejected the fresh evidence, concluding it did not meet the Palmer test as it would not have affected the trial's outcome.

The sentence was upheld as fit and reflecting no error in principle.

The appellant challenged assault convictions on the basis that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The court held that in-court identification evidence from the two victims, standing alone, could not support reasonable convictions.

Although evidence that the attacker was addressed by the first name Perry was capable of providing some confirmation, the Crown led no evidence explaining how the recorded licence plate number led police to the appellant.

The court held it could not fill gaps in the Crown's case and concluded the verdict did not cross the reasonableness threshold.

The appellant sought certiorari during an ongoing summary conviction trial after the trial judge refused to quash an information on the basis that there were allegedly no reasonable and probable grounds for one of the charges when the information was sworn.

The Court of Appeal held that interlocutory review in criminal proceedings is not routinely available and that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a prohibited interlocutory appeal absent compelling interests of justice.

Applying the governing framework, the court found no reason for immediate superior court intervention and held that the trial should have proceeded to completion within the ordinary criminal process.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his attempted murder conviction arising from a gang invasion of a karaoke bar, arguing that the trial judge misdirected himself on the principles governing eyewitness identification evidence.

The court held that the identification case was very strong, based on circumstantial evidence and the eyewitness identification of two persons, and found no error in the trial judge's treatment of that evidence.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, submitting that a three-year sentence for extortion should have been concurrent rather than consecutive.

The court held that, regardless of that issue, the total sentence of 18 years, taking into account two years of pre-trial custody, was entirely appropriate.

The appellant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea and sought to withdraw the plea, arguing it should not stand.

The court accepted trial counsel's affidavit that the plea was fully informed and voluntary and made in the face of an overwhelming Crown case.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence and challenged the refusal of a conditional sentence for offences involving a large quantity of counterfeit travellers cheques, forged identification, embossing plates, a criminal record, and commission of the offences while on probation.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence arising from a knife assault following a driving-related confrontation.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly consider evidentiary inconsistencies and physical evidence said to support self-defence.

The court held the inconsistencies were not significant, and although one item of physical evidence was not addressed, it would not have assisted the self-defence theory.

The court also upheld a 15-month custodial sentence followed by three years probation, finding the offence called for a deterrent sentence and that a conditional sentence was inappropriate.