Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment, willfully altering computer data, and making available intimate images without consent, stemming from a "revenge porn" incident.

He appealed his convictions on three grounds: that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof, misapprehended the evidence, and erred in concluding guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the principles of burden of proof, did not misapprehend the evidence given the strong circumstantial case, and was entitled to find the appellant's text messages constituted implied admissions.

The appellant was convicted of importing a controlled substance (cocaine) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to exclude a prior exculpatory statement under the Edgar exception, the application of the W.(D.) analysis, or the treatment of circumstantial evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the trial judge's imposition of a sentence at the low end of the established range for cocaine importation, and clarified the reconciliation of the Cunningham sentencing range with the proportionality principles emphasized in Parranto.

This is an appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) concerning an individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for uttering threats and possessing a weapon.

The ORB upheld a detention order, finding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant challenged the ORB's finding of significant threat, arguing the evidence did not support it under the Winko test, and that the Board erred by not granting a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no fault with the ORB's comprehensive analysis of the Winko test and its decision not to grant a conditional discharge given the appellant's history of substance abuse, medication non-compliance, and aggression following a previous conditional discharge.

The Crown appealed a youth sentence, arguing that the trial judge misinterpreted s. 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act by not imposing a custodial sentence despite finding it an 'exceptional case'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying that an 'exceptional case' determination under s. 39(1)(d) does not automatically mandate a custodial sentence if the sentence imposed adequately reflects societal values and the YCJA's principles.

The appellant was convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package from China.

On appeal, she raised several grounds, including errors in jury instructions on importing, circumstantial evidence, and after-the-fact conduct, as well as the unreasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on two errors: the trial judge improperly permitted the Crown to invite an adverse inference against the appellant for testifying after another defence witness, and the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's application to adduce evidence of a known third-party suspect.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Noordin Premji, appealed a 13.5-year prison sentence for heroin importing.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the appellant's advanced age (77 at sentencing) as a mitigating factor, contrary to the principles established in R. v. M. (C.A.).

Considering the appellant's significantly deteriorated health and the Crown's concession, the court performed its own sentencing analysis.

While rejecting a conditional sentence due to the seriousness of the offence, the court varied the sentence to nine years, emphasizing that this reduction was due to the highly unusual circumstances of the appellant's advanced age and severe medical problems, not a general change in sentencing approach for large-scale drug importing.

The appellant appealed his sentence for robbery, specifically challenging the calculation of presentence custody and credit for restrictive bail terms (Downes credit).

The parties jointly agreed that the sentencing judge was misinformed about the actual time spent in presentence custody and on restrictive bail conditions, leading to an incorrect credit calculation.

The Court of Appeal granted an additional 37 days of credit to remedy the error.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly assess future risk, denied him procedural fairness, and erroneously applied a presumption in favour of an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly relied on psychiatric evidence indicating the appellant posed an unacceptable future risk without medication, which he refused to take.

The court concluded the indeterminate sentence was reasonable and necessary to protect the public.

The appellant was convicted of possession of 102 grams of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to 18 months' incarceration.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors such as his rehabilitation, bail history, and drug addiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence was within the fit range.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of several offences arising from his conduct at his father's business premises, where he appeared agitated, made gestures suggesting he was armed, and a loaded handgun was subsequently found at the rear of the building.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the case was circumstantial in nature but that the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the appellant's guilt was the only reasonable conclusion on the totality of the evidence.

The applicant sought to set aside a 2008 order dismissing his conviction and sentence appeals as abandoned.

He claimed he never instructed his former appeal counsel to abandon the appeal, while counsel maintained he received clear instructions to do so.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the surrounding circumstances, including telephone records, the applicant's subsequent conduct, and counsel's vague recollection and lack of written confirmation.

The Court concluded the applicant did not instruct counsel to abandon the appeal and that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the dismissal and reinstate the appeal.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a five-year penitentiary sentence imposed after the respondent pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences against his daughter.

The court considered whether the sentencing judge misapprehended the applicable range for repeated parental sexual abuse and whether the sentence was manifestly unfit in light of prior authorities and the respondent's dated prior sexual offence record.

The court held that the sentencing judge did not treat the earlier authority as binding in a way that precluded a higher sentence and remained alive to both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Although the sentence was at the bottom of the applicable range, it was not manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against a child, arguing that the trial judge improperly assessed credibility, gave insufficient weight to inconsistencies, overemphasized demeanour, misapprehended the appellant's evidence, and allowed interpreter errors to undermine trial fairness.

The court held that appellate intervention in credibility findings is rare and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's treatment of the complainant's evidence or the appellant's testimony.

The court also held that interpreter mistakes were minor, were addressed as they arose, and did not establish trial unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 15 years.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for murder and the statutory defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by instructing the jury that the narrow statutory definition of provocation applied when considering the impact of the deceased's conduct on the appellant's state of mind for the mens rea inquiry.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of production, conspiracy to produce, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking in connection with two rural grow operations.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay evidence from a Ministry of Transportation database, admitting real estate documents protected by solicitor-client privilege, and failing to exclude search evidence obtained under invalid general warrants pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant also argued the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of the evidence and concluding that the cumulative circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the convictions.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that set aside a trial stay entered under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant argued the Crown failed to perfect its appeal, the appeal judge improperly raised a new ground of appeal, and the appeal judge erred in the s. 11(b) analysis.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the appeal judge's procedural decisions were discretionary and caused no prejudice.

The Court also agreed with the s. 11(b) analysis, noting that delay was an integral part of the defence tactics.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest because the informant did not reveal the source of their information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly assessed the totality of the circumstances and that the informant's source is only one factor in that analysis.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the imposition of consecutive sentences totaling 14 months was fit and revealed no error in principle.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for various drug-related offences.

The Crown's case relied entirely on intercepted communications and derived evidence.

The appellants argued the wiretap authorizations violated s. 8 of the Charter due to lack of reasonable and probable grounds and failure to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the authorizations were properly issued and the evidence supported the convictions.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, varying one appellant's intermittent sentence to time served due to post-sentencing progress, and adjusting the other's intermittent sentence schedule to accommodate employment.

The appellant was convicted of theft and possession of stolen property after $120,000 went missing from an armoured car driven by her common-law partner.

She appealed her conviction and 12-month sentence, arguing errors in the jury charge regarding an unsavoury witness, the defence theory, reasonable doubt, and out-of-court statements, as well as seeking a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the offences involved a serious breach of trust and a conditional sentence would be unfit.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching on five grounds, including unreasonable verdict, improper reliance on demeanour, reversal of the burden of proof through motive-to-fabricate reasoning, improper use of prior consistent statements, and refusal of a further sentencing adjournment.

The court held that the trial judge was alive to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, properly assessed them, and did not improperly rely on demeanour or prior statements.

It further found no reversal of the burden of proof and no basis to interfere with the refusal of an additional adjournment.

The appeal was dismissed.