Michael G. Quigley

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude his prior criminal record from evidence should he choose to testify.

The accused intended to argue self-defence and accident.

The court balanced the probative value of the record against the prejudicial effect of propensity reasoning.

The court excluded the accused's youth offences to prevent undue prejudice but permitted the Crown to cross-examine the accused on his adult convictions for assault, theft, drug trafficking, and dangerous driving, with a limiting instruction to the jury.

During jury selection, a sworn juror advised the court that he was an electrician foreman and his absence would prevent apprentices from working, causing hardship.

The court considered whether the juror could be discharged and replaced before the trial commenced.

Applying section 644(1.1) of the Criminal Code, the court found the juror's circumstances constituted 'other reasonable cause' and discharged him, allowing for a replacement to be selected from the panel.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case, arguing there was no evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The defence contended that a 1.5-minute gap in the circumstantial evidence meant the jury would have to speculate on intent.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural consequences of their actions.

The court found that firing a shotgun at close range into the victim's lower torso provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation for a properly instructed jury to infer the intent required for murder.

The appellants, owners of waterfront properties on Nottawasaga Bay, appealed a decision of the Coordinator in the Office of the Surveyor General confirming a municipal resurvey under the Surveys Act.

The resurvey extended two road allowances straight across accreted lands to the water's edge, effectively cutting off the appellants' water access.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, finding that the Coordinator's decision was unreasonable.

The Court held that the Surveys Act does not displace the common law principles of accretion, which dictate that accreted lands attach to riparian properties and should be equitably allocated.

The matter was remitted for a trial of an issue regarding whether the survey should be confirmed with or without amendments.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario that summarily dismissed his application alleging discrimination on the basis of race, colour, and reprisal by a retail store.

The Tribunal had found no reasonable prospect of success because the applicant failed to point to evidence establishing a link between the store's actions and his race or colour.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's decisions were transparent, intelligible, and fell within the range of reasonable outcomes.

The applicant, the Mayor of the Township of Springwater, sought judicial review of a decision by the Township's Compliance Audit Committee to order a second, 'forensic' audit of his election campaign finances after finding the first audit unsatisfactory.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that the court should not intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings absent exceptional circumstances.

The court found that the Committee's decision to order a second audit involved the interpretation of its home statute and was not a true question of jurisdiction.

The court also limited the Committee's standing on the judicial review to jurisdictional issues and confirmed that the Committee's term had not expired.

The appellant, a personal injury lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court action against the respondent, another lawyer who took over his client's file.

The respondent had given a personal undertaking to protect the appellant's account but later revoked it on the client's instructions.

The Divisional Court found that while the trial judge erred in concluding the undertaking ended when the appellant's separate action against the client was dismissed, the trial judge correctly held that the claim against the respondent was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant City sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award that reduced the penalty imposed on two firefighters for off-duty impaired driving convictions.

The firefighters had lost their driver's licenses and were demoted for one year by the City.

The arbitrator substituted a two-day suspension, finding the demotions were disciplinary and the firefighters could still perform their core duties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's exercise of discretion to substitute the penalty was reasonable and fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate's appeal decision regarding a catastrophic impairment determination under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Delegate had overturned an arbitrator's finding that combining impairment ratings for a physical brain injury and a separate psychological disorder constituted impermissible 'double counting'.

The Delegate also remitted the issue of medication impairment back to arbitration and upheld a 4% rating for scarring.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, finding the Delegate's interpretation of the AMA Guides and the Schedule fell within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The tenant appealed a consent order from the Landlord and Tenant Board that terminated her tenancy for non-payment of rent.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Divisional Court found that the appeal did not raise any question of law and was an attempt to resile from a consent order.

The court quashed the appeal but granted the tenant a brief grace period to pay the arrears and costs to avoid eviction.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a motion judge's dismissal of its motion to strike an application brought by a convicted offender seeking post-conviction disclosure of police records.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge's one-paragraph endorsement lacked sufficient reasons regarding the plain and obvious test, standing, and prematurity, preventing meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was granted, the decision quashed, and the matter remitted to a different judge of the Superior Court for a fresh hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision ordering her to pay the respondent physiotherapy clinic for unpaid treatment accounts out of her motor vehicle accident settlement.

The appellant argued the matter should have proceeded as an action rather than an application, challenged the factual findings, and argued the interest rate violated the Interest Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the procedural and interest arguments were improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

Furthermore, the court found no material facts in dispute and held that the Interest Act did not apply because the interest rate was governed by the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from orders arising from summary judgment motions, while also commencing appeals in the Court of Appeal.

Noting potential jurisdictional issues regarding whether the underlying orders were final or interlocutory, the Divisional Court adjourned the motions for leave to appeal and ordered the parties to provide supplementary written submissions on the jurisdictional question.

The appellant father appealed an order denying his application for periodic or lump sum dependant support for his minor daughter from her deceased mother's estate under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The mother had left life insurance proceeds in a bare trust for the daughter.

The application judge found the father's budget included expenses not attributable to the child and ordered funds paid into court to be administered by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's consideration of the statutory factors, his assessment of the evidence, or his decision to utilize the Minor's Fund Program to manage the support payments.

The appellant appealed an order granting the respondent summary judgment, which dismissed his motion to change a previous child support order.

The appellant argued the previous order did not comply with the Child Support Guidelines.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the original judge was entitled to make an order based on Minutes of Settlement even if it deviated from the Guidelines, provided reasonable arrangements were made.

To vary the order, the appellant had to show a material change in circumstances, which he failed to do.

The appellant landlord brought a motion to vary a single judge's order that had dismissed her four ongoing proceedings against the respondent tenants.

The single judge had dismissed the proceedings because the appellant was absent, her husband was unauthorized to act as her agent, and the proceedings were improperly perfected.

On the motion to vary, the appellant was represented by counsel, curing the representation defect.

The Divisional Court granted the motion in part, permitting the statutory appeal to continue while dismissing the other duplicative proceedings.

The offender, a 26-year-old security guard with no prior record, was convicted of stealing 46 computers valued at $79,145 from a bank.

The Crown sought 6-8 months imprisonment, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court noted the aggravating factor of breach of trust but emphasized the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and late expression of remorse.

Finding that incarceration would not serve a meaningful public purpose and that a conditional sentence was legally unavailable, the court imposed a suspended sentence with 3 years of probation, 250 hours of community service, and a full restitution order of $79,145.

The appellant tenant appealed an eviction order issued by the Landlord and Tenant Board for rent arrears.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider a previous order granting her a rent abatement and improperly proceeded in her absence due to a medical emergency.

On consent of the parties, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board committed a reversible error by failing to account for the prior abatement order.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a fresh hearing to be held concurrently with a new eviction application filed by the property's subsequent owner.

The appellants appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision approving official plan and zoning by-law amendments for a proposed limestone quarry.

The appellants argued the OMB breached procedural fairness during a partial re-hearing and misapprehended evidence regarding at-risk turtles and noise levels.

The Divisional Court dismissed these grounds, finding the appellants had consented to the re-hearing process and that the OMB's evidentiary findings were reasonable.

However, the Court granted the appeal on one issue, finding the OMB erred in law by proposing noise mitigation measures that might require access to private lands without evidence of feasibility, and remitted that issue to the OMB.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his complaint of age discrimination against his former employer.

The applicant alleged that his termination at age 46 was discriminatory and that the Tribunal made errors of fact and law in its findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no errors of law and holding that the Tribunal's factual findings regarding the applicant's performance and the employer's business reasons for termination were reasonable and entitled to deference.